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I. INTRODUCTION

"Any Mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in
Mankinde; And therefore never send to know for whom the
bell tolls; It tolls for thee."**
*Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. The author thanks David
Barnes, Daan Braveman, Guido Calabresi, Richard Goldsmith and Daniel Polsby for their time
spent reviewing a lengthy earlier draft of this article and for their insightful comments thereon.
**J. DONNE, Seventh Meditation, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 87 (1975).
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Tort law has significantly relaxed restrictions on recovery for
psychic injury in the past fifteen years.1 Persons psychically injured
directly by another's culpable conduct 2 may now more easily recover
damages.' Recovery for psychic injury caused indirectly through witnessing physical injury to a third person has also become widely
permitted.4
This widespread judicial relaxation of restrictions on recovery for
psychic injury tends to obscure the restrictiveness of the rules which
remain. Only a handful of states permit a psychically injured plaintiff
to recover damages when no physical harm accompanies the plaintiff's psychic harm.5 Every jurisdiction denies recovery in at least
some instances of foreseeably caused psychic injury where that injury
results from another person's physical injury caused by the defendant's culpable conduct.6 Nowhere does a plaintiff who has suffered
psychic injury have the relatively barrier-free path to recovery which
a physically injured person has.
The existing rules restricting recovery for psychic injury disserve
generally
accepted goals of tort law. Recently, in Ohio and in England, 7 new rules have burst forth which may be harbingers of a new

1. See infra notes 24-38 and accompanying text. As used in this article, psychic injury
refers to harm which is generally considered to be harm to one's feelings or mind. "Psychic
injury" encompasses harms referred to in cases and literature as mental or emotional distress,
but does not suggest the intensity of that harm. The term includes feelings of grief. "Normal"
grief reactions apparently are not included within the sorts of psychic injury for which courts in
Great Britain and, perhaps, California permit recovery. See Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59,
72, 562 P.2d 1022, 1028, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869 (1977); Teff, Liability for Negligently Inflicted
Nervous Shock, 99 LAW Q. REV. 100, 105 (1983).
2. As used in this article, culpable conduct refers to conduct for which a defendant would
be held liable under either negligence or strict liability theories. Most courts would not treat
psychic injury differently in warranty or strict liability cases than in negligence cases. See, e.g.,
Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 (1977); Walker v.
Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1982). Contra Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 443, 428 N.E.2d 596, 599 (1981), aff'd and remanded, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457
N.E.2d 1 (1983).
3. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
4. Since the seminal decision of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72 (1968), many jurisdictions have permitted some form of bystander recovery. In the past five
years, a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue have permitted some recovery. See infra
notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. By referring to the distinction traditionally drawn by courts between physical and psychic harm, I do not mean to adopt that distinction as reflecting reality. There are considerable physical aspects to what are commonly considered psychic injuries and vice-versa. See infra notes 281-92 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. Recovery in such instances is often
called "bystander" recovery. See, e.g., Comment, Bystander Recovery for Neligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress in Iowa: Implementing an Optimal Balance, 67 IOWA L. REV. 333 (1982).
7. See Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983); McLoughlin v. O'Brian,
[1982] 2 All E.R. 298 (H.L.). Both cases permit recovery for psychic injuries foreseeably resulting from a defendant's negligent direct physical injury of another person.
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position on the law governing psychic injury, one which will more
fully heed John Donne's tolling bell, so as to acknowledge man's involvement in mankind. The new position favors replacing the existing
restrictive rules with a full recovery rule. This approach permits a
plaintiff to recover for psychic injury proximately caused by a defendant's culpable conduct under the same circumstances permitting recovery for physical injury." This full recovery rule would serve the
goal of reducing overall accident costs more satisfactorily than do the
present liability rules. Those rules send potential tortfeasors a clear
message that they can ignore a significant part of the psychic costs of
his culpable behavior. Moreover, the full recovery rule would respect
a victim's entitlement to freedom from invasion of their psychic wellbeing. In addition, the full recovery rule, unlike the present restrictive rules, would not deny compensation to seriously injured persons,
nor would it contradict generally accepted principles of corrective
justice.
This article examines the relationship between the existing restrictive rules and the relevant goals of tort law. In so doing, it discusses why the reasons advanced for those restrictions do not justify
their retention.9 Initially, the article briefly explains the existing rules
restricting tort liability for psychic injury. The article then outlines
the basis for a person's entitlement to some form of psychic integrity.
The focus then shifts to an analysis of the failure of the present restrictive rules and the likely success of the full recovery rule in reducing overall accident costs. The article concludes by examining how
the full recovery rule more satisfactorily achieves compensation and
justice goals.
8. The "full recovery" rule for psychic injury will, throughout this article, mean recovery
by a plaintiff for psychic injury which was a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct. See,
e.g., Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, ,
451 N.E.2d 759, 767 (1983) (proximate cause
equated with reasonable foreseeability). In jurisdictions which consider factors other than foreseeability in determining duty/proximate cause in physical injury cases, the full recovery rule
for psychic injury would include those additional factors as well.
This article's conclusion that courts should adopt the full recovery rule is not entirely unequivocal. That equivocation arises with respect to recovery for trivial psychic injury. This article will suggest a slight modification of the full recovery rule which a jurisdiction may adopt if
the practical problems of the rule in the instances of trivial injuries become too great.
9. The change to a full recovery rule would not eliminate all the problems which accompany tort liability for psychic injury. Many important problems are those associated with tort
recovery generally. This article will not attempt to deal directly with those more general difficulties inherent in the present system of common law tort recovery. Those difficulties are considerable and might well lead to the conclusion that major modifications should be made in the
system. See, e.g., Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L. REv. 467 (1976); Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and
Government Regulation, 33 VAtN. L. REv. 1281 (1980). Those modifications, if desirable, should
be made with respect to all injuries, not just psychic ones.
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THE EXISTING RESTRICTIVE RULES

The present rules restrict recovery for psychic injury in two important ways. First, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions refuse
to permit a person injured psychically by another's conduct to recover for his psychic injury unless some sort of physical injury ensues. 10 Second, in cases where the defendant's physical injury of a
third party caused the plaintiff's psychic injury, the so-called bystander cases, many jurisdictions deny the plaintiff recovery for his
psychic injury unless he was in the zone of physical danger created
by the defendant's culpable conduct." While several jurisdictions
have relaxed the zone of danger rule, they continue to apply requirements of proximity in time, place, and relationship which create significant barriers to bystander recovery for reasonably foreseeable
psychic injury.' 2
Although the potential harshness of the ensuing physical injury
requirement" has been moderated in many jurisdictions by a liberal
interpretation of what constitutes a physical injury, the rule continues to pose some significant obstacles to recovery in some situations.
At the turn of the century a plaintiff could not recover for psychic
injury unless he could also prove some physical impact. 14 Before
adoption of the ensuing physical injury rule, the impact rule was circumvented by finding the requisite impact in trifles, such as dust in
10. See Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D.R.I. 1983); Paugh v. Hanks, 6
Ohio St. 3d 72, -, 451 N.E.2d 759, 764 (1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; Note, Administering the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Synthesis, 4 CARDozo L. REV. 487, 487-89 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Administering]; Note, The Death of the Ensuing Physical Injury Rule: Validating
Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213, 214-15 (1981).
11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, §§ 313(2), 436(3); Note, Duty, Foreseeability, and the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 33 ME. L. REV. 303, 305 (1981);
Comment, Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Iowa: Implementing an Optimal Balance, 67 IOWA L. REV. 333, 338 (1982).

12.
13.
mitting
14.

See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
This rule requires some physical manifestation of plaintiff's psychic injury before perrecovery. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (no recovery

for injuries arising solely from negligently caused emotional distress), overruled Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (absence of physical impact does not preclude

recovery for physical harm resulting from negligently inflicted emotional distress); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (no recovery for injuries resulting therefrom),

overruled Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, (1961) (recovery
permitted for injuries resulting from negligently induced fright); Victorian Rys. Comm. v. Coultas, [1888] 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C.); Note, Administering,supra note 10, at 492-97. The recognition that psychic injury should be compensated in some instances marked a change from the
early hostility of some courts to all such injuries. Early American decisions restricted recovery
for intangible loss to plaintiffs who suffered physical pain and suffering. Pearson, Liability to
Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm - A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 486-87 (1982).
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one's eyes.15 The courts have used a similar technique to facilitate
recovery for psychic injury under the ensuing physical injury rule.16
Several courts have permitted recovery for psychic injury when any
physical injury, no matter how trivial, has resulted.17 Others have
blurred the requirement, demanding only physical or objective "manifestations" of the psychic injury."' More recently, a few courts have
explicitly abandoned the ensuing physical injury rule to permit recovery for serious psychic injury alone.1 9
Except in jurisdictions which have either abandoned or emasculated the rule, the ensuing physical injury rule regularly prevents recovery by psychically injured persons. There are no statistics on the
numbers of persons with genuine psychic injury who either do not
sue or lose in court because they cannot show sufficient psychic injury. Nonetheless, enough cases annually reach the highest state
courts, in the face of relatively clear ensuing physical injury requirements, to suggest such situations are not rare.20 The Restatement of
Torts suggests the rule's substantial exclusionary effect by emphasizing that "transitory, non-recurring physical phenomena.. . such as
dizziness, vomiting and the like" will not be regarded as sufficient
physical injury to permit a plaintiff to recover for his underlying
emotional disturbance.2 1 In fact, the requirement has operated recently to bar the cancerphobia and other psychic injury claims of
large numbers of diethylstilbestrol (DES) mothers and daughters. 2
15.

Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906). See also W. PRos-

SER, THE LAW OF TORTS 331 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Administering, supra note 10, at 496 & n.54.

16. A few jurisdictions retain the impact rule. See Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540,
437 N.E.2d 171, 176 n.6 (1982); Millard, Intentionally and Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, 15 IND. L. REv. 617, 618 & n.12 (1982); Pearson, supra note 14, at 488 n.68.
17. See, e.g., Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500-01, 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (1979); Corrigal
v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wash. 2d 959, 962, 577 P.2d 580, 582 (1978). Cf. Molien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-29, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 83738 (1980) ("unqualified requirement of physical injury is no longer justifiable"). In England,
where the same type of physical injury requirement exists, it has been interpreted to require "a
recognizable psychiatric illness." Hinz v. Berry, [1970] 2 Q.B. 40.
18. See Note, Administering, supra note 10, at 503 & n.101.
19. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509, reh'g denied, 52 Hawaii 283, P.2d (1970); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Schultz v.
Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983). Rodrigues may not be the final
word in Hawaii. See Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Hawaii 464, 468, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982).
20. See, e.g., Morgan v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1102, 1115 n.20 (D.C.), reh'g en
banc granted, 452 A.2d 1197 (1982), aff'd en banc, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983); District of Columbia v. Smith, 436 A.2d 1294 (D.C. 1981); Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho
95, 100, 625 P.2d 1098, 1103 (1981); Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Ctr., 233 Kan. 267, 662
P.2d 1214 (Kan. 1983); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, _,
437 N.E.2d 171, 181
(1982); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605 (1981).
21. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 10, § 436A, comment c.
22. See Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 F. Supp. 920, 924 (D.R.I. 1983); Payton v. Abbott
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The current rules governing bystander recovery for psychic injury
have an even greater restrictive impact. Bystander cases typically2"
involve a plaintiff whose psychic injuries are apparent and severe,
with manifest physical symptoms. These injuries are usually the result of serious physical injury to a member of plaintiff's family
caused by the defendant's culpable conduct. Until 1968, no plaintiff
could recover for psychic injury unless personally threatened physically by the defendant's conduct. Then, in Dillon v. Legg,2 4 the California Supreme Court lowered the bystander barrier by permitting a
mother to recover for psychic injury caused by witnessing her daughter's negligently caused death. According to the Dillon court, the
chief element in determining a defendant's liability for psychic injury
to a bystander was the foreseeability of that injury.2" The court set
forth three factors - plaintiff's proximity to the accident, the directness of her observance of the accident, and the closeness of her
relationship to the accident victim - as guidelines for future courts
to determine whether the psychic injury was reasonably foreseeable.2 6
The Hawaii Supreme Court quickly picked up on the Dillon approach and permitted recovery for mental distress where that injury
was "a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act."27
The promise of Dillon constitutes the premise of this article: recovery for psychic injury foreseeably caused by defendant's culpable
conduct should be allowed. That promise was not fulfilled. In a series
of bystander cases culminating in Justus v. Atchison"5 and
Labs., 386 Mass. 540,
-, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982). See also Note, Emotional Distress
Damage for Cancerphobia:A Case for the DES Daughter, 14 PAC. L.J. 1215, 1235 (1983) (emotional distress of DES daughter is foreseeable and legally compensable). The requirement has
also been applied in cases involving plaintiffs who allege claims of cancerphobia resulting from
exposure to toxic wastes. See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Township, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d
184 (1983).
23. Almost all the recent cases in the highest state courts denying bystander recovery
have involved as plaintiff an immediate family member of the person directly injured by the
defendant's conduct. But see Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503
(1983) (plaintiff living with injured person for 11 years has cause of action for loss of
consortium).
24. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
25. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
26. Id., 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
27. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 408, 520 P.2d 758, 764-65 (1974); Rodrigues v. State,
52 Hawaii 156, 174, 472 P.2d 509. 521 (1970). The Dillon-Long approach was hardly racial.
Both courts simply adopted the foreseeability approach used by most courts to determine liability in physical injury cases. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99,
reh'g denied, 249 N.Y. 511, 164 N.E. 564 (1928); W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 150; Pearson,
supra note 14, at 477.
28. 19 Cal. App. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977). Plaintiffs were fathers
who suffered emotional shock after watching the negligent delivery of their still-born infants.
Recovery was denied because their injury did not ripen into disabling emotional shock until
after a doctor informed them of the infants' death. Thus plaintiffs did not meet the second
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Hathaway v. Superior Court,29 the California courts abandoned reasonable foreseeability as the liability determining principle. Instead,
the three factors listed in Dillon as guidelines for determining the
foreseeability of a plaintiff's psychic injury were transformed into
substantive legal limitations on a defendant's liability.3 0 Hawaii similarly retreated from a reasonable foreseeability standard."'
With the reasonable foreseeability standard emasculated, the Dillon approach, which had received no immediate warm welcome in jurisdictions east of California,3 2 has begun to sweep the nation. In permitting recovery for at least some psychic injuries to bystanders
outside the zone of physical danger, Dillon is rapidly becoming the
majority rule.3 3 However, the new Dillon jurisdictions generally ac"guideline" of Dillon, that their injury result from "a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident ...
" Id. at 582, 565
P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
29. 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980). Plaintiffs were parents who discovered their six-year-old son lying in a puddle of water gagging and spitting up within minutes
after the child had touched an electrically charged evaporative cooler. The.parents watched him
in a dying state as efforts to revive him failed. They were denied recovery because they also did
not meet the second Dillon "guideline," in that they had not actually observed the injurycausing event. Id. at 732, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
30. See Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging
From Chaos, 33 HAsTIrGs L.J. 583, 589-601 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Nolan].
31. In Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975), the
Hawaii Supreme Court imposed a Dillon guideline to foreclose consideration of whether plaintiff's psychic injury was reasonably foreseeable. The plaintiff died from a heart attack upon
learning by telephone of the death of his daughter and granddaughter in a traffic accident
negligently caused by the defendant. Because the plaintiff lived in California, rather than in
Hawaii where the accident occurred, the court concluded his psychic injury could not be reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law. Id. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676. Kelley apparently limits a
defendant's liability for even foreseeable psychic harm by adding a requirement that plaintiff
be a "reasonable distance from the scene of the accident." Id. See Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime", 1
U. HAwAII L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1979). The Kelley court's statement that plaintiffs injury was not
reasonably foreseeable seems contrary to common sense, given the close family relationships
involved. In light of that detour from common sense and the court's emphasis on the need to
set limits on liability, the conclusion seem inescapable that the court was moving away from a
strict reasonable foreseeability test.
32. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTs 421 (6th
ed. 1976). Indeed Dillon's chief immediate contribution may have been inspiring Chief Judge
Breitel's articulate opinion rejecting bystander recovery in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609,
249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). Tobin is generally regarded as the leading decision
opposing recovery for psychic injury by a bystander outside the zone of physical danger.
33. See, e.g., Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201 (D.S.D. 1983); Barnhill v. Davis,
300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982);
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Versland v. Caron Transport,
671 P.2d 583, 586-87 (Mont. 1983); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521
(1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643,
338 A.2d 524 (1975); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Hunsley v.
Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). The author's impression, gathered from com-
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cept Dillon's three "guidelines" as either substantive prerequisites to
bystander recovery or their functional equivalent.3 4 Accordingly, current bystander recovery rules either completely bar recovery to plaintiffs outside the zone of physical danger 35 or permit recovery only if
the plaintiff contemporaneously observed or was physically proximate to an accident involving a close relative.3 6 No jurisdiction accepts the full recovery rule."
Thus the existing rules - the ensuing physical injury rule and
the bystander recovery rule - deny tort recovery to substantial
numbers of persons with serious psychic injuries proximately caused
by another's culpable conduct.38 The full recovery rule proposed in
this article would greatly reduce the number of such uncompensated
persons. This rule also would more thoroughly protect individuals'
entitlements to psychic well-being, more effectively reduce overall accident costs, and more satisfactorily serve fairness goals than existing
rules.
puter-assisted research for this article, is that a majority of courts which are reaching the issue
are accepting Dillon in some form. This is reinforced by similar conclusions in recent law review articles. See Pearson, supra note 14, at 478 ("most courts"); Note, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: A Proposalfor a Recognized Tort Action, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 557, 572-76
(1984); Comment, supra note 11, at 340 ("about one-half of the jurisdictions ... have accepted
the Dillon view").
34. See cases cited supra note 33. See also Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass.
327, -, 450 N.E.2d 581, 589 (1983) (reasonable foreseeability test did not mean court should
look only at what is "logically reasonably foreseeable"; mother who suffered severe mental
anguish denied recovery from defendant who culpably caused death of her son).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, §§ 313(2), 436(3); Comment, supra note
11, at 341 & n.68.
36. See cases cited supra notes 33-34.
37. See Pearson, supra note 14, at 497-98. Two recent decisions again hold out the original Dillon promise that bystander recovery would be determined by asking whether plaintiff's
psychic injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's neligence: Paugh v. Hanks,
6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983); McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1982] 2 All E.R. 298 (H.L.).
In Paugh, the court emphasized that the Dillon factors requiring proximity of place, time and
relationship were not fixed guidelines, but rather considerations to aid in determining whether
the psychic injury was reasonably foreseeable. 6 Ohio St. 3d at -,
451 N.E.2d at 764, 766.
Paugh permits a plaintiff to recover for psychic injury alone. Id. at __,
451 N.E.2d at 765. It
therefore seems to come the closest of any American jurisdiction to the full recovery rule. However, Paugh requires that the plaintiff's emotional distress be "serious" before he can recover.
Id. at at -, 451 N.E.2d at 765. One must await the Ohio courts' subsequent applications of
Paugh before stating confidently that one American jurisdiction has adopted a reasonable foreseeability rule in bystander cases. While Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096
(1976) is considered by some also to adopt that rule, see Pearson, supra note 14, at 497 & n.126,
the Hunsley opinion is far too indefinite on that point to permit such a conclusion.
38. See, e.g., Saunders v. Air 'Florida, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1983); Oberreuter v.
Orion Indus., Inc., 342 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1984); Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass.
327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983); Miles v. Tabor, 387 Mass. 783, 443 N.E.2d 1302 (1982); Nutter v.
Frisbie Mem. Hosp., 474 A.2d 584 (N.H. 1984).
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III.

ENTITLEMENT TO PSYCHIC WELL-BEING

The underlying premise of this article is that persons have an entitlement to psychic well-being, i.e., the right to be free from invasions by others which harm them psychically.39 For present purposes,
such an entitlement exists when tort law will protect interests in
psychic well-being from the culpable invasions of others.40 There are
two general approaches to determine whether an entitlement exists.
One, the "instrumental" approach, begins with envisioning the desirable society and then awarding the entitlements most likely to create
that society. The other, the "original" approach, begins with some
preexisting authority and awards entitlements as that authority
would have awarded (or did award) them. The most notable proponents of the instrumental position, Calabresi and Melamed, focus on
whether protecting a particular interest would serve societal goals of
41
efficiency, wealth distribution and other justice considerations.
39. This article focuses at this early stage on the issue of one's entitlement to psychic
well-being for several reasons. First, a discussion of the merits and demerits of particular rules
governing recovery for psychic injury might seem meaningless to the reader who believes that
persons generally have no right to be free from invasions of their psychic well-being. See infra
note 40. Second, the discussion herein demonstrates that approaches to the societal decision to
entitle other than the one taken throughout most of this paper also lead to the conclusion that
people have a right to psychic well-being. Finally, this preliminary discussion clarifies the link
between the decision to entitle a person to psychic well-being and the factors which are discussed later in the article.
40. For example, one has an entitlement to his house when tort law will award him damages when another's culpable conduct harms the house. In this article, we are concerned only
with the protection of entitlements by liability rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089,
1092 (1972).
Without an entitlement to something, one cannot recover tort damages for harm to itAssume that A brings an action for assault and battery against B. A is not entitled to
recover - no matter how close the causal connection, no matter how deliberate the harm
if A has no proprietary claim to his own person. If the body of an individual is
unowned, then what A wants to describe as an assault and battery is simply a sequence
of physical events initiated by B, but indistinguishable legally from B's kicking a clod of
unclaimed dirt.
Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. LEGAL STU.
49, 50 (1979). See also Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 100, 439 A.2d 110, 122 (1981); Steiner,
Economics, Morality and the Law of Torts, 26 U. TonoNTo L.J. 227, 251-52 (1976) (discussing
entitlements in connection with award of damages or granting of injunction). Some courts have
permitted recovery for harm caused by a defendant's fault, regardless of the injured party's
entitlement to what was harmed. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974)
(commercial fishermen can recover lost profits for harm caused to ocean fishing by defendant's
negligent oil spill); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Iowa 1981) (children have cause of
action for loss of parental consortium). Both decisions can be plausibly explained as having
taken what this section terms an "instrumental" approach to determining the existence of an
entitlement.
41. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 40, at 1093-1105; Posner, Esptein's Tort
Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 473-74 (1979).
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They allot entitlements on the basis of increasing desirable societal
characteristics.4 2 Most originalists, on the other hand, look to what
the founders of the society would have agreed were entitlements. 3
Still other originalists, notably Professor Epstein, look to ordinary
linguistic usage as evidence of generally established entitlements.4"
Under either the instrumental or the original approach, the law
would recognize one's right to be free from culpable invasions of his
psychic well-being.
The originalists would recognize psychic well-being as an entitlement regardless of their different perspectives. Some look first to
what consensus a gathering of all persons forming a society would
reach while still ignorant about their future status in that society.4 5
These persons would be unlikely to agree to give others the right to
cause them significant psychic injury. 46 Psychic well-being is the core
of what is important to human existence and is too important to the
individual to surrender. Possessions have significance only insofar as
they contribute to an individual's pleasure or satisfaction, which are
elements of psychic well-being. Similarly, avoiding physical injury
and death are important because they mean a loss of satisfaction,
pleasure, and enjoyment of life, all aspects of psychic well-being.
One might argue to those in the original position that they could
protect themselves against most significant psychic injuries simply by
entitling themselves to their own bodily integrity and physical possessions. The quid pro quo for not granting an across the board entitlement to psychic well-being would be a wealthier society in which
most persons could buy as much protection from psychic injury as
could be provided by the broader entitlement, and have money to
buy a few other things as well. This seemingly convincing argument
against a broad entitlement to psychic well-being would almost certainly be rejected. First, in choosing specific entitlements to such
things as bodily integrity and possessions, the original positioners
42. See, e.g., G.

CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND THE LAW,

ch. 4 (Syracuse

Univ. Press 1985) (forthcoming). Professor Calabresi graciously permitted this author to review
the draft of this chapter of his forthcoming book which originated as the third Abrams Lecture
series at Syracuse University. That draft chapter is on file with this author.

43. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY

OF JUSTICE

11-12 (1971); Michelman, Foreword:On Pro-

tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 15-16 (1969).
44. See Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 499-500 (1979).
45. This is Rawls' original agreement, akin to the Rousseauian social contract. See J.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 11-12.
46. If a person does not have an entitlement to psychic well-being, others have an entitlement to invade that well-being, assuming that the law will protect all persons from the use of
physical force against them of the sort which would be necessary to thwart an invasion of one's
psychic well-being. I use the phrase "significant psychic injury" here because, as later discussion will make clear, the original agreers might conclude differently about insignificant psychic
injuries. See infra text accompanying notes 57-63.
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would at least include an entitlement to important relationships with
other people.47 Harm to such relationships would undoubtedly be
perceived as a greater threat to psychic well-being than harm to possessions and, perhaps, harm to one's body. Second, persons ignorant
of their place and wealth in the coming society would be particularly
averse to risking something as important as psychic well-being. 48
Thus, society's original members are not likely to create an entitlement structure that might later leave them unable to buy protection
against a significant risk of others invading their psychic well-being.49
Accordingly, persons in the original position would have probably
agreed to give each person an entitlement to psychic well-being.
The same result would follow from the Epstein originalist position
which regards ordinary language as evidence of entitlement. Assuming entitlement to one's physical integrity to be a given, 0 one can
infer that the psychically injured plaintiff's cry "you injured me" and
the relative importance of psychic well-being discussed above51 would
convince Epstein to acknowledge the entitlement to psychic wellbeing.
The instrumental approach to entitlements leads to the same conclusion. Reduction of overall accident costs, victim compensation,
and justice considerations discussed in subsequent sections encompass most of the societal goals which the instrumentalists consider
47. An entitlement to such relationships would be in effect the same as having legal protection for a bystander's psychic injury. Tort protection of one's interest in important relationships would mean the award of damages for the emotional harm which would most often be the
prime injury resulting from damage to the relationship.
48. See, e.g., G. CALABREsi & P. BoBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 90-91 (1978). By saying one is
entitled to psychic well-being, I do not imply that one has a right to a particular level of
psychic well-being, any more than a person with the generally acknowledged entitlement to
physical well-being would have a right to a particular level of health, strength or beauty. The
psychic well-being entitlement is, for tort purposes, the right to be free from culpable invasions
of one's existing level of psychic well-being.
49. If the risk of such invasion was not significant, once specific entitlements such as that
to bodily integrity and to possessions were established, the original positioners might agree to
pass up the broader entitlement to psychic well-being, taking the good chance they would share
in the resulting general wealth increase in society arising from not having the broad entitlement. It seems unlikely, however, that mere elimination of tort liability for insignificant risks
would greatly increase societal wealth. In the situation hypothesized, removal of an insignificant
liability risk is all that would result from rejection of the broader entitlement.
Moreover, the fact that the original positioners would be generally wealthier by more than
the value of the psychic well-being entitlement they passed up would not necessarily enable
them to buy protection of psychic well-being once they were in a functioning society. The
transaction costs associated with each buyout of others' limited rights to invade one's psychic
well-being would be very high. As a result, the individual who bought such protection, if it
could in fact be bought, would probably then find himself considerably less wealthy than if he
had opted for the broad entitlement in the first place.
50. See Epstein, supra note 44, at 499-500.
51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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significant in determining tort entitlements.2 As those discussions
will show, these goals would be well served by recognizing an entitlement to psychic well-being. One entitlement-determinative goal deserves special mention at this point, however, because it is not
treated in the subsequent sections and has a special importance to
the issue of entitlement. That is the goal of a desirable distribution of
wealth and important goods in society. A widely shared preference
for a particular wealth distribution would influence a decision to provide an entitlement for psychic well-being.
Whether there are any such widely held distributional preferences
relevant to entitlement to psychic well-being is not clear.5 4 Preferences which arguably do exist favor recognition of the entitlement.
The first such preference favors greater equality in wealth distribution. 5 Realistically, the class of persons suffering psychic injuries is
indeed likely to be poorer than the class of invaders. Aggressiveness,
competitiveness and tenaciousness have long been heralded as traits
helpful in attaining material wealth in this society. Persons with such
traits are probably less susceptible to psychic injury than persons
without them. The latter, in turn, are less likely to be wealthy. Accordingly, persons who suffer significant psychic injuries are, as a
class, likely to be poorer than the class of persons who invade their
psychic well-being. Thus, recognizing an entitlement to psychic wellbeing would equalize wealth distribution by forcing the invaders to
pay for their invasion.
A second possible preference would sanction distributing more
wealth to sensitive people and less to callous people. Underlying this
distributional preference would be a feeling that society would be
better with more money, and thus more power, in the hands of persons sensitive to the sorts of things which cause psychic anguish.
Since such sensitivity seems more likely to grow out of a prior susceptibility to psychic injury than out of the psychically unscathed
past of the callous person, recognizing the entitlement to psychic
well-being would result in greater wealth among the sensitive. 6
52. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-28, 44-45 (1970).
53. Wealth distribution is the second of three main factors suggested by Calabresi and
Melamed as determinative of whether an entitlement exists. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
40, at 1093, 1098.
54. Nor is it clear to the authors who identify the distributional goal. See id. at 10981101.
55. See, e.g., id. at 1104. The existence of a progressive income tax and extensive government benefit programs for poorer persons suggests the preference for more equal distribution of
wealth is widely held.
56. This second distributional preference, however, conflicts with Calabresi's views about
reducing the overall level of psychic injury in society. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 42. Calabresi's concern is that giving persons the right to recover damages for psychic injury will pro-
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A. The Insignificant Psychic Injury Problem
The discussion to this point illustrates that either an originalist or
instrumentalist approach to entitlement determinations would lead
one to conclude that persons should have an entitlement to psychic
well-being and, therefore, be protected by liability rules from culpable invasions of their psychic well-being. That conclusion
is easily accepted with respect to significant psychic injuries. 57 It is not so easily
accepted with respect to insignificant psychic injuries.
This article will discuss fully the problems that recognizing an entitlement to protection from insignificant, or trivial, psychic injuries
will pose for the reduction of overall accident costs. 5 8 Insofar as recovery for insignificant psychic injuries hinders achieving that goal,5 9
long or intensify psychic injuries which do occur. Denying persons the right to recover will
make them more callous and less likely to be significantly psychically injured in the future. Id.
This article discusses fully elsewhere why Calabresi's concern that full recovery for psychic
injury might increase the number of psychic injuries is insufficiently powerful to justify denying
persons the entitlement to psychic well-being. See infra notes 148-71 and accompanying text.
Calabresi's position does, however, highlight the close interrelationship between goals subsequently treated and the decision that one distribution of wealth is preferable to another. His
views are mentioned here to emphasize that denial of entitlement to psychic well-being may
have the distributional result of making callous persons wealthier, and thus more powerful, visA-vis sensitive persons. The resulting greater concentration of wealth and power among the
callous might well lead to the adoption of social policies likely to increase psychic injuries. It
would not be surprising if political leaders relatively callous to the sorts of traumatic events
which cause psychic injury made collective decisions more favorable to such events than would
relatively sensitive leaders. One might sensibly assume, for example, that callous leaders would
be more inclined than sensitive leaders to involve a society in war. A greater concentration of
wealth and power among callous persons presumably would result in a greater number of political leaders with similar attitudes.
57. I use the term "significant" and "insignificant" psychic injury to refer to psychic injuries which differ from one another in degree, much as the ordinary meaning of the words suggest. The courts have widely adopted the term "serious emotional distress" to refer to what I
term significant psychic injury. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930,
616 P.2d 813, 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d
131, -,
447 N.E.2d 109, 113 (1983). I purposely avoid the term serious emotional distress
because it often sounds like a drastic psychic injury as opposed to merely a significant one. See,
e.g., Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, -,
451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983) ("[S]erious emotional
distress describes emotional injury which is both severe and debilitating.... [It] may be
found where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately
with the mental distress ...
."). There is a much closer correlation between what I refer to as
insignificant psychic injury and what courts and commentators refer to as "trivial" injuries.
See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, , 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982); Pearson,
supra note 14, at 507-08.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 199-226. The special features of insignificant
psychic injuries are of little relevance to the justice and compensation goals, except insofar as
they demand much less in the way of sympathetic social concern.
59. In fact, permitting recovery for insignificant psychic injuries may increase the number
of psychic injuries many people experience and may increase transaction costs associated with
psychic injury lawsuits in excess of the benefits those lawsuits provide. See infra text accompanying notes 207-29. On the other hand, such recovery may not increase those costs. Id. However, it is certain that granting people an entitlement to freedom from significant invasions of
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the instrumentalists would conclude that the law should not entitle
persons to protection from insignificant invasions of their psychic
well-being. The distributional goals discussed above 0 would not
move instrumentalists to recognize an entitlement to protection
against insignificant invasions because the wealthy and the callous
are no less likely than the sensitive and the poor to incur insignificant psychic injuries."
The originalists also would be less disposed to grant entitlement
protection for insignificant psychic injury. Persons originally forming
society would not be nearly as averse to risking trivial psychic harm
as to risking significant harm. They would be less likely to regard a
claim for freedom from insignificant invasions of psychic well-being
as having priority over a claim for freedom from restraints on their
freedom to act as they desire in society. The decrease in one's psychic
well-being resulting from insignificant psychic injury would probably
be less than the decrease in psychic well-being occasioned by having
restrictions placed on one's freedom to act. Granting people an entitlement to psychic well-being simultaneously restricts their freedom
to act in ways which risk psychic injury. If that entitlement includes
the right to be free from insignificant invasions of one's psychic wellbeing, the concomitant restrictions on people's freedom to act will be
significantly greater because many more activities create risks of insignificant psychic injury than risk significant psychic injury.2
In sum, it is clearly questionable whether the instrumental and
original approaches would recognize an entitlement to freedom from
insignificant psychic injury. The hesitancy to permit tort recovery for
insignificant psychic injury is reflected in case law." To understand
why an entitlement to freedom from all culpably caused psychic injury, which is the basis for the full recovery rule, may serve the critical goals of tort law, and why an entitlement to freedom from significant psychic injury does serve those goals, the relationship of those
their psychic well-being while denying an entitlement to freedom from insignificant invasions
will markedly increase the costs of deciding psychic injury cases. It will do so because many
cases will involve disputes about whether the psychic injury was significant or insignificant, a
determination not easily made. See infra text accompanying notes 212-19.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
61. The lesser sensitivity of the wealthy and callous to traumatic stimuli, see supra text
accompanying notes 54-56, could mean that such persons incur more insignificant psychic injury than distributionally preferred groups because the stimuli which cause the latter significant psychic harm probably cause an insignificant injury to one who is mentally "tough."
62. Such an analysis might explain why tort law protects persons from some insignificant
invasions, such as offensive contact, when they are intentionally inflicted but not when they
occur because of a defendant's negligence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, § 18(2).
One need not restrict his activities very much to avoid intentionally causing offensive contact to
others, but must substantially restrict them to avoid causing such contact negligently.
63. See infra notes 158-59 & 227-29 and accompanying text.
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goals to the issue of recovery for psychic injury must be examined
directly.
IV. BENEFITS OF FULL REcOVERY: THE REDUCTION OF OVERALL
ACCIDENT COSTS

In rejecting broader recovery rules for psychic injuries, courts generally have not focused on considerations such as whether people
have some original entitlement to psychic well-being. Rather, courts
have articulated concerns about unlimited liability, false claims, a
flood of trivial lawsuits, uncertainty of damages and windfall compensation for plaintiffs. Those concerns are in fact aspects of a larger
concern: the reduction of overall accident costs. These costs consist of
the sum of accident and accident avoidance costs. Cost reduction is a
primary concern of tort law, articulated most forcefully and thoroughly by Professor Guido Calabresi.6 4 The reasons courts give for
limiting recovery for psychic injury fit well into the three analytic
categories of accident costs described by Calabresi as primary, secondary or tertiary costs.6 5 So do the reasons why courts should not
limit recovery for psychic injury. Accordingly, this article will examine the effects of liability rules for psychic injury on primary, secondary and tertiary accident costs, to inquire if those effects adequately explain the denial of a right to full recovery.
A. Primary Costs: Reducing Losses
First among the concerns of Professor Calabresi and others interested in tort liability rules is reducing the number and severity of
injury-causing accidents." Another prime concern is that such a reduction not cost more than the savings in accidents avoided. In other
words, there should be an efficient, or cost-justified, reduction in the
number and severity of accidents. Tort law ordinarily attempts to accomplish that end by making an actor liable for an accident when his
cost of avoiding the accident was lower than the accident's expected
cost and by making him pay the actual accident costs which he proxi64. See G. CALABRFsI, supra note 52, at 26.
65. Id. at 26-28. The aim of compensating injured persons, which retains considerable
force in tort law despite its one-directional impetus, does not fit so well within the aim of
minimizing overall accident costs, although it could be discussed as a secondary cost reduction
goal. See id. at 39-45. For a discussion of issues bearing upon the compensation goal's significance for psychic injury see infra notes 230-57 and accompanying text.
66. I use "accidents" to mean any interaction between person(s) which results in harm.
Although the term may include intentional harm, the focus of this article is on harm caused, in
lay terms, by accident. It might be more accurate to use Joseph Steiner's description, "interaction damage," but that phrase seems unnecessarily cumbersome. Steiner, supra note 40, at 227.
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mately caused. 7 By so doing, tort law forces an actor to consider the
expected accident costs of his activities. In theory, the threat of liability will deter a person from behaving in a way which benefits society less than it costs society in accident injuries.6 8 So long as tort law
accurately ascertains the cost of an accident and correctly assesses its
probability the actor will be provided with an appropriate disincentive to accident-causing behavior. If he acts rationally, when the expected cost of his behavior is greater than the benefit the actor expects to get from it, he will choose either not to engage in that
behavior or to modify it so as to reduce the expected accident cost.
As a result, the number and severity of accidents will decrease because reducing accident costs provides potential tortfeasors with
greater benefits than those that are lost by acting safely."
67. This liability rule is often known as the Learned Hand rule, after that judge's formulation of a liability standard in United States v. Carroll Towing, Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947). Judge Hand concluded that liability should result if the burden of avoiding the accident
(B) was less than expected cost of the accident, computed by multiplying the probability that
the accident will occur (P) by the accident loss, its cost if it does occur (L). In other words, a
defendant is liable when B is less than P x L. For a more complete explanation of this rule, see
R. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9 (1982). The rule aptly describes how
courts decide cases involving negligently or intentionally caused harms. It probably does not
describe cases of strict liability. See id. at 476-78.
68. Examining the actual deterrent effect of tort law is beyond the scope of this article.
Regardless, the view that the threat of tort judgments induces actors to behave more safely is
widely accepted and well established. See Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 76, 85, 439 A.2d 110, 11415 (1981); P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 556-57 (3d ed. 1980); G. CALABRESI, supra note 52, at 69; L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
135-36 (1975); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 143 (2d ed. 1977). Even those who criticize the role of deterrence recognize it as one of tort law's main aims, crucial in many cases.
See, e.g., Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980). There is even some empirical support for the view that tort law deters.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AUTOMOBILE No-FAULT INSURANCE: A STUDY BY THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LEGISLATION 11-12 (1978); Bell, Legislative Intrusions
into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort
Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939 (1984).
There is considerable concern that tort law's deterrent effect is muted by insurance. See,
e.g., Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U.W. ONTARIO L. REV. 111,
115 (1979); Pierce, supra note 9, at 1298-99. To a considerable degree, insurance rates are based
on the insured's accident experience. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY 1-22 to 1-29 (1977);
James, Accident Liablility Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549,
560-61 (1948). Insurance rates deter dangerous behavior because they indicate much more
about the riskiness of engaging in certain activities than one would otherwise learn. Id.
69. One of the possible flaws in this theory is its assumption that the societal benefits of
certain behavior are accurately reflected in the benefit of that activity to the individual actor.
In most instances that assumption is probably quite accurate. For example, the benefit to me of
driving a car and driving it in certain ways probably closely approximates the benefit society
gets from my driving. However, there are certain activities which so regularly affect the public
interest that their social utility regularly outweighs the individual benefit to any actor considering whether and how to pursue that activity. See, e.g., Bowman, The New Haven: A Passenger
Railroad For Nonriders, 9 J.L. & EcON. 49, 50 (1966). Consider the special rules regarding the
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Psychic injuries are real and significant costs of accidents.7 0 If tort
law is to reduce efficiently the injury costs of accidents, all real costs
that result from accidents, including psychic injury costs, must be
taken into account in assessing damages for defendants' culpable
conduct. If defendants are not held liable for psychic injuries, they
will not figure those injury costs in when they weigh their behavior's
expected costs against its expected benefits. In short, insofar as tort
law does not allow plaintiffs' recovery for psychic injury foreseeably
caused by defendants' behavior, defendants are being inadequately
deterred from engaging in potentially unsafe conduct. Thus society
endures more, and more severe, accidents than are justified by the
costs of avoiding those accidents. If the full recovery rule governed,
tort law would force defendants to more accurately weigh the costs
and benefits of their behavior, thereby insuring a more cost-justified
level of accidents. 1
The foregoing is the strongest argument for the full recovery rule.
law of defamation. The benefit to society of publishing a possibly false news story may be much
greater than the benefit which a particular newspaper may obtain from that publication, in
terms of increased circulation, prestige or the like. See Comment, Strict Liability Versus Negligence: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Libel, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 398, 400-06. Holding a
media defendant strictly liable in defamation for publishing a false news story, however, would
lead it not to publish the story even where the expected cost of publication, the probability the
story is false times the loss if it is, is lower than the social benefit of publication. Accordingly,
courts have used the first amendment to bar states from holding media defendants strictly
liable for defamation. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Applying a
negligence standard for liability, as Gertz requires at a minimum, will eliminate the problem in
defamation cases where social benefits exceed individual benefits of publication, because the
social benefit is considered in determining whether the actor is liable at all. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 10, §§ 291, 292.
If society concludes it benefits more from an activity than the actor can recoup for himself
and fears the actor may be forced out of that activity because its costs are higher than its
benefits to him, society should directly subsidize his continuation in the activity by giving him
some additional benefit, be it money, fame, or power. Society should not assure his continuation by eliminating some of the accident costs he has to pay, thus forcing the psychically injured to subsidize the activity.
70. There is reason to believe that psychic injuries may even be the most significant costs
of accidents. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
71. When the social cost of an activity exceeds the cost to individuals injured by the
activity who can get tort damages for the injury, the negligence formula does not require the
excess social cost to be realistically taken into account by the actor. Tort law does take the
expected social cost of the activity into account in determining whether or not the actor was
negligent. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 10, § 293(a). Realistically, however, all
the actor is concerned with is whether the expected individual costs of his activity, the costs he
will have to pay out in damages, exceed its expected benefits. If the costs do not exceed benefits, he will engage in the activity, regardless of any possible liability for those costs, because he
will obtain a benefit well above any tort damages he may be required to pay. As the actor will
have to pay only those injury costs for which he can be successfully sued, he has no incentive to
consider any excess social costs of his activity. To encourage persons to assess accurately the
costs and benefits of their activities, tort law must provide to the fullest extent practicable a
cause of action to those injured by those activities.
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However, concluding that failure to allow full recovery for psychic
injury systematically underdeters risky behavior does not end the inquiry concerning the most cost efficient rule. Conceding the systematic underdeterrence of the existing rules, one might oppose the full
recovery rule in the belief that its application will overdeter risky behavior. That belief 72 underlies several of the most prominent challenges to the full recovery rule. Critics believe overdeterrence will occur because damages will be awarded for false claims, because
psychic injury damages are so uncertain that inappropriately high
monetary awards are likely to be made for even real psychic injuries,
and because defendants will be assessed damages for psychic injuries
their behavior did not cause.7s These challenges must be examined in
72. The belief is, in essence, a view that accurate damage assessments will not occur if
existing rules are relaxed. If tort law does not accurately assess damages, defendants will either
underestimate or overestimate the true expected costs of their activity. As a result they will
behave, or not behave, in undesirable ways, in the sense that their behavior's costs to society
outweigh it(s) benefits or vice-versa. For example, if minor psychic injuries were evaluated constantly by juries or insurance companies as more serious than they actually were, cf. O'Connell,
A Proposalto Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of
Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 339, defendants would be discouraged
more than we want them to be from engaging in an activity, such as home remodeling, which is
likely to result in many minor psychic injuries. Assuming that a jurisdiction imposes tort liability for such injuries, home remodeling will become more expensive. Thus, some people will
choose not to remodel who would have chosen to do so if remodeling costs were lower, as the
costs would be if tort law accurately assessed psychic injury costs. Depending on such factors as
the extent of overestimation of the psychic injury costs, the elasticity of the demand for remodeling and the ease of entry into the remodeling business, the amount of remodeling will be less
than would occur if the costs were accurately assessed.
73. Arguably, regardless of possibly inflated damage awards, tort law will give only appropriate disincentive messages to actors because no defendant will be held liable in tort unless he
has behaved culpably. That argument is not valid for the areas of strict liability that, when
products liability and vicarious liability are included, make up a significant segment of tort
cases. The argument has some validity for negligence cases, but not much. Assuming that a
finding of negligence equates to a determination that the expected accident cost of defendant's
conduct was greater than the cost of avoiding the accident (B less than P x L), see United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 164, 173, (2d Cir. 1947), society wants to give the defendant and potential defendants the message that they should change their conduct. However, if
the defendant is assessed more damages than he caused, the wrong disincentive message will be
given even in negligence cases. Such an overassessment disrupts the market deterrence role tort
law normally plays. The actor will get the message that the expected cost of contemplated
behavior is higher than it in fact is. That means he will avoid some behavior, although its
benefits outweigh its true costs.
Consider, for example, a sports facility owner who is considering how much plexiglass
screening to install between the spectators and the area of play. If spectators have succeeded on
tort claims in other cases where an object from the area of play went into the crowd, regardless
of whether they were in fact injured or whether the object's flight caused the injury, the sports
facility owner will build a more extensive plexiglass screen than he would if damages in those
other cases had been assessed accurately. His judgment will weigh the cost of additional plexiglass screening (the burden of avoiding the accident) against the number of objects that the
additional screening would prevent from leaving the area of play, multipled by the average cost
incurred each time an object goes into the crowd. That is the calculation which tort law,
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order to assess the cost efficiency of the full recovery rule. That examination will disclose that while there are kernels of truth in each of
these challenges to the full recovery rule, there is little reason to expect any regular overassessment of psychic injury costs.
1. The False Claims Problem
Courts and commentators have long felt 4 that permitting recovery for psychic injury would create a substantial risk of false claims.7 5
The kernel of truth in the false claim challenge lies in the opportunity which any intangible injury affords the artful impostor to convince a jury he was more seriously injured than was actually the case.
Obviously, expanding bystander recovery and relaxing the current requirement that some physical injury result from a psychic injury creates some potential for additional false claims. Nonetheless, it is unlikely full recovery will increase the number of false claims which
succeed in litigation. Psychiatric/psychological examining techniques
have increased markedly in sophistication since the advent of the
physical impact, zone of danger and ensuing physical injury rules. As
7
a result, successfully feigning a psychic injury is not an easy matter. 1
through the generally accepted Learned Hand test for negligence, directs actors to make. Id.
The result will be an investment in plexiglass screening which is more costly than the real
savings in accident costs.
Given the pivotal role of insurance as a communicator of expected costs, another undesired
message may go out from overassessments of damages in negligence cases. An actor may be
discouraged from even entering into an activity when his entry would lead to more benefits
than costs to society. That would occur because previous overassessments of damages had resulted in overly high insurance premiums for all persons engaged in that activity. For the marginal actors who obtained relatively low, although still higher than actual costs of the activity,
benefits from the activity, this wrong message about costs would lead to abandonment of a
useful and socially desirable activity.
74. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896).
That feeling persists. See, e.g. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass, 540, _,
437 N.E.2d 171,
175-76 (1982). See also O'Connell, supra note 72, at 334-39; Pearson, supra note 14, at 509
n.178; Recent Development Torts-Mental Distress, 63 GEo. L.J. 1179, 1183 & n.24 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Torts].
75. Undoubtedly, the courts' concerns about false claims reflect a community sense that it
is unjust to award damages for an injury to someone who is just faking that injury. Because it is
by no means certain that this would occur if full recovery for psychic injury were allowed, while
it is quite certain that present legal restrictions on such recovery require persons with real
psychic injury to receive nothing, one must question the strength of the justice concern with
false claims.
76. See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent
Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1248-53, 1258-62 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress] in which the author examines in unusual detail the medical aspects of mental
reactions to trauma and concludes that "medical science is capable of satisfactorily establishing
the existence, seriousness, and ramifications of emotional harm." Id. at 1253. See also Sinn v.
Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 158-60, 404 A.2d 672, 678-79 (1979) (medical science can establish causal
link between psychic injury and viewing of gruesome accident); Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury,
Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 6 CLEV.-MAm L. REv. 428, 435-37 (1957); Torts, supra
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In fact, courts seem quite sanguine about permitting juries to determine the genuineness of plaintiffs' claims for many injuries which
are as easy to feign as the psychic injuries for which recovery is denied. Recovery for negligently inflicted psychic injury is permitted in
most jurisdictions if some physical injury results, no matter how
slight.7 Recovery is also permitted for psychic injury without any resulting physical injury if intentionally inflicted.7 8 While both of these
categories of psychic injury have some circumstantial indicia of genuineness, plaintiffs may readily fake those circumstances7 9 or those circumstances may exist in the absence of genuine psychic injury. In
addition, juries regularly sort out false from true claims of physical
injury, even though some physical injuries, such as whiplash, back
pain and other soft tissue damage, probably are feigned more easily
than complex psychoneurotic reactions.8 0
Even where medical expertise fails to clearly establish the truth or
falsity of a psychic injury claim,"' one would not expect a jury to be
consistently biased either towards false or against true psychic injury
claims.82 Given the availability of medical expertise and the absence
note 74, at 1184.
77. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-29, 616 P.2d 813, 820,
167 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837-38 (1980); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d
109, 111 n.3 (1983); supra notes 16 & 17. Cf. Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241,
176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961) (discussion of ease of feigning injuries in slightimpact cases).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, at § 46. The plaintiff's psychic injury must
be severe and the defendant's conduct must be "extreme and outrageous." A rationale advanced for the latter requirement is that such conduct provides a good guarantee that the
plaintiff's injury is genuine. See Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress By Outrageous Conduct,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 47 (1982). In fact, psychiatrists perceive no direct correlation between the
intensity of a trauma and the nature of the neurosis that follows. See Note, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129, 1138 (1961).
79. Where "nervous shock" satisfies the requirement that a physical injury has resulted, it
can hardly be maintained that the requirement effectively eliminates the possibility of feigned
injury. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 924, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 832, 835 (1980).
80. See Deziel v. Difco Labs., 403 Mich. 1, 36-37, 268 N.W.2d 1, 15-16 (1978); Note, supra
note 78, at 1137. Juries are also permitted regularly to determine the validity of claims for pain
and suffering. See, e.g., Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 626 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1980)
(affirming award of $35,000 for pain and suffering for 2 minutes plaintiff was alive while
drowning).
81. One recent commentator suggests this may occur frequently because medical experts
are not likely to provide accurate testimony. Pearson, supra note 14, at 509 n.178. That assumption is questionable. Even if it were not, determining which experts are accurate is a task
which our legal system everywhere else leaves to the jury.
82. Where objective indicia of real injury do not exist, empirical findings indicate that
juries are unbiased. See, e.g., Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV.
744, 750 (1958) (judge and jury disagree on liability in only 17 % of test personal injury cases; in
9%, jury found for the plaintiff while judge found for the defendant; in 8 %, judge found for the
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of jury bias, courts have probably been correct in concluding that the
jury is particularly well suited to determine the genuineness of a
psychic injury claim. 3
Courts have rightfully recoiled from denying recovery to persons
with obviously real psychic injuries just because future false claims
might be successful. 4 Plaintiffs with real injuries strike a responsive
chord when they ask the legal system to do its job in sorting out true
from false claims, rather than effectively treating all claims as false.
2. The Uncertain Damages Problem
Some challenge the full recovery rule because damages for psychic
injury cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty. 5 Such
damages are indeed uncertain. No on6 can, with any confidence, assign a definite dollar value to the grief of a parent who has witnessed
her child's death. Nevertheless, uncertainty is not a reason for courts
to deny full recovery for psychic injury unless uncertainty has some
evil effect which will be remedied, or at least mitigated, by disallowing psychic injury claims. Probably the major evil effect which challengers fear is that juries will award psychically injured plaintiffs explaintiff while jury found for the defendant).
Actually, one would expect a plaintiff to have considerable difficulty in convincing a jury
that it is more likely than not that he has the psychic injury he claims if neither the circumstances of the accident, medical experts nor physical symptoms support the claim with some
strength. See, e.g., Purver, Workers' Compensation:Disability Resulting from Mental Stress,
25 POF2d 1, 24 (1981) ("[E]xpert psychiatric testimony is usually essential to recovery since
mental or nervous disturbance are claims easy to make yet highly difficult to prove; the finder
of fact is frequently wary of such claims.").
83. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167
Cal. Rptr. 832, 839 (1980); Chapetta v. Bowman Transp., 415 So. 2d 1019, 1022-23 (La. Ct. App.
1982); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, -,
447 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1983).
84. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 737, 441 P.2d 912, 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77
(1968); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240-41, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37
(1961); Neiderman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 410-11, 261 A.2d 84, 87-89 (1970). This has led the
British courts to reject the fear of false claims. See Teff, supra note 1, at 112.
85. See Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile v. Smith, 171 Ind. App. 315, 325, 357 N.E.2d 247, 253
(1976); Kalen v. Terre Haute, 18 Ind. App. 202, 213, 47 N.E. 694, 697-98 (1897); Smith, Relation of Emotions To Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV.
193, 198 n.16 (1944).
Clearly psychic injury for which the courts do not allow recovery is no less amenable to
measurement than that for which recovery is allowed. Nevertheless, the courts' hostility to the
uncertainty involved may move them to be unsympathetic to this kind of claim. That will lead
them more readily towards disallowing some psychic injury claims for some of the reasons discussed elsewhere in this paper. Cf. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447-48, 563
P.2d 858, 862-63, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306-07 (1977).
The concern underlying the uncertainty challenge is not that too little will be awarded in
money damages, even though that result is as likely as an excessive award. Uncertainty of damage awards, it is argued, is a reason why courts should not allow claims of psychic injury at all.
Such disallowance, of course, is the best guarantee that too little money will be awarded for any
particular psychic injury.
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cessive damages. In time, excessive damages would deter legitimate
activities which would not be deterred if their costs were valued
correctly.8 6
The shortest, most satisfactory answer is that uncertainty is inherent in a system which seeks to restore tort plaintiffs to the same
position they occupied before being injured by translating their injuries into dollars. Damages for psychic injury directly inflicted upon a
plaintiff or indirectly inflicted through harm to a third person are no
more uncertain than damages for other intangible injuries for which
victims are routinely provided full compensation. In fact, once the
law awards money damages for any injuries to which the marketplace
has not affixed a monetary value, it has forsaken any claim that damage awards accurately reflect the value of a plaintiff's injury.
Some sorts of injury may still be more difficult to value than
others. Yet, the injuries which make up the major components of
most substantial tort awards, pain and suffering and lost future
wages, are tremendously uncertain. Physical pain is just as subjective
as psychic pain. Even if this were not so, a factfinder could be no
more confident in assigning an accurate dollar value to past or continuing physical pain than to psychic injury."' In addition, determin86. There are other reasons why uncertainty may be of concern. See infra notes 181-98
and accompanying text (transaction costs). It also seems unjust to subject litigating parties to
the whims of juries. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 9, at 476-77, 515-19. Insofar as those who
emphasize uncertainty are concerned with justice to the parties, they clearly are not concerned
with doing justice to the plaintiff, who is legally precluded from recovering any damages flowing
from his psychic injury. A particular defendant may suffer some injustice because of the uncertainty of damages. No injustice will be done, however, if the defendant can convince the trier of
fact that a given amount is probably higher than the real worth of plaintiff's injury. If the
defendant cannot convince an impartial decision-maker that the real dollar value of plaintiff's
injury is probably less than a certain amount, then the defendant's claim of injustice seems
rather hollow, unless he can show that the decision-maker is not impartial. No one has offered
evidence that juries have any institutional bias which causes consistent misevaluation of damages in favor of plaintiffs. See Broeder, supra note 82, at 750 (judges as likely to find for plaintiffs as juries). The success of trial lawyers' sophisticated use of demonstrative evidence and
other techniques designed to impress upon juries the reality of plaintiff's injury suggests that, if
anything, juries have undervalued plaintiffs' injuries in the majority of cases where these sophisticated techniques have not been used. Despite the hue and cry raised by defendants and
insurers, it does not seem that juries are giving plaintiffs higher awards today than 20 years ago,
except in the few cases involving the most serious injuries. See M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, THE
CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

1960-1979 ix (1982). Pos-

ner suggests that juries probably undervalue serious injuries, because such injuries reduce the
amount of pleasure a plaintiff can obtain with any of his dollars. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW

87.
88.

also P.

105 (2d ed. 1977).

See infra notes 280-92 and accompanying text.
See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 702 (W. Va. 1982). See
ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW

213 (3d ed. 1980):

There appears to be simply no way of working out any relationship between the value of
money - what it will buy - and damages awarded for pain and suffering, and disabili-
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ing lost future earnings requires speculative predictions about hypothetical future events. Such damages provide the illusion of certainty
because they involve calculating lost dollars based upon testimony
concerning what jobs the plaintiff might have held, present salaries of
those jobs, and the plaintiff's life expectancy. This calculation is less
mathematically precise than it seems. Simply put, the task embarked
on by the trier of fact is to predict how long a plaintiff would have
lived and what jobs paying what salaries he would have held, a task
which resembles crystal-ball gazing. 9 Similar uncertainty exists in
damage awards for loss of enjoyment of life, for which a majority of
jurisdictions permit recovery; 90 for damage to one's reputation, which
is the harm occasioned by defamation; and for loss of the consortium
of one's spouse, for which all jurisdictions permit recovery. Given the
degree of uncertainty which the tort system has accepted in other
areas, to treat psychic injury differently on the grounds that it leads
to uncertain money damages is arbitrary and unfair.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that damages for psychic
injury are not extraordinarily uncertain, i.e., so unclear that juries
would reach vastly different monetary estimates for essentially similar psychic injuries. Expert testimony and objective symptoms will
give the jury a reasonable understanding of the injury. Moreover,
psychic injuries are within the personal experience of many jurors. 91
While there may be disagreement concerning the precise dollar award
for a particular psychic injury, there would probably be considerable
agreement concerning the outer limits of excessiveness or inadequacy
ties. All such damage awards could be multiplied or divided by two overnight and they
would be just as defensible or indefensible as they are today.
89. This process of predicting lost future earnings becomes even more other-worldly when
the action is for the wrongful death of a child. In such cases, many jurisdictions, including New
York, grant damages to parents for the present value of a child's wages over the period of time
the parents would have expected to receive them. See Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The
Death of Children: A Nonparametric Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 884 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Finkelstein]. Needless to say, jury awards in
such cases have displayed extraordinary disparity. Id. at 892-93. See also Drayton v. Jiffee
Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 362-64 (6th Cir. 1978) (reversing infant plaintiff's $500,000 award
for loss of future income).
90. See Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life - Should It Be a Compensable Element
of PersonalInjury Damages?, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 459, 469 (1975).

91. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 953, 603 P.2d 58, 71, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141,
154 (1979) (jury able to fix monetary amount for emotional distress resulting from defamation);
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 563, 632 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1981) (medical testimony not a prerequisite to award for emotional distress resulting from negligent killing
of family pet dog); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 174-75 & n.8, 472 P.2d 509, 521 & n.8
(1970) (jury in better position to determine under what circumstances society should recognize
recovery for mental distress).
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of awards.9 2 Where juries exceed reasonable evaluative bounds,
judges, who at least have the benefit of having seen monetary evaluations of similar injuries, can reduce or increase awards. 93 Ultimately,
recovery for psychic injury, like the recovery permitted for other intangible injuries, will result in a range of relatively certain damages
even if the precise amount within that range is quite uncertain. Since
such a monetary range would probably be as precise as any group of
objective evaluators could assign to a particular intangible injury,
there is no reason to think that the uncertainty inherent in psychic
injury has any regularly pernicious effect in overdeterring useful
behavior.
3. The Causation Problem
A substantial challenge to the full recovery rule based on
overdeterrence is the claim that defendants often do not cause much
or all of plaintiffs' psychic injuries. First, the challengers argue,
overdeterrence occurs where plaintiffs have a preexisting susceptibility to psychic injury.9 4 By this, opponents of full recovery may mean
that plaintiffs' injuries would have occurred regardless of defendants'
risky conduct. Liability in such situations causes overdeterrence by
encouraging defendants to spend resources on safety measures, which
expenditures will not reduce these psychic injury costs. 9 5 Second,
overdeterrence occurs where defendants are held liable for psychic
92. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 88, at 215. The only empirical examination of psychic
injury damages which research disclosed suggests that there is not great variation in awards.
See Finkelstein, supra note 89, at 891-92.
93. See, e.g., Gary v. Schwartz, 43 A.D.2d 562, 349 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1973) (judge reduced
damages for wrongful death from $98,000 to $50,000). The court can overturn an award when it
is not an amount which "a reasonable person would estimate as fair compensation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, § 912, comment b.
94. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 85, at 226, 282 ("Plaintiff had a preexisting vulnerability
in 216 of the 301 cases of a nature which probably made him more susceptible to injury of the
type alleged than an average person would have been."). See Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr
Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 512, 330 N.E.2d 603, 607, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 643 (1975) (Breitel, J., dissenting); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 618-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561-62
(1969). Wolfe suggests that the often repeated reference to certain psychic injury as a "risk of
living" is just another way of saying that the injury is one which would be expected to occur in
the normal course of life even without anyone's negligent behavior. Compare Judge Breitel's
statement in Wolfe with that of Chief Justice Shaw in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45
Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). In Farwell, a worker was denied recovery for a crushed hand because
of the fellow servant rule. The burden of the crushed hand properly fell on the plaintiff, Justice
Shaw said, because it was typical of injuries which could be suffered in life in general. Farwell,
id. at 57-59. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process - The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 587-88 (1961) (discussion of allocation of losses among parties).
95. In other words, there is no causal link between defendant's risky conduct and plaintiff's injuries. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CH. L. REv. 69, 71 (1975).
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injuries which plaintiffs can more cheaply avoid. Holding defendants
liable in such situations causes overdeterrence by encouraging defendants to expend more resources to avoid psychic injuries than would
be expended if the incentive to avoid such injuries were placed on
plaintiffs. There will undoubtedly be instances of psychic injury in
which each of these overdeterrence arguments applies. Those instances, however, comprise far too small a percentage of psychic injury cases to justify the general restrictive rules which now exist.
The first argument presupposes that there will be a significant
number of cases in which the psychic injury would have happened as
a result of nonculpable conduct" regardless of the defendant's risky
conduct. Moving from the premise that many persons have preexisting susceptibilities to psychic injuries 97 to the conclusion that their
96. If the injury would have happened as a result of culpable conduct, then the defendant's conduct has caused an injury to plaintiff which the liability-encouraged safety expenditure would have avoided. That injury is the plaintiff's loss of a future cause of action for
psychic injury against the person whose culpable conduct would have caused the psychic injury
later.
97. A person's pre-existing psychological state unquestionably plays a significant role in
determining the nature and extent of his response to trauma. See, e.g., Gross v. United States,
508 F. Supp. 1085 (D.S.D. 1981); Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App.
1982); Deziel v. Difco Labs., 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr
Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975); Yandrich v. Radic, 495 Pa. 243,
433 A.2d 459 (1981). One must not, however, overrate the importance of pre-existing susceptibilities to a plaintiff's ultimate psychic injuries. The American Psychiatric Association has recognized that post-traumatic stress disorder (PSD) possesses sufficiently typical sympotomatology to merit classification as a mental disorder. Andreason, Post-traumatic Stress
Disorder,in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TExTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1I 1517 (H. Kaplan, A. Freedman, G.
Sadock, eds., 3d ed. 1980). The recognition of this mental disorder, occasioned by serious
trauma, indicates either that a defendant's conduct inflicting trauma upon a plaintiff may be
expected to cause serious psychic injury regardless of pre-existing susceptibilities or that the
sorts of pre-existing susceptibilities which lead to PSD are widespread. That conclusion finds
support in the markedly similar psychic injuries found among the victims of unexpected community wide disasters. The recurrence of psychic numbing, death anxiety, nightmares, social
isolation and sleep disturbances in similar patterns among persons subject to severe floods has
demonstrated that personal idiosyncrasies play a relatively minor role in much trauma-induced
psychic injury. See, e.g., G. GLESER, B. GREEN, & C. WINGET, PROLONGED PSYCHOSociAL EFFECTS
OF DISASTm A STUDY OF BUFFALO CREEK 140-45 (1981); Lifton & Olson, The Human Meaning
of Total Disaster, 39 PSYCHIATRY 1 (Feb. 1976); Kilman, Psychological First Aid in a Mass
Disaster: The Coming Flood Project (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
Insignificant psychic injuries are more likely to result from common trauma. However, they
are also more likely to recur. Therefore, while one might conclude that that sort of psychic
injury would have happened to the plaintiff regardless of the defendant's culpable conduct, one
could not confidently conclude that the particular injury in question, with its addition to the
total of plaintiff's life pain, would have occurred anyway. In such situations, the probable conclusion would be that defendant's conduct has resulted in one more injury than plaintiff would
otherwise have suffered.
The fact that the injury would probably have occurred in response to some unusual, but
not singular, trauma would not save the defendant from liability. In such cases, the defendant's
risky conduct has increased the chances that the injury would occur. Therefore, the safety expenditure by the defendant and others similarly situated, which tort liability will encourage,
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injuries would have happened anyway is quite a leap. Common sense,
tempered by a modest familiarity with the field of psychology, does
not suggest that many significant psychic injuries occur in response
to the common traumas of everyday life. That conclusion is borne out
by the reported psychic injury cases. No more than one or two cases
out of the hundreds read in preparation for this article argue that the
psychic injury would have occurred in response to commonplace
trauma regardless of the defendant's conduct.
Yandrich v. Radic9" provides a good example. In Yandrich, the
plaintiff's decedent had demonstrated marked behavioral changes
and had ultimately committed suicide following the negligently
caused death of his son. The decedent had previously experienced
the death of three of his very young children when his car rolled into
a reservoir and sank with the unattended children inside. His wife
had also died previously. 99 Assuredly those deaths significantly affected the decedent's emotional makeup and, absent the psychological scars from those incidents, he probably would not have suffered
such severe psychic injury from his son's death. However, the situation in no way suggests that had the defendant not negligently killed
the decedent's son, something similarly traumatic would have occurred in the normal course of life to push him over the psychological
edge.
Because there probably will be few significant psychic injury cases
where the injuries would have occurred regardless of the defendant's
conduct, psychic injury recovery should not be denied on the basis of
the first "no causation" argument. Rather, such cases should be
treated like physical injury cases involving similar claims of lack of
causation. Defendants should be given the opportunity to prove that
the psychic injury precipitated by their risky conduct would have occurred anyway as a result of common, nonculpable stimuli. 100
The second causation argument claims overdeterrence would result from a full recovery rule because defendants would be held liable
in many cases in which plaintiffs could more cheaply avoid the
psychic injury. To sustain a general restrictive rule, that proposition
would have to be true in most cases for which recovery is denied.
There are no characteristics of psychic injury, however, which suggest
that its victims can better avoid their injuries than can physically
will reduce the likelihood that similar injuries will happen in the future.
98. 495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459 (1981).
99. Id. at 251, 433 A.2d at 463.
100. See, e.g., Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (2d Cir. 1970); Dillon v.
Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932).
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injured victims. 1 1
Advocates of the longstanding contrary view have usually maintained that psychically injured persons should "toughen their
hides"'0 2 rather than burden others with responsibility for their
psychic weaknesses. The argument focuses on those with preexisting
susceptibilities to psychic injury, reasoning that such persons know
better than uninformed strangers how best to protect themselves. 103
This argument will not withstand close scrutiny. It is not so easy for
the psychically fragile individual to toughen his hide. First, for someone even to gain awareness of his psychic frailties is difficult, absent
some trauma. Therefore, some not insignificant expenditure of resources usually will be necessary before a person is even aware of his
weakness.0 Second, even when the plaintiff has obtained that
knowledge, 0 5 there is still little he can do to avoid being injured.
Changing one's psychological makeup does not occur overnight, nor is
there any widely approved method for making the change. 06 While
101. Of course it would be open to a defendant in any particular psychic injury case to
argue that the plaintiff was the cheaper cost avoider with respect to this injury, using traditional tort doctrines, such as contributory (comparative) negligence or assumption of the risk,
which exist to burden the plaintiff with the loss if he is the cheaper cost avoider.
102. See, e.g., Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
H.nv. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936).
103. Smith, supra note 85, at 256.
It is both just and expedient to require the frail fellow who ventures out into the world
to assume such special risks of injury from every day stimuli as arise from his idiosyncrasy. He knows better than uninformed strangers how to protect his weakness by sheltering his Achilles heel. As most persons possess average hardihood and resistance, an
actor is entitled to expect that a particular person within his sphere of action has normal
fortitude unless he has notice to the contrary.
104. People pay psychologists and psychiatrists substantial amounts of money for counseling. A significant part of any counseling involves helping the patient to become aware of his
psychic weak points.
105. Admittedly, as the Smith excerpt quoted in supra note 103 claims, the fragile plaintiff can more cheaply obtain knowledge about his frailties than can a stranger/defendant. However, because we propose only to hold the defendant liable when some psychic injury to a normally constituted person might occur, i.e., when psychic injury was foreseeable, our concern in
deciding who is the cheaper cost avoider is with the cost to defendant of learning what might
happen to normal persons. That cost will be quite low, probably lower than the cost to the
plaintiff of learning about his psychic frailties.
106. See Smith, supra note 85, at 255-56 n.194. Dr. Smith uses several examples to illustrate the way in which the average person's hide toughens. Borrowed primarily from wartime
experiences, these examples point to the conclusion that frequent exposure to previously
unencountered death or danger reduces the psychic impact of those events. Such illustrations
indicate Dr. Smith was confusing psychic injury resulting from unexpected trauma with anxiety
about the unknown or unfamiliar. He surely does not mean to suggest that people should seek
out situations involving death or some other calamity so they will be less affected when someone's conduct exposes them to a psychically troubling trauma. Thus, Dr. Smith's examples are
not useful in revealing how someone goes about toughening his fragile psyche.
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professional help seems the most obvious source of desensitization," 7
such assistance is not only expensive, it is rarely recognized as necessary in advance of significant psychic pain. The fragile could severely
restrict their activities, but in our society staying at home is hardly a
realistic and certainly not a "cheap" method of avoiding injuries. 1 8
In short, even if persons have more significant susceptibilities to
psychic injury than they do to physical injury,'09 those susceptibilities do not in general create situations where the plaintiff could avoid
his psychic injury more cheaply than a culpable defendant. Accordingly, holding the defendant liable for psychic injuries will properly
encourage him to take safety precautions which will avoid such injuries most cheaply in the future." 0
107. I use this term purposely to suggest that the process of toughening one's hide, so as
to be less severely affected by trauma, will necessarily have effects which may not be desirable.
People who are less sensitive to the moderate and severe traumas which people negligently visit
upon them will be less sensitive to the pain to others attendant on such events in all other
aspects of life as well.
108. See Calabresi, supra note 95, at 96 & n.40. To be the cheaper cost avoider, a party
must have both superior knowledge of the risks of injury and realistic ability to minimize or
eliminate those risks. Id. Again, this conclusion cannot be reached as confidently with respect
to insignificant psychic injuries. People may in fact be able to toughen their hides a little, so as
to withstand minor interferences with their psychic well-being. Attempts to cope with the
sources of minor psychic hurts are common. Such hide-toughening is not easy. If avoidance of
insignificant psychic injury turns out to involve considerable effort, which is only partially successful, the plaintiff is unlikely to be able to avoid his injury more cheaply than can the
defendant.
109. This would have to be true for the "no causation" challenge to justify different recovery rules for psychic injury than for physical injury.
110. It should be emphasized that the defendant will be given the appropriate deterrence
signal even when held liable for the full costs of the psychic injuries suffered by a plaintiff with
an "eggshell personality" - a plaintiff with an extreme susceptibility to the trauma inflicted
on him by defendant's culpable conduct. Liability in such a case will encourage the defendant
and others similarly situated to make safety expenditures which will avoid such injuries in the
future. Holding a defendant liable for psychic injury costs greater than he would have expected
will ensure that defendants generally take into account all the accident costs their safety behavior will avoid when they are deciding what resources to commit to safety measures. See R.
POSNER, supra note 67, at 26-27. Because most defendants will have liability insurance, and all
defendants will have had the opportunity to obtain liability insurance, the signal they will receive from tort law, via those insurance premiums, is the expected average cost, in psychic
injury, resulting from their activities. To be accurate, that average must include unusually high
as well as unusually low psychic costs of negligently caused accidents.
Where he has deliberately bypassed liability insurance the defendant cannot claim that
liability for psychic injuries caused to abnormally susceptible persons conflicts with his "entitlement" to expect people to have normal psychic fortitude. See the Smith quote, supra note 103.
The defendant may have arranged, through insurance, to pay only the average cost of the
psychic injuries he risks. Or he may have deliberately gambled, by not purchasing insurance,
that fewer or less severe psychic injuries than average will result from his risky behavior. Because he will not be liable for psychic injury unless he created an unreasonable risk of injury to
a normally constituted person, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, § 436A, the
defendant can hardly complain that he was surprised to be held liable for psychic injury or that
the liability for unusually severe psychic injury is an undue burden on him.
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4. Overdeterrence Unlikely
The above discussion of the challenges to full recovery for psychic
injury on overdeterrence grounds demonstrate that there is little reason to expect any regular over-assessment of damages for psychic injuries. Even if the incidence of overassessing damages is much greater
than the above discussions indicated, permitting full recovery for
psychic injury would not lead to overexpenditure on safety. The tort
system already provides such an excessively small incentive to avoid
accidents that permitting some false claims, some unreasonably inflated damage awards, and some awards for injuries not caused by
defendants would still not result in overdeterrence. For tort liability
to provide the proper incentive for safety, it should cause actors to
pay the full cost of all injuries proximately caused by their culpable
conduct. That aim is defeated before the tort system has a chance to
function because most persons injured by such culpable conduct
never seek any financial compensation.1 1 1 Those who do seek compensation often are unable to prove the defendant's culpable conduct
or its causal connection to their injuries." 2 Other claimants settle for
well below the actual monetary value of their injuries.
Some defendants may pay more in damages in particular psychic
injury cases than are properly attributable to their culpable conduct.
Insofar as tort law should provide appropriate encouragement to defendants to avoid psychically injurious accidents, however, such incidences of overpayment are virtually meaningless." 3 So long as tort
ll. See, e.g., W. SCHWARTZ & N. KomEsAR, DOCTORS, DAMAGES AND DETERRENCF- AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 11-12 (1978); Pierce, supra note 9, at 1295-96.
112. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 1296-98. No assumption is made that plaintiffs who
cannot prove causation deserve to succeed on their claims. Likewise, no assumption should be
made in dealing with the causation issues raised above, see supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text, that defendant's conduct was not causally linked to plaintiff's psychic injury in the

usual case.
113. This is not to say that we do not wish to avoid those results on other grounds, such
as fairness to the parties. Our sense of fairness to the parties, however, will not condone a rule
which takes care of these few incidences of overassessment by throwing out of court all the
legitimate claims of psychic injury that arise in certain circumstances. In addition, any sense of

unfairness is mitigated by the fact that defendants are given the full opportunity to convince
the impartial fact-finder that plaintiff's claim is false, or not worth more than a certain amount,
or not attributable to defendant's culpable conduct. Regardless of the difficulty inherent in that
task, it seems more fair than the alternative, which bars psychically injured plaintiffs from
presenting their claims to the court.
Perhaps more important, liability insurance will protect most defendants from any overassessment of damages in a particular case. A potential defendant's insurance premiums are
based on the insurer's payouts in a large number of psychic injury cases, which include those in
which damages were underassessed as well as those in which there were overassessments. Unless there is a regular bias toward overassessment, of which there is no indication, the defendant will be protected by the law of averages from any apparently unfair effects of occasional
overassessments.
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damages generally amount to less than the real accident costs proximately caused by decisions against safety, actors have no incentive to
spend as much to avoid those accidents as the accidents actually cost.
Because defendants act on predictions about the future costs and
benefits of their behavior, particularly when they are insured, a few
damage awards higher than actual injury costs will matter only insofar as they influence those actors' estimates of the future costs for
that behavior. The factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph are
more likely to influence tort law to underassess costs than are false
claims, uncertain damages and uncertain causation likely to influence
the law to overassess costs. Accordingly, tort law should not further
reduce the already inadequate incentives to avoid accidents by permitting actors to completely disregard most psychic injuries when
calculating the expected costs of their behavior.
B. Secondary Costs: Loss Bearing
Secondary costs are the costs of accidents to society once the injury has occurred. While secondary costs are as important in the reduction of overall accident costs as primary costs, they are only relevant if primary accident reduction measures have failed to prevent
an accident.1 1 4 Two significant concerns about full recovery for
psychic injury focus on these postaccident costs. 1 5 The first such
concern, a major inspiration for the current restrictive rules in bystander cases, is the fear that full recovery for psychic injury will lead
to "unlimited liability.""' 6 Unlimited liability is discussed as a secondary cost because its direct effect is the "crushing" of the defendant, a spectre which invokes such traditional secondary cost concerns as the ability to spread loss." 7 The other secondary cost
concern is that full recovery for psychic injury will decrease the overall level of psychic well-being in society, even while reducing the total
number of accidents which cause psychic injuries.
1. The Threat of Unlimited Liability
The major secondary cost issue concerns unlimited liability. In
114. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 52, at 27-28.
115. A third concern relevant to psychic injury rules, compensation of injured persons,
could be discussed as a secondary cost. See G. CtLABaEsi, supra note 52, at 44-45. For a discussion of compensation as a separate goal, see infra notes 230-57 and accompanying text.
116. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 616-17, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 559-60 (1969); Miller, supra note 31, at 6; Henderson, supra note 8,at 515; Nolan & Ursin,
supra note 30, at 607.
117. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 52, at 64-67. Because the unlimited liability concern
also involves concerns about overdeterrence of useful activities, see infra notes 124-41 and accompanying text, it has primary cost reduction aspects as well.
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the past fifteen years, many courts and commentators have identified
potentially limitless liability as a critical obstacle to their willingness
to permit full recovery for psychic injury.1 18 That concern has been
articulated primarily with respect to psychic injuries to bystanders.
Even the California Supreme Court, which took a bold step towards
recognizing bystander recovery for foreseeably caused psychic injury
in Dillon,119 has since retreated by imposing artificial definitions of
what is foreseeable, largely because of reawakened concerns about
unlimited liability. 12 0 Unlimited liability also has a more theoretical
importance. It is probably the only realistic rationale for denying recovery for bystanders' psychic injuries in a judicial system which permits full recovery for pain and suffering and for psychic injuries resulting from damage to a plaintiff's property. The incongruity of
permitting such recovery while denying it for bystander psychic injury is emphasized below. 12 1 That incongruity finds some explanation,
at least as regards bystander cases, in the built-in limits on liability
that exist in pain and suffering and psychic injury for property damage cases because there is only one plaintiff.1 22 If recovery is allowed
for foreseeable psychic injury to bystanders, the potential exists for
many plaintiffs to sue as the result of a defendant's physical injury to
one person.
Despite the importance of the unlimited liability concern to opponents of full recovery for psychic injury to bystanders, no one has
satisfactorily articulated why unlimited liabiltiy is such a major concern.1 23 An obvious concern is that defendants will have to pay dam118. See supra note 116. See also Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204,
208-09, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975) ("without a reasonable and proper limitation of the scope of
the duty of care owed by appellees, appellees would be confronted with an unmanageable, unbearable, and totally unpredictable liability.").
119. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
120. See Nolan, supra note 30, at 607-08. The Hawaii Supreme Court, the other bystander recovery leader, similarly retreated because of unlimited liability fears. See Kelley v.
Kokua Sales & Supply Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975).
121. See infra notes 276-95 and accompanying text.
122. Only one person's pain and suffering will be taken into account when that person is
physically injured by defendant's culpable conduct. Recovery for psychic injury for damage to
one's property normally will entail recovery only by the property owner. While that occasionally may be more than one person, see, e.g., Edwards v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 280 Or. 307, 570
P.2d 1169 (1977), the number of persons psychically injured by damage to property they own
ordinarily will be very low. This does not explain as well the difference in treatment between
the usual bystander cases and cases allowing recovery for psychic injuries resulting from physical injury to a pet, where the plaintiffs' link was emotional rather than proprietory. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981).
123. Even the most careful judicial and academic expositors of the restrictive position do
little better than talk about the need for "reasonable circumspection within tolerable limits
required by public policy" or "the social policy function of placing practical limits on negligence-based liability." Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301
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ages"" which place too heavy a burden on useful activity. 12 That fear
has two closely related aspects. First, there is the possibility that a
large damage judgment will exceed the defendant's resources, bankrupting him. Second, such enormous liability may make liability insurance unavailable to the defendant, either because insurers will refuse to insure against psychic injuries or because the insurance will
be prohibitively costly. Thus, large liability would prevent some defendants from engaging in the risky activity which caused the psychic
injuries. If defendants were able to pass on the liability costs assessed
against them, the result would be an increase in the price of some
26
goods to consumers.1
The threat of those supposedly 2 7 undesirable effects is not likely
to materialize.'
Concededly, the spectre of crushing liability looms
N.Y.S.2d 554, 560 (1969) (Breitel, J.); Henderson, supra note 9, at 517. But see Shavell, An
Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463,
599-500 (1980).
124. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 559 (1966) ("The factor of unduly burdensome liability is a kind of dollars-and-cents
argument.").
125. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 334. The unlimited liability concern may also
contain an element of fear that a negligent defendant will be held liable for damages out of
proportion to his fault. Yet even under the full recovery rule a defendant will be held liable
only for psychic injury foreseeably risked by his conduct. His liability will in fact be fully consonant with his fault in engaging in that conduct. See infra notes 310-28 and accompanying
text (discussion of disproportionality).
In some areas of law, the unlimited liability concern may involve a belief that transaction
costs associated with litigation need to be avoided. Cf. Shavell, supra note 123, at 465, 479-81.
That concern in the area of psychic injury is usually raised in the argument that liability will
lead to a flood of litigation.
126. That could be an increase in the price of something the defendant sells, if the defendant is carrying on a business activity, or an increase in the price of liability insurance, if the
defendant externalizes his liability through insurance.
127. For a discussion of why a "crushing burden" of liability is often desirable, see infra
notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
128. There is reason to approach any judicial prediction of crushing liability with skepticism. That reason was best explained by Fleming James:
[T]he fear of crushing useful activity by liability too vast to be borne is no new thing in
the law, and its history has not been altogether savory. This consideration, like the
fabled cry of "wolf," often has been invoked when later events proved that the fear was
groundless. Sometimes the fear has been voiced by a dissenting minority, and the decision overruling them has not been attended by the dire consequences that the dissenters
predicted. Sometimes the fear has prevailed for a while, to be overruled by a later judicial generation. When this has happened, the fear that stayed the hand of liability in the
earlier day has often not been realized when liability finally was imposed. This points to
a danger: the factual basis for the fear must not be accepted too readily and should be
examined critically on the basis of whatever data are at hand. The caveats, however, do
not all run in one direction. As the fable itself suggests, although the cry of "wolf" may
often be false, there are wolves, and wolves are dangerous.
James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 48-49 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
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large, at least in one's imaginings, if bystanders can fully recover for
their psychic injuries.1 2 9 Almost every person who is physically injured will have loving ones who are distressed by his injuries. Full
recovery for bystanders will therefore entail several compensable injuries for every person injured directly. Today's already large verdicts
will expand exponentially.'"0
The spectre probably is no more than that, a conjured-up possibility which never materializes. The spectre is one of over-whelmingly large liability. That is exceedingly unlikely to occur unless very
serious physical injury or death has been inflicted on someone by defendant's culpable conduct. Liability for such serious injury may be
crushing all by itself. 3 ' In fact, if the psychic injury component of
liability in accidents involving death or serious bodily injury is looked
at separately, it has far less crushing potential than the direct physiThe law is replete with instances in which argument for extensions of liability have been
met with judicial resistance on the grounds of avoiding the crushing burden of liability without
limit, resistance which was later abandoned, or was abandoned in other jurisdictions, without
any evidence that the new rules left a wake of crushed defendants. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 620, 249 N.E.2d 419, 425, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 562 (1969) (Keating, J., dissenting); Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees & W. 109, 152, Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). Compare
Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 411, 449, 563 P.2d 858, 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307
(1977) with Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 14-15, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981).
129. An illustration of how large the spectre may loom is presented by the use of the
example of the assassination of a President, with the question whether the assassin could be
held liable to the millions of distressed persons around the world. See W. PROSSER, supra note
32, at 69; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 10, § 46, comment 1. Put aside the possible difficulties involved with millions of lawsuits - it would not be extraordinary to require all
psychic injury actions to be joined with the action of the directly injured party, see Weitl v.
Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 1981), and class actions with thousands of plaintiffs have
been maintained. The important points to be derived from the example are that (1) the
assassin would be "crushed" financially by a finding of liability in a wrongful death action by
the President's estate, an action already permitted by tort law; and (2) if the assassin were
quite wealthy and the risk of bankruptcy would have a deterrent effect on him, we would want
him to feel the economic threat of a multitude of psychic injury judgments. Few persons, and
even fewer judges, would feel much sympathy for a wealthy assassin "crushed" by the financial
burden of massive tort judgments.
130. For a detailed account of the damages which might result from a negligently caused
death if full bystander recovery were permitted, see Miller, supra note 31, at 14-15 n.84.
That is not to say that there will not be bystander psychic injuries resulting from lesser
physical injuries to others. Absent serious injury or death, however, damages for both the direct
injury and for the bystander psychic injuries will be moderate to small. Even in those rare
instances in which a bystander suffers a debilitating psychic injury as a result of a moderate
injury to someone else, no more than one person would have that idiosyncratic reaction.
131. Few individuals carry sufficient liability insurance to pay a million-dollar damage
judgment. Many small businesses probably would be "crushed" by a million-dollar verdict.
Such verdicts happen often enough now that they no longer can be considered extraordinary.
See, e.g., USA Today, Oct. 27, 1983, at 3A, col. 6 (in 1982, there were 251 personal injury jury
verdicts of greater than one million dollars); 26 ATLA L. REP. 130-32 (Apr. 1983). All 13 of the
million-dollar verdicts or settlements reported in that limited part of one month's Association
of Trial Lawyers of America publication were for physical injuries to an individual
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cal injury alone. 1 32 One would expect psychic injury awards to close
family members to be significant, but only in rare cases would an
individual's psychic injury be as crippling and permanent as death or
a grievous physical injury. The potential existence of many psychically injured persons for every seriously physically injured plaintiff
does not mean that psychic injury liability will approach that for
physical injury. Only in the extraordinary case will more than a few
very close persons suffer serious psychic injury from physical injury
to a loved one.1 33 Liability for those injuries and whatever liability
might dribble in for minor injuries will make the liability burden associated with any serious physical injury heavier in almost every case.
In some few cases the additional weight of psychic injury liability
might make an otherwise bearable liability burden unbearable. The
likelihood that bystander psychic injury liability will so tip the scales,
however, seems no greater than the likelihood that liability from
other physical injuries from the same accident would do so.'
Experience demonstrates why bystander psychic injury recovery
would not be expected to materialize into any additional crushing
burden on defendant's activities. One would expect the threat of a
crushing bystander liability burden to manifest itself in the form of
notable increases in liability insurance premiums. California's experience with bystander recovery demonstrates the effect of expanded recovery on liability insurance rate increases. That state pioneered the
expansion of bystander recovery to persons outside the zone of physical danger. 3 5 It has the longest experience with the expanding rule
and also possesses a large population base which would be likely to
generate substantial numbers of bystander claims. Indications are
that the effect of expanded bystander recovery for psychic injury on
California liability insurance rates is negligible. One major California
132. See, e.g., Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982) (mother awarded
$118,000 for mental suffering resulting from daughter's permanent brain injury; award for
physical injury itself more than $1.3 million); D'Ambra v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 1180
(D.R.I. 1973) (mother who suffered a depression-like psychoneurosis from seeing her four year
old son killed by a mail truck awarded $10,000); Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d
1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977) (husband awarded $52,000 for his own physical injuries and
emotional suffering as a result of an accident which killed his wife). No court, of course, denies
recovery for physical injury for fear that damages will be crushingly large.
133. Usually only some close family members and one or two others in an ongoing relationship with the physically injured person might be expected to have the sort of intense and
long-lasting psychic injury that would generate a significant damage award.
134. See Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercom. Hosp., 52 Or. App. 853, 868, 631 P.2d 1377,
1385 (1981) (Roberts, J. dissenting), aff'd, 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 (1982). "I do not believe,
however, that the fact that more than one person is damaged by a defendant's negligence
should relieve that defendant of liability in this situation [children suing for loss of parental
society and companionship] any more than if the defendant negligently ran into a school bus."
135. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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liability insurance underwriter reported that it did not alter its actuarial tables to reflect psychic injury liability.136 The company has not
even bothered to separate out data concerning liability claims for
psychic injury because there have been only one or two such claims
annually since Dillon was decided in 1968.137 Even if some bystander
liability claims make a defendant's total liability unbearable, defendants should be able to avoid financial ruin the same way they avoid
that result from other kinds of liability: through liability insurance.
There is no reason to believe that liability insurance for psychic injuries would be any less available or affordable than for physical
injuries.'
Despite the foregoing reasons and evidence, those long wedded to
the fear of unlimited liability may be reluctant to abandon the idea
that bystander psychic injury recovery will suppress at least some socially useful activities. An onerous burden of liability, however, is
probably just what is needed" 9 to encourage a reduction in overall
accident costs. Even an oppressive liability burden should be im136. Telephone conversation with Walter Moffett, Underwriter-Property Manager, San
Francisco office of the Kemper Group (Sept. 16, 1983) (notes of conversation, initiated by Syracuse University College of Law student Lisa I. Cohen, on file with author). Mr. Moffett has
apparently worked with Kemper since before the Dillon decision which expanded bystander
recovery.
137. Id. Mr. Moffett did report that claims involving psychic injury tended to be significantly larger than in the average physical injury case.
138. Admittedly, there might be much greater uncertainty by insurers about the potential
scope of psychic injury liability. Such uncertainty might cause cautious insurers to build into
their basic rates overly pessimistic assessments of their insureds' psychic injury liability resulting in insurance disproportionately expensive in relation to the actual injury. However, insurers
are no more likely to do this with respect to psychic injury coverage than physical injury coverage. The predictability problems associated with psychic injury damages are, if anything, less
severe than those associated with physical injuries. The possibility of the freakishly large
psychic injury claim will be handled the same way insurers have handled the possibility of a
freakishly large physical injury, such as the possibility of a motorist colliding disastrously with
a school bus. The insurer will build the aberrant liability risk into its basic rate for the relevant
class of insureds, spreading the risk of the fortuitously large judgment across the entire class of
insureds whose conduct might cause such an unusual injury. Even freakishly large injuries, like
million-dollar physical injury verdicts, happen often enough to become statistically predictable
after a time.
139. That conclusion is articulated more definitively than is really meant, for the purpose
of emphasizing the inapplicability of the utiliarian concerns about the loss of socially useful
activities. Society should care about barricades it erects to, or guillotines it brings down on, the
activities in which its members chose to engage. The financial "crushing" of a person or business has high costs in emotional and economic pain. So may simply scaring some individual or
business off from a desired activity. One cannot be concerned with plaintiffs' injuries without
being troubled by the injury which a tort judgment inflicts on a defendant. No one would suggest, however, that this concern about injuries to defendants or potential defendants should
move society to protect them with rules which mean greater injuries will be inflicted on others
in society. This is particularly so in light of the more ready availability of insurance to the class
of defendants than to the class of plaintiffs. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

posed on defendants if it represents an accurate evaluation of the
psychic injuries proximately caused by their culpable conduct. "40
'
Such liability will send the proper message, discouraging actors from
activities which risk such psychic injury.' 4 1 The actors retain the option of engaging in any activity they choose. The threat of large damage awards simply means that some actors will not engage in activities the expected benefits of which, they have decided, do not
outweigh their expected costs.
This market deterrence approach of tort law would lead to undesired results only when a defendant does not accurately calculate the
benefits of his risky behavior. In such cases, liability could force an
actor to abandon, or deter him from commencing, an activity from
which society would otherwise derive a net benefit. Abandonment of
a socially useful activity would occur, however, only when the actor's
private benefit from the activity is significantly less than the social
benefit resulting therefrom.' 4 2 Because courts want activities to continue only when their social benefits exceed their social costs, they
must have such situations in mind when they resist the imposition of
"crushing" liability burdens. Such situations may occur, 4 3 albeit infrequently. They will most likely occur only in strict liability cases.
This is because in negligence cases, which comprise the overwhelming
majority of psychic injury claims, the defendant will not be held lia144
ble if the benefits of his conduct outweigh its costs.
In those few, if any, situations in which courts conclude that liability for psychic injury will curtail an activity whose social benefits
outweigh its social costs, they should nevertheless apply the full re140. The full recovery rule will lead to that accurate evaluation. See supra notes 73-108
and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
142. If the private benefit to the actor of his conduct approximates its social benefit, the
courts should be sanguine about assessing the actor the full injury costs caused by the conduct.
He will be able to accurately weigh the costs and benefits because he experiences both fully.
The situation could also arise when the actor is a poor predictor of the benefit which will accrue
from his conduct. Tort law's market deterrence approach assumes that individuals usually are
the best judges of the benefits they are deriving and will derive from certain conduct. While the
numbers of failed businesses in this country are ample testimony to the failures of individuals
in making such judgments, it seems unlikely that there is some other person or institution
which would better predict or evaluate the benefits of an individual's conduct than that individual himself. Cf. G. CALABREsi, supra note 52, at 69. The individual's picture of the social
benefit of his conduct or activity usually derives from the income he can derive from others as a
result of his actions. That income of course need not be monetary. We regularly weigh monetary costs with non-monetary benefits to determine if the benefit is worth the cost.
143. See supra note 69.
144. In determining, in the negligence calculus, whether the burden on the defendant of
avoiding the accident was greater than the expected cost of his original risky conduct, courts
look at the social value of the interests to be advanced or protected by the defendant's original
conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, § 292.
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covery rule. Its application will ensure that only activities which provide this net social benefit will continue. That result will occur because the liability burden will crush an activity which causes an
extraordinary amount of psychic injury, unless that activity receives
some subsidy. Ideally, those members of society who received the
benefits would pay for them, although that probably would not be
feasible where the market will not reward defendants commensurate
with the benefit their conduct confers on others. In those few cases,
from the appropriate legisthe subsidy would probably have to14 come
5
lative or other governmental body.
Ultimately, actors in society would pay the injury costs associated
with their conduct just as they pay the costs of services, materials,
etc., necessary to their activities. If society desires certain beneficial
activities which would discontinue in a free market requiring actors
to pay the activities' full accident costs, then society should make it
worthwhile for actors to engage in those activities. So long as the appropriate societal decision-maker decides the social benefit is great
enough, some form of subsidy will flow from the social treasury to
ensure the activities continue. That will assuage the courts' concern
that the psychic injury liability will crush valuable activities. On the
other hand, if the decision-maker decides not to subsidize an activity,
presumably the social benefit is not sufficiently great. In either event,
requiring defendants to bear the full costs of their activities will force
some societal evaluation of the benefits which it supposedly receives.
The present rules, based on the concern about the crushing burden of
liability, hide that question. Based on unexamined assumptions
about the social usefulness of some unmentioned activities, the courts
determine that defendants in all activities should not have to pay for
the full psychic costs caused by their conduct. No decisions are made
that particular activities are so valuable that society would lose a net
benefit if the relevant actors faced potentially large psychic injury
liability. If such decisions are ever attempted,1 4 6 they are not being
attempted by those in the best position to evaluate the benefits: the
representatives of the society which supposedly receive the
benefits. 4 7
145. Such subsidies are hardly unprecedented. The bailout loan guarantee for the
Chrysler Corporation to save it from bankruptcy was based, one must assume, on Congress'
judgment that the nation benefitted more from Chrysler's continued existence than Chrysler's
sales reflected.
146. No court has articulated that decision as its rationale for denying recovery to
bystanders.
147. In speaking of the government, particularly the legislature, as the best decisionmaker about what benefits really obtain from the activities in question, I am not just parroting
the tired refrain that the legislature is the only true voice of the people. In many matters which
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In sum, the fear of unlimited liability should be disregarded as a
rationale for restricting recovery for psychic injury. The concern
upon which it is based, that a crushing burden of liability will be
imposed on useful activities, seems unlikely to become a reality. Even
if it became a reality in some instances, that crushing burden would
be a desirable result.
2. The Threat of Increased Psychic Injury
The other principal secondary cost concern which the full recovery rule raises is that opening the courtroom doors to psychic injuries
will indirectly increase the sum of psychic injury in society. That
might happen in two ways. First, the litigation process may aggravate
or extend the psychic injuries of the plaintiff. Second, by giving more
hospitable treatment to psychic injury claims, the law may encourage
a greater sensitivity to psychically disruptive events in the general
population, which will result in more overall psychic injury. On the
other hand, permitting full recovery for psychic injury may significantly ameliorate plaintiffs' psychic injuries. Additionally, any
greater sensitivity which the law happens to encourage in the general
population may be desirable. There is some evidence and logic to
support both views, but it is inconclusive. There is certainly no sufficient basis for confidently concluding that a full recovery rule will
create more psychic injury in society than now exists. 14 8
On the more general level, the traditional reaction to the supposed effect of liability rules on nonlitigants' psychic well-being has
been to deny recovery because mental toughening will provide better
protection.' 49 In other words, 150 denial of recovery will lead to a geninvolve governmental expenditures to assure the continuance of usually private activity, as in
the Chrysler and Lockheed matters, there is considerable public interest and difference of opinion. Those factors move the government more towards responsible articulation of the public
will on any issue.
148. It must be kept in mind that this discussion focuses only on what effect a recovery/
no recovery rule will have on the levels of psychic injury once injury-producing accidents have
occurred. It ignores, as the full discussion of the merits of the full recovery rule cannot, the
deterrent impact of the rule on behavior which risks such injury. See supra notes 66-71 and
accompanying text. Here again insignificant psychic injuries may present a less compelling argument for recovery. See infra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
149. Magruder, supra note 102, at 1035. "Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in community life, a certain
toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be." Id.
150. The other interpretation of this view is that it will be cheaper for potential plaintiffs
to avoid psychic injuries by toughening their hides than it will be for potential defendants to
avoid psychic injuries by altering their risky behavior. The view that the psychic injury plaintiff
will probably be the cheapest cost avoider does not seem supportable. See supra notes 102-08
and accompanying text.
A related idea proposes that the plaintiff in psychic injury cases is the cheaper cost
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eral toughening of people's mental hides, so that either they do not
suffer any psychic injury from certain trauma or they suffer less
psychic injury than they would have with tender mental hides. Perhaps the more relevant obverse view is the idea that the full recovery
rule will gradually soften people's hides. Two questions arise. First,
will full recovery increase sensitivity to psychically disruptive events?
Second, is such an increase in sensitivity desirable?
Answering the desirability question first may make the answer to
the sensitivity question more clear. "Softer" hides are considered undesirable because they mean that more psychic injury will result from
a given level of traumatic stimuli. Softening presumably would occur
in the presence of a full recovery rule because the law's subtle molding of attitudes and feelings would cause psychic hurts to increase by
permitting recovery for them.'- This view relies on a strong belief in
tort law's strength as a shaper of people's attitudes and feelings. Assuming such strength, there is considerable doubt whether it is undesirable that tort law communicate a message which affirms the value
of close human relationships and emphasizes the importance of feelings. The full recovery rule would deliver such a message. Denial of
tort recovery for psychic injuries sends out a contrary message. If the
full recovery rule results in more psychic pain to individuals from the
same level of traumatic stimuli, it must be because the law's change
has made human relationships or feelings more important to those
individuals' lives. Opposition to such a shift in attitudes and feelings
seems unlikely, even if it did expose people to more hurt in the event
of accidents.1 5 2
spreader, the person in the best position to spread the cost of the psychic injury across the
greatest number of people. Plaintiffs presumably would do this through insurance. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 52, at 224 & n.19. It is questionable whether plaintiffs can more cheaply
spread the costs of their psychic injuries. Insurance for psychological care necessitated by
trauma is available through most group health insurance plans, but is not readily available
through many individual first-party insurance policies. Conversations with Mrs. Edwards, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Central New York (Aug. 5, 1983), and Jed Rhoades, of the Kemper Group,
Inc. (Aug. 2, 1983). As a practical matter, few potential plaintiffs could do anything about their
insurance for psychic injury, regardless of liability rules, even if they wanted to. In addition,
individuals probably have considerable difficulty appreciating a risk of future serious psychological harm from an accidental cause. An actor who cannot easily appreciate a risk of harm nor
easily act on that information once he does appreciate the risk is not a prime candidate to be
designated the cheaper cost spreader. Cf. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1062 (1972) (discussion of assumption that injurers have
requisite foresight to estimate accident costs and avoid accidents).
151. See G. CALABREsI, supra note 42, ch. V. Professor Calabresi points to changes in the
law regarding alienation of affections and pornography as examples of situations where legal
changes led to a decrease in sensitivity to psychic injury. He does not point to situations where
a liberalization of the right to recover has led to a softening of hides. Id.
152. It seems unnecessary to itemize here all the reasons why we would prefer persons to
value more highly human relationships and the feelings of themselves and others. The key to
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The increased psychic 'hurt which would accompany greater sensitivity to traumatic stimuli should be more than offset by the increase
in overall psychic well-being likely to accompany that sensitivity. An
increase in the importance individuals attach to human relationships
and feelings logically results in an increase in deeper relationships
among people and increased attention to what makes oneself and
others feel better. Concomitantly, as people become more sensitive to
feelings and interpersonal relations, they will be less likely to take
actions which damage others' lives' 53 and less likely to permit their
governments to do so.' At the same time, just permitting recovery
in cases where courts have ignored important psychic injuries should
reduce the demoralization costs felt by participants in and observers
of such rulings. 55
This discussion of the desirability of "softer" hides should carry
some clues for the reader concerning a proper evaluation of whether
such softening truly will take place as a result- of a change towards a
full recovery rule. One might well doubt, in reading the above two
this discussion is that one would not expect significant disagreement in society about such a
preference. Should one disagree with that preference, he should consider the reasons set forth
in the following sentences of the text which indicate that a shift toward higher importance of
relationships and feelings would probably lead to a higher overall level of psychic well-being.
153. See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, supra note 42, ch. V, in which the author points to the tolerance of Germany's 1933 racial laws by "good" Germans as leading to later tolerance of the
extermination of Jews. That is merely the obverse of the idea expressed in the text. Calabresi
also emphasizes, as does the text here, that the long-run costs of rules must be examined to
make sure that the avoidance of short-run costs, such as the initial increase in psychic injury
that might result from full-recovery-rule-encouraged sensitivity, is not over-emphasized in assessing those rules' secondary impact. It is the long-run increase in psychic well-being expected
from increased sensitivity which should offset any short-run cost increase.
154. This latter point may be particularly significant to the view that the concern about
increased injury is greatest when recovery is permitted for insignificant psychic injury. See, e.g.,
G. CALABRESI, supra note 42, ch. V. If permitting tort recovery will increase the psychic injury
experienced by persons who witness a highway accident and who would otherwise feel only a
passing twinge of sorrow, such a rule creates an undesirable secondary cost. That increased cost
may not have the obvious offset of the injury decrease from more sensitive behavior, because
the person with an insignificant psychic injury is likely to be enough of a stranger to the events
which gave rise to that injury that his increased sensitivity will not affect those events. However, that "tangential" sensitivity may still reduce psychically injurious events through the influence which more sensitive persons have on either governmental action or the actions of other
members of society. For example, persons who witness a bad traffic accident and whose transitory psychic injury is increased by their ability to recover tort damages will presumably be
more concerned than they would otherwise be with governmental policies regulating traffic
safety and will presumably influence their family and acquaintances towards safer traffic
behavior.
155. See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, supra note 48, at 33; Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights - Part1,1973 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1173;
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1214 (1967). Demoralization costs are the outrage,
resentment, demoralization or the like which persons feel when the state refuses to compensate
the wrongly injured or to sanction the wrongful injurer.
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paragraphs, that tort law so significantly affects attitudes and feelings, either because lay people are overwhelmingly ignorant about
such fine points as for what one may recover damages or because
equivocal rules15 6 about damage recovery seem unlikely to affect a
person's psychological makeup in the face of the many more significant direct effects on that makeup. If it exists, that skepticism should
carry over to challenge the notion that the full recovery will make
people more psychically injury prone. Even those most concerned
about the cost of increased susceptibility to injurious trauma acknowledge that tort recovery rules are not likely to change one's
psychic reactions to serious injury or death of a loved one.15 On the
other hand, if in reading the preceding paragraphs, one focuses on
the nature of the full recovery rule's effects, one would conclude that
there would be some increased psychic sensitivity. As those
paragraphs demonstrate, however, one must go beyond the surface
suggestion that more psychic injury will result and examine both
psychic benefits and reductions in injury causing accidents that
might contemporaneously result. At best, the notion that society
would be a net loser in psychic welfare if there were a full recovery
rule is highly debateable. Looked at more objectively, that notion
probably appears erroneous.
There has been more directly focused research and analysis of
whether permitting recovery for psychic injury increases psychic injury for those who would seek such recovery. Unfortunately, it likewise is inconclusive. There is some evidence and logic which supports
arguments both that psychic injury recovery aggravates and that it
ameliorates claimants' injuries.
It would be no great surprise to find that psychically injured persons who did not go through litigation had more fully recuperated
than similarly injured persons who did litigate. A plaintiff in a per156.

See, e.g., J.

O'CONNELL,

ENDING INSULT To INJuRY 113 (1975). O'Connell points to an

Illinois study which showed that 70% of all accident victims had no knowledge or expectation
of compensation for pain and suffering. Tort law gives recovery for some directly caused
psychic injury and for some bystander psychic injury while denying it for other psychic injury
that may be identical in its psychic nature and in its occurrence as a result of someone's culpable conduct. See supra notes 11-38 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the message which will
go out to all but the most sophisticated observers will be equivocal.
157. See G. CALABREsI, supra note 42, ch. V. Given how little would be known about recovery for lesser psychic injuries, it would be suprising to find such rules influential in affecting
people's sensitivities to psychic injury, except for those few persons who actually brought a tort
claim for insignificant injuries. If persons are generally ignorant about the availability of damages for pain and suffering, see J. O'CoNNEL, supra note 156, at 113, they will probably have
virtually no knowledge of a recovery rule regarding trivial psychic harm which will have none of
the long tradition and financial significance of pain and suffering recovery rules. Given the costs
of lawyers and litigation, few lawsuits for insignificant psychic injury are likely to be brought.
See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
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sonal injury suit must stress the severity of his symptoms in pre-trial
discovery and at trial to recover the maximum amount of money
damages. His lawyer will also reinforce the plaintiffs sensitivity by
asking him to focus on the injury 15 and by guiding the evidence
through specialists who emphasize the gravity of his situation. Contested litigation itself is often very anxiety producing, both because
of its delay and uncertainty and because an adversary will attempt to
discredit the plaintiff.159 The possibility of a sizeable monetary reward and the considerable attention, perhaps even prominence, given
the plaintiff as the star of the litigation show may also reinforce the
psychic injury. 60 These factors suggest that damage claimants might
generally experience more psychic injuries than non-claimants. A recent long-term study reinforced this suggestion. That study showed
that persons receiving medical treatment for low back pain tend to be
disabled longer or rehabilitated less successfully if they were receiving or hoping to receive compensation than if they expected no
compensation.''
No doubt these sorts of logical inferences motivated legal and
medical experts to approach a study of pain and litigation in the late
1970's with, the thesis that pendency of a compensation claim causes
more pain to the claimant than would be experienced by a similarly
suffering individual who brought no such claim. 1 62 The study revealed, however, that neither participation in litigation nor representation by attorneys had any significant effect on the pain behavior of
persons who filed claims for workers' compensation. In fact, the study
suggested that persons represented by lawyers underwent greater rehabilitative treatment than persons not so represented, thereby up158. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 72, at 337-39 (quoting from basic trial advocacy
handbook's suggested detailed instructions for a personal injury lawyer to give a client, which
instructions force the client to focus extensively on, and memorialize, his injury).
159. This view of the litigation's effect on the plaintiff's psyche postulates the worst-case
scenario of a lawsuit fully contested to verdict. As most suits end in settlement, the majority of
the effects mentioned in the text would be eliminated or reduced.
160. Cf. Deziel v. Difco Lab., 403 Mich. 1, 55-58, 268 N.W.2d 1, 24, 25 (1978) (Coleman,
J., dissenting) (discussion of factors which lead plaintiffs to dwell upon, and fail to resolve,
their psychic injuries).
161. Finneson, Modulating Effect of Secondary Gain on the Low Back Pain Syndrome, 1
ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY

949, 950-51 (J. Bonica & D. Albe-Fessard eds. 1976).

In the study, the 324 patients not receiving benefits averaged a total disability of 16 days per
episode while the 281 patients receiving or hoping to receive benefits averaged a total disability
of 36 days. Similarly, of the patients treated surgically, only 5% of the non-receivers had unsatisfactory results, while 11% of those receiving or hoping to receive benefits had unsatisfactory
results. Id. For a discussion of the strong similarity between pain and what is generally considered psychic injury, see infra notes 281-92 and accompanying text.
162. Peck, Fordyce & Black, The Effect of the Pendency of Claims, for Compensation,
Upon Behavior Indicative of Pain, 53 WASH. L. REV. 251 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Peck,
Fordyce & Black].
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setting the thesis that lawyers resist attempts to cure their clients.16 3
Another study in a different setting also supports the conclusion
that litigation ameliorates claimants' psychic pain. In the Buffalo
Creek Flood of 1972, an entire community was wiped out by a flood.
Persons were permitted to sue for their psychic injuries.6 The law
suit on behalf of more than 600 men, women and children was settled
in 1974 for $13.5 million, over half of which was paid for psychic injuries.16 5 Researchers from the University of Cincinnati Department of
Psychiatry conducted studies of the psychological conditions of the
flood victims beginning soon after the flood and continuing until well
after the lawsuit settlement. They found that the largest improvement in the mental health of the victim-litigants took place in the
year following the settlement and concluded that the lawsuit victory
was an important positive factbr in alleviating the victims' sometimes
severe psychic injuries."6
The researchers' explanations for this positive effect seem commonsensical. In the first place, litigation clearly may be therapeutic,
affording the plaintiff an opportunity to do something about the injury which was wrongfully inflicted upon him.167 The lawsuit thus decreases the plaintiff's sense of powerlessness, helping him to recover
from psychic injury which may be aggravated by the feeling of loss of
control over life. Even the process of formally describing the injurious experience may be psychologically beneficial, both as a catharsis
and as a constructive channeling of anger."6 s That therapeutic effect
may be bolstered by the prospect of money damages at the end of
litigation. A person's self-confidence and initiative may be aided by
having sufficient finances to implement decisions about his life. 6 9
Similarly, the availability of a monetary recovery should make the
plaintiff both more willing and hopefully more able to quickly obtain
163. Id. at 273-74.
164. See Prince v. Pittston Co., 63 F.R.D. 28 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
165. G. GLESER, B. GREEN & C. WINOET, PROLONGED PsYcHosocIAL EFFEcTs oF DIsAsTMm A
STUDY OF BUFFALO CREK 121 (1981) [hereinafter cited as G. GLEsER].
166. Id. at 129.
167. One need only think back to the earliest kind of action for purely psychic injuries,
that for assault, see L de S. et ux. v. W. de S., Y.B. Lib. Assis. f. 99, pl. 60 (1348), to recognize
that the law has long viewed civil litigation as a psychological substitute for physical retaliation.
Cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 38 (probability that our assault would be followed by a
breach of the peace led to an early recognition of that test). A psychiatrist who studied survivors of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency skywalk collapse reported that the lawsuits brought by
many persons displaced their anger over the harm to them or loved ones. N.Y. Times, July 6,
1982, at C4, col. 3.
168. See, e.g., Cienfuegos & Monelli, The Testimony of PoliticalRepression as a Therapeutic Instrument, 53 Aim& J. ORTHOpSYcIATRY 43 (1983).
169. See O'Connell, supra note 72, at 360 n.84.
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professional help in dealing with his psychic injury.'7 0 Finally,
whatever anxiety might be produced by the litigation process 1 ' pales
in comparison to the anxiety which psychically injured persons would
suffer when inability to obtain compensation and the resulting financial worries are added to already serious psychic upset. It must not
be forgotten that individuals are free to forego suit for their psychic
injuries if they think it will cause them to experience more psychic
pain.
In sum, the arguments and evidence that full psychic injury recovery will have undesirable secondary costs are unconvincing. Indeed, only very large secondary costs could sway the argument
against the full recovery -rule. Full recovery will decrease psychic injury by deterring psychic-injury producing accidents. As a result,
even if some increase in costs was associated with the fewer accidents
which would occur, the full recovery rule would still lead to an overall
reduction in psychic injury accident costs. However, the factors emphasized by those who foresee an increase in secondary costs do not
withstand close scrutiny. The widely articulated fear of unlimited liability is chimeric. In fact, the focus on defendants' potentially limitless liability obscures the important fact that defendants are probably in a better position to spread the loss than are the victims. 172 The
170. Id. See also Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 15, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981) (child's
cause of action for loss of parental consortium allowed, in part because damages will enable
child to cope with loss). Given the relative infrequency of first-party psychiatric insurance, see
supra note 150, the sort of immediate professional assistance necessary to minimize an injured
person's psychic injury is likely not to be used, for cost reasons, if the prospect of at least
having the professional's bills paid is not available.
171. See supra text accompanying note 160. If that anxiety is to be used as a reason for
denying recovery, the plaintiff has been doubly crossed by the law. He not only must go
through a lengthy, expensive, anxiety-producing system in order to obtain compensation for his
injuries, but he then must face the argument that because the system is so difficult that it
might add to his woes, it will refuse recovery completely for his injury. We will see the same
sort of argument later with respect to transaction costs, see infra text accompanying notes 20711. At some point the common sense of fairness will be offended by a legal system which makes
itself so complex, anxiety-producing and costly that it then refuses to redress violations of people's rights because the process of redress is too difficult or costly.
172. The difficulties potential plaintiffs would have in evaluating the risks of psychic injury and obtaining insurance for such injury are pointed to in supra note 150. That note does
not discuss the difficulty an individual may have in appreciating in advance the value of insurance against psychic injury. Just as it has been difficult for the courts to understand the value
of money in dealing with serious psychic injuries, see, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19
Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977), so too potential victims may
have considerable trouble foreseeing what a dollar payout from an insurance company will do
to salve their distress. The potential defendant, on the other hand, may be able to spread his
liability loss across a large number of consumers through a price increase in his product as well
as being able to spread through insurance. The only significant obstacles to the defendant's
acquisition of insurance against liability for psychic injury are uncertainty of damages and the
possibility of many injured plaintiffs. As the discussion in the text accompanying supra notes
102-08 indicates, those obstacles will usually be less significant than those facing the plaintiff.
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less widely articulated fear1 73 that full recovery may increase the sum
of psychic injury in society may have more merit, but that fear is
rooted in observations about direct negative impacts of permitting
psychic injury which fail to perceive larger direct and indirect positive impacts. Although the conclusion that the full recovery rule will
reduce secondary accident costs is reached less confidently than the
conclusion it will decrease primary accident costs, it seems highly unlikely that the rule will increase secondary costs.
C. Tertiary Costs: The Costs of the JudicialProcess
Even if the full recovery rule will more effectively reduce the
number and severity of accidental injuries and more fully spread the
costs of those injuries than the present rules, it might not reduce
overall accident costs. A full recovery rule may substantially increase
transaction costs in determining liability for psychic injuries.174
Those opposing expansion of recovery for psychic injury have offered
three kinds of arguments which suggest the tertiary or transaction
costs of psychic injury cases may outweigh their primary and secondary cost savings. 17 5 The first argument focuses on obvious increases in
transaction costs that would accompany the full recovery rule, the
cascade of costs from the predicted "flood of litigation." The second
argument also focuses on the costs of deciding psychic injury cases,
Regardless of what the relative loss-spreading capabilities of plaintiffs and defendants
would be if plaintiffs insured themselves more, the present reality is that defendants usually
can more easily and completely push at least part of the burden of any particular accident onto
others than can the injured victim.
173. The fear does influence courts, however. See, e.g., McLoughlin v. O'Brian & Others,
[1981] 1 All E.R. 809, 828 (C.A.) (Griffiths, L.J.).
174. In other words, in seeking to achieve the reduction of overall accident costs, courts
must make sure that their "tertiary" costs, the costs of whatever they do to reduce primary and
secondary costs, are not greater than the reduction in accident costs they achieve. See G. CALABRsi, supra note 52, at 28.
175. These kinds of arguments raise a fundamental question about the relationship between transaction costs and legal rights. Commentators such as Calabresi and Posner, who pursue a cost-benefit analysis of tort rules, seem to have little doubt that the administrative costs
attendant on a cause of action should influence whether any legal right exists. See, e.g., G.
CALABRESI, supra note 52, at 143-44; Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STMU.109, 126-27 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Landes]. See also Epstein,
supra note 40, at 74-79 (rights theorist accepting importance of administrative costs). As has
been noted, an injured person might legitimately feel unfairly treated if he finds the system
through which he seeks vindication of his right very difficult and expensive. Unfairness becomes further apparent when he is told he does not even have the right in question because the
system is too expensive to make enforcement of that right worthwhile. See supranote 171. This
issue has potentially broad importance, but needs a fuller treatment that would divert from the
principal questions this article seeks to redress. It suggests that where the principal arguments
for or against recognition of a certain cause of action are its relative administrative costs, courts
should tread cautiously in deciding whether such arguments even apply.
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but does so more subtlely by pointing to inherent factors making
such cases more costly to decide than ordinary cases. The third argument takes a slightly different approach. Rather than emphasizing
the costs of deciding psychic injury cases, either in gross or in particular, 17 6 this argument stresses the insignificance of benefits arising
from the "trivial" cases which comprise a substantial portion of the
cases courts would have to hear. Even if such cases were no more
costly than the usual cases to decide, they would not be worth entertaining because their cost reduction benefit would be so small. While
the first two kinds of arguments should give little cause for concern
about the wisdom of the full recovery rule, the latter is troubling and
requires serious consideration of modifications to the full recovery
rule.
The first tertiary cost concern marched out to confront the advancing full recovery rule seems always to be the Chicken Little cry
that courts will be overwhelmed by an ensuing flood of litigation. Although justifiably discredited by most courts and commentators,7
the argument persists.178 In essence, it says that substantially broadening the right to recover for psychic injury will mean the already
overburdened judiciary will be staggered by a sudden, enormous increase in its caseload. That argument should not persist. It should
cease in psychic injury cases because experience with the incremental
steps taken to relax restrictions on suits for psychic injury, particularly bystander psychic injury, 17 9 indicates a great increase in the
number of cases is not likely to occur.'8 0 The argument should cease
176. It is not unusual, however, to find expositors of this third kind of argument also
claiming that the transaction costs will be unusually high. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 14, at
506-07.
177. See Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131,
-, 447 N.E.2d 109, 111
(1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 161-64, 404 A.2d 672, 680-81 (1979). Even courts which reject
expansion of liability for psychic injury have rejected the flood of litigation rationale. See, e.g.,
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969).
178. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 14, at 506.
179. It is bystander cases, with their potential for many psychic injuries arising out of a
single instance of culpably caused physical injury, which seem to stir up talk about the litigation flood. Id.
180. Since 1968, several states have permitted some bystanders to recover for psychic injury without themselves having been in the zone of physical danger created by defendant's
culpable conduct. Hawaii and California have been the leaders in loosening restrictions on bystander recovery. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text. The Hawaii Supreme Court
reported in 1981 that more than a decade of experience with its broadened bystander recovery
rule had shown that there would not be a "plethora of similar cases" nor would there be unlimited liability problems. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066,
1071 (1981). A review of the longer California experience with bystander recovery similarly
found no substantial increase in litigation by psychically injured bystanders. See infra notes
248-50 and accompanying text. In New South Wales, Australia, where family members were
given a statutory cause of action for mental suffering due to the injury or death of a spouse or
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in regard to tort law generally, because it completely ignores the benefits such cases might produce. To say there should not be full recovery for psychic injuries because many such cases will be brought
makes no more sense than saying there should not be recovery for
trespass or violations of first amendment rights because there will be
many such cases. The number of potential cases is irrelevant to
whether we will be net losers or winners by allowing such causes of
action. This makes it necessary to consider the societal benefits and
costs which psychic injury cases are expected to generate. Accordingly, examination of transaction costs in psychic injury cases should
focus on the other two tertiary cost arguments: that transaction costs
of such cases are unusally high, and that the cost reduction benefits
are unusually low.
There are two ways in which psychic injury cases may be unusually costly to decide. First, they may lead disproportionately to trial,
rather than to settlement.1 8 1 Second, they may be unusally costly to
decide whether settled or tried. The full recovery rule would not be
unusally costly in either respect. It would not increase the probability
that cases will go to trial, because the rule is readily comprehensible.
Moreover, the uncertainty of damages associated with psychic injuries is no greater than for many other injuries and may actually assist
settlement.
With respect to comprehensibility, Professor James Henderson
has attacked the Dillon v. Legg approach which permits bystander
psychic injury recovery on the grounds that it leaves the liability decision devoid of sufficiently formal guidelines for jury decision. 182 The
crux of Professor Henderson's criticism of the Dillon approach, however, is the fact that the limits it sets on bystander recovery are so
nebulous that liability can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.1 " The full recovery rule, which merely tracks the usual proximate
cause requirement that the psychic injury have been reasonably forechild, no flood of litigation ensued. P. ATiYAH, supra note 68, at 82-83.
181. It normally costs more to try a case than to settle it. Some indication of the relative
costs of settlement versus trial can be found in a 1977 report of the California Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform which concluded that the cost of settled tort cases was $200-$300 per
case while the cost of jury trial was about $3,300 per case. E. BERNZWEIG, By AccIENT, NOT
DESIGN THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE INQUIRY PREPARATIONS 89 (Praeger ed. 1980). A 1982

report of the Rand Institute for Civil Justice said that cases concluded after a settlement conference in the jurisdictions studied cost $311-$393 to process, while a jury trial's average cost
ranged from $2,790 in a Florida court to $8,649 in Los Angeles County. J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN,
COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES 63.
182. Henderson, supra note 9, at 515-18. The open-ended or "polycentric" decision which
the jury must make in applying Dillon-type guidelines leaves the litigants unable to make orderly and rational argument on the question of liability and leaves the jury to exercise unlimited discretion. Id. at 468-76, 517.
183. Id. at 517-18.
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seeable, is not so informal nor unclear. 84 Lawyers and insurers, the
key figures in structuring settlements, are quite familiar with the
concept of reasonable foreseeability. The concept has been a linchpin
of tort liability for more than a century. 18 Admittedly, the full recovery rule on its face does not appear as simple or formalistic as the
zone of physical danger or ensuing physical injury rules. The increasingly broad interpretations given those rules by courts sensing the
injustice of excluding obviously legitimate claims of serious psychic
injury, 86 however, have rendered the application of those rules less
clear in practice than they appear on paper.
Uncertainty of psychic injury damages also will not force more
cases to trial. The nature of psychic injury will not make damages
more difficult to estimate than they are in the cases already accepted
by the judicial system. Those trying to settle physical injury cases
must make guesses concerning the probable award for pain and suffering and for loss of earnings, judgments about which they can be no
more certain than they would be in assessing likely psychic injury
damages." 7 As a practical matter, the uncertainty may help the settlement process because it will probably make both parties feel they
have something to lose by going to trial and give both room for negotiation. 8 8 Regardless, the process of settlement will be no more difficult than it currently is in most tort cases.
Likewise, trials will be no more costly. Psychic injury trials might
actually be less costly per injury than other trials if jurisdictions
adopted a rule requiring joinder, where feasible, of psychic injury
suits with the lawsuit filed by the primary victim whose injury led to
184. In fact, Professor Henderson seems fairly comfortable with the standard proximate
cause rules, although he might be less comfortable if he perceived those rules as being more
often outcome determinative. See id. at 516 & n.180. The foreseeability of plaintiff's psychic
injury will seldom be seriously in question. It would be surprising if that foreseeability were a
central issue more frequently than foreseeability is an issue in physical injury cases.
185. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 251-56.
186. See, e.g., Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, 276-78, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 684
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980) (mother
permitted to recover for psychic injuries resulting from child's birth with severe birth defects,
caused by defendant's drug administered during pregnancy; father not permitted to recover).
See supra notes 15-18 (cited cases interpreting physical impact or physical injury to include
trifles). See also Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 838 (1980) (criticizing the physical injury requirement because it "encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony").
187. Insurers will probably compute the dollar value of psychic injuries by multiplying
the medical bills and other special damages by a predetermined figure, just as they do in reaching intangible injury damage settlements. See E. BERNZWEIG, supra note 181, at 117.
188. Any increased uncertainty inherent in psychic injury cases favors defendants because
they will not be under the same pressure to resolve the litigation quickly as many plaintiffs.
See, e.g., E. BERNZWEIG, supra note 181, at 115-16.
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the psychic harm. 189 Because the primary victim would be in court
seeking redress for his injuries anyway, 190 the incremental costs of
determining whether bystanders were in fact psychically injured and,
if so, to what extent, would be much less than if separate trials were
needed for each bystander's injury.
Even if separate psychic injury suits are brought, they would
probably be similar in cost to most tort actions. Some, perhaps many,
psychic injury cases would require expert testimony to deal with disputes about causation and the nature and extent of the injury.1 91
Medical malpractice physical injury cases, which comprise a substantial share of tort litigation, already require experts not just for determining causation and dimensions of the injury, but also for determining whether defendants acted negligently in the first place. Products
liability cases, another major portion of the torts caseload, also usually require expert testimony, often about technical matters much
more unfamiliar to the average juror than the somewhat familiar
world of human emotion. In fact, medical malpractice and products
liability cases are particularly costly to handle,19 2 yet they continue to
be heard unquestioningly by courts. Similarly, physical injury lawsuits are not intrinsically easier to decide. 9 3 The extent of psychic
injury is no more difficult for a jury to determine than the extent of a
plaintiff's pain and suffering, which is an integral element of most
significant physical injury damage awards. In terms of time and effort, psychic injury determinations are probably less burdensome
than assessments of lost future earnings which, because of the illusion of possible certainty, require long and complex calculations in189. The Iowa Supreme Court adopted a joinder rule permitting children to bring actions
for loss of parental consortium in the face of objections based on the high administrative costs
of such actions. Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 1981). See also Shockley v. Prier, 66
Wis. 2d 394, 404, 225 N.W.2d 495, 501 (1975).
Such a joinder requirement would assuage concerns expressed by some courts about multiple suits arising from one accident and about possible duplications in. recovery. The concern
about duplicative recovery, one plaintiff recovering damages that are in essence for the same
injury for which another person has already recovered damages, has appeared most frequently
in cases in which the plaintiff has been psychically injured as a result of culpable injury to a
close relative. See, e.g., De Angelis v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 84 A.D.2d 17, 23, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188,
195 (1981), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1983).
190. If the original victim and the psychically injured bystander are personally close to
each other, they are more likely to litigate or settle together.
191. Some quite clearly would not require expert testimony. See, e.g., Campbell v. Animal
Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 562-64, 632 P.2d 1066, 1069-70 (1981); Vance v. Vance, 286
Md. 490, 502-03, 408 A.2d 728, 734-35 (1979).
192. See, e.g., E. BERNZWEIG, supra note 181, at 86-87.
193. In assessing whether psychic injury actions are inherently more costly to try, this
analysis focuses on difficulties and uncertainties of proof and decision partly because the most
recent attempt to explain psychic injury tort rules on the basis of administrative costs does so
with that focus. See Landes, supra note 175, at 127.
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volving decisions about life expectancy, proper discount rates, and
the like.
Arguably, a jury decision about a psychic injury may be less costly
in time and effort than a loss of future earnings determination because it is much more akin to flipping a coin. If a jury decides what
damages to award for psychic injury on the basis of unguided discretion, that too is a cost of the transaction.19 4 In assessing the significance of this possible arbitrariness, however, remember that discretion is inherent in any system which tries to place a monetary value
on intangibles having no market value. Additionally, much greater
discretion exists at the stage of valuing the injury than at the stage of
determining liability, where the jury is guided by the same requirements that guide juries in other tort cases.'9 5 Even in making their
valuation, however, the jury is bounded by generally accepted notions
of what would be too much or too little for particular psychic injuries. 198 Juries are no more effectively bound with respect to a host of
other decisions they routinely make, such as the amount of money
which represents a particular level of pain and suffering or what
amounts to "reasonable" behavior under all the circumstances.' 9 ' Because there is no indication that juries regularly exercise their broad
discretion in valuing a particular psychic injury in favor of plaintiffs
or defendants, 98 society should accept seemingly arbitrary damage
assessments as the best the system can achieve while acting against
culpable defendants only through money damage awards.
1. The Insignificant Injuries Problem
The foregoing explanations as to why psychic injury cases are not
unusually costly are only marginally relevant to the third kind of
transaction cost argument against expanding recovery for psychic in194. Exactly how to categorize this cost is difficult. Arbitrariness in decisions may influence society's view of law or the legal system in a way that makes future dispute resolution
more costly or decreases the effect of legal rules on behavior. One commentator would approach
the problem of unguided discretion as a process, rather than a cost-benefit problem. See Henderson, supra note 9, at 515. Others might find arbitrariness offensive to their sense of justice.
The problem is discussed in this section because it relates most directly to the way in which
psychic injury cases are decided. See also supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
195. Juries are guided by rules concerning the culpability of defendant's conduct, proximate cause, and the like.
196. Cf. P. ATIYAH, supra note 88, at 215. Courts have the power effectively to throw out
jury awards which go beyond generally accepted limits of generosity or penury in awarding
damages for particular injuries.
197. See, e.g., 1 N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL, PJI 2:10 (2d ed. 1974). For a
discussion of the uncertainty inherent in damage awards for psychic injury, see supra notes 8593 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 82 & 86.
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juries. That argument focuses on the negligible benefits to society in
reducing primary and secondary accident costs obtained from trivial
psychic injury cases. We do not want to permit recovery for trivial
psychic injuries, the argument goes, because the costs of making liability decisions outweigh the benefits which that decision confers. l99
The present rules, the argument concludes, do the best job of keeping
insignificant psychic injuries out of the courts, while permitting some
psychic injury cases to be heard. 200 The strongest answer to this argument has been articulated throughout this article: rules designed to
keep out trivial cases also keep out many serious psychic injury cases.
As a result, actors are not being sufficiently discouraged by tort law
from conduct which results in significant personal injury. Moreover,
the present rules are not even necessary to solve the problem of trivial cases.
Much like the concern about unlimited liability, the concern
about permitting trivial psychic injury claims is almost universal
among courts.2 0 ' What is not shared is a concept of the policy underlying that concern. Putting aside the "flood of litigation" bogeyman
sometimes mentioned in the same breath as the fear of trivial
claims, 20 2 there seem to be three identifiable underlying policies.
First, the courts may simply be concluding that persons have no right
to be protected against non-serious invasions of their psychic wellbeing. Section III of this article analyzed the entitlement to psychic
well-being in such instances. 0 3 Second, an underlying policy may be
the belief that all persons in society both cause and receive trivial
psychic injuries. Therefore, permitting recovery for such injuries will
simply result in a costly shuffling of wealth back and forth among the
same parties.2 0 4 Finally, the underlying policy may be a belief that
199. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 175, at 125-27.
200. In fact, the argument as phrased by the courts rarely is expressed so fully in costbenefit terms. Most often a court will simply say that it must reject a psychic injury claim
because it will lead to a flood of trivial cases or because courts cannot be havens for those with
hurt feeling or bruised egos. See, e.g., Swanson v. Swanson, 121 Ill. App. 2d 182, 257 N.E.2d 194
(1970); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, _,
437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982).
201. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, , 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982).

Even those jurisdictions which have eliminated most barriers to psychic injury recovery have
been careful to erect one new barrier: that the psychic injury be "serious" before it can be
compensated. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929-31, 616 P.2d 813,
820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838-39 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509,
520 (1970). Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, -,
451 N.E.2d 759, 764-65 (1983).
202. See, e.g., Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824, 825-26 (D. Del. 1965).

203. See supra notes 39-63 and accompanying text. Insofar as the administrative costs of
protecting certain interests through litigation influences one's notion of the rights people have,
see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 40, at 74-79, the discussion in this subsection is quite relevant to a
decision whether people have a right to freedom from trivial psychic injuries.
204.

This seems to be the view espoused by Professor Richard Pearson, who is among the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

51

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

recovery for trivial injuries serves no significant accident cost reduction purpose and the costs of deciding such cases produces a net cost
to society.
Only the latter policy needs attention here. The second view, that
courts may want to ignore trivial psychic injuries because of their reciprocal nature does not explain judicial unwillingness to award damages for such injuries where the defendant is found negligent. The
reason not to confront defendants with liability for trivial injury
where such injuries occur reciprocally throughout society is that such
persons, who are simply behaving the way most people do, will undergo a significant burden to change their behavior from the norm.
That burden will not be outweighed by the possibility that a small
psychic injury will result. The flaw in this reasoning lies in the meaning of a court's finding of negligence. Negligence is the decisionmaker's conclusion either that the defendant created a risk of psychic
injury to others greater than was generally created to him or that the
burden of avoiding the risk of injury was actually less than the risk of
injury."' In other words, if the burden of behavior changing were really greater than the value of avoiding the psychic harm to be
avoided by the change, the defendant never would be found negligent
in the first place.20 6
The final policy basis cannot be as easily discarded as the other
two. The fact is that we do not want most trivial psychic injury
claims to be litigated. However, we do want substantial psychic injury claims to be litigated. Furthermore, we do not want to create
rules to keep out trivial claims which end up costing more than the
rules save.
The principal accident cost reason to bar insignificant psychic injury claims is that allowing such claims will only slightly benefit society, while the cost of resolving them is not so slight. With the average
most impressed of the thoughtful commentators on psychic injury by the need to eliminate
trivial claims. Pearson, supra note 14, at 508. This view echoes Fletcher's notions of the creation of non-reciprocal risks as being at the heart of liability determinations. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537, 546-47 (1972).
205. These points rearticulate the Fletcher and traditionally accepted Learned Hand tests
for negligence. See Fletcher, supra note 204, at 542.
206. The reciprocal risk view discarded here may be based on the feeling that all of us act
negligently from time to time. As a result of this, people's feelings get hurt, and it would be a
waste of resources to allow lawsuits for such situations. The same could be said for our automobile driving (that each of us acts negligently at times), yet no one suggests we should not be
liable for negligent driving. Arguably, automobile driving is different because there serious injuries are being risked. It should be kept in mind that the nature of the injury risked is an
important determinant of whether certain conduct is negligent. Where the harm risked is small,
courts are unlikely to find that a common behavior is negligent, because the burden of altering
such behavior will be higher than the injury risked.
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jury trial costing more than $3,000,207 excluding the costs of attorneys, witnesses, paperwork, etc., litigation of trivial claims must
achieve some significant primary or secondary cost reduction in order
to be cost-justified. A trivial claim would probably not result in a
damage award of more than $400-500.2o8 While the damages assessed
are not the only factor to consider in determining the deterrent and
cost-spreading benefits of a case,20 9 they are probably a reasonable
indicator of those benefits in most cases. If a case which generates no
more than $400-500 in deterrence and cost-spreading costs more than
$3,000 to decide, society will be wasting resources if it allows those
cases to go to trial.2 10
207. See supra note 181.
208. In Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 558, 632 P.2d 1066, 1067
(1981), the Hawaii Supreme Court approved a trial court finding that the plaintiffs had suffered
"serious emotional distress." The total damages awarded to the five persons with "serious"
injury were $1000. Id. Even allowing for differences among courts and juries, it would seem to
be a rare occurrence to find a jury awarding more than $500 for what courts would consider a
trivial injury. But see Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., 97 Misc. 2d 530, 531, 415 N.Y.S.2d
182, 183, (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1979), in which the court awarded plaintiff $700 damages for what
Professor Pearson concludes a neutral eye would recognize as a trivial claim. See Pearson,
supra note 14, at 508 & n.177. The plaintiff suffered "shock, mental anguish and despondency"
which lasted through the time of trial as a result of defendant's wrongful disposal of her deceased poodle's body and his substitution of a cat in the casket he delivered to the elaborate
funeral the plaintiff had arranged. From the opinion's description of the funeral the plaintiff
had arranged for her dog, it is clear that the plaintiff had an extraordinary relationship with
the deceased. Given that, it is not at all apparent that her psychic injuries were trivial, even
though Professor Pearson would probably be correct if he were concluding that the stimulus for
the injury was trivial.
209. For example, the mere fact of a liability judgment may have a noteworthy deterrent
effect on image-concious defendants. In addition, certain indirect benefits may result from permitting recovery in trivial cases: persons may become more sensitive to the feelings of others;
persons may become more respectful of the law generally if they see it as enforcing rights even
when principles, rather than large sums of money, are involved. See supra notes 148-55 and
accompanying text. After all, there are many instances where the legal system permits lawsuits
to protect interests where very little if any, money damages will available. See, e.g., Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
210. In addition to this waste of resources, permitting recovery for small claims may result in overdeterrence of useful activities, especially if many such claims are initiated. In the
instances of trivial claims, the defendant's litigation costs may very well exceed the accident
costs. As a result, the defendant will be receiving a deterrence message notably stronger than
the one which the primary accident costs of his conduct would send on their own. The defendant thus will have an incentive to change his behavior in ways which cost society more than it
benefits from the reduction in accidental injuries which accompanies those changes. Of course,
if the defendant is not held liable for small claims, he will not have the incentive to change his
behavior when that change would lead to a reduction in accidental injuries greater than the cost
of the change.
Although the costs of trials far outweigh the apparent benefits of the results of those trials
in trivial injury cases, the costs and benefits come much closer together in the vast majority of
cases which are settled before trial. Not only are the transactions costs much lower, the defense
payout is likely to be sizable relative to the seriousness of the claim. In short, the deterrent and
cost-spreading benefits are much more likely to approach the transaction costs when an insignificant psychic injury case is settled.
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While the above figures suggest that it is desirable to bar all insignificant psychic injury cases from court,2 1 ' the cost of erecting such a
barrier may be greater than its benefit. General rules designed to
keep out trivial claims are inevitably quite costly, both because they
keep out significant psychic injury claims and because considerable
dispute arises over their applicability. The benefits of such rules are
marginal at best, because they probably keep out of court few trivial
claims that would have been litigated anyway.
The costs of a general rule to bar trivial psychic injury claims
have proven to be considerable. The ensuing physical injury rule excludes some serious psychic injury cases and permits some trivial
ones.2 12 In addition, it creates substantial litigation over whether the
plaintiff's injuries reached the necessary level of objective manifestation.2 13 Those jurisidictions which bar all bystander psychic injury
cases obviously exclude many instances of serious psychic injury; so
do jurisdictions which have opened the courts to some bystanders.
The California experience in the thirteen years following Dillon v.
Legg indicates that considerable litigation attends efforts to draw the
It is generally accepted that settlement payments for trivial intangible injuries are higher
relative to the value of the injury than are payments for more serious psychic injuries. See, e.g.,

P.

ATIYAH,

supra note 88, at 217; E. BERNZWIEG, supra note 181, at 114; O'Connell, supra note

72, at 339. Interestingly, courts and commentators look at the data showing the relatively
higher payments for small claims and conclude they are overpaid. Given the financial and psychological pressures on a seriously injured plaintiff for early resolution of his claim, it seems
more likely that the serious injury claims are underpaid. See E. BERNZWIEG, supra note 181, at
115-17.
211. The figures of course make no such suggestion about trivial psychic injuries incurred
by a plaintiff who is suing to recover for other compensable injuries as well. In such instances,
the incremental cost of deciding the psychic injury claim may be so small that society gets some
net accident cost reduction benefit from permitting it to be decided. That view might explain
the courts' willingness to hear psychic injury claims which are parasitic to some independent
tort. See infra notes 298-303 and accompanying text. However, it does not explain the dichotomy between the treatment of significant psychic injury claims which are brought directly and
those which are brought as ancillary to an independent tort.
212. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-29, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 838 (1980). The ensuing physical injury requirement would have excluded
claims for what the courts regarded as serious emotional distress in Molien and in Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). It permitted what Professor Pearson's "neutral eye"
probably would have regarded as a trivial psychic injury in Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (Sup. Ct. 1906). In those jurisdictions where the physical
injury requirement has become so relaxed, see supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text, it is a
poor device for screening out the trivial.
213. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929-31, 616 P.2d 813, 82021, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838-39 (1980).
214. See, e.g., Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435
(1980); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Kelley v.
Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975); Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983).
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line for bystander cases, 215 a line which obviously is only partially

successful at including significant psychic injury claims while excluding insignificant ones.
Some courts have recognized that traditional restrictive rules do
only a hit or miss job at foreclosing trivial claims, while they also
foreclose serious claims important to accident cost reduction. Those
courts have confronted the problem of trivial claims head on, requiring plaintiffs demofistrate "serious emotional distress" for recovery. 216 If this threshold requirement was the only restriction added to

full recovery rule,217 it would largely solve the existing rules'
problems in excluding significant psychic injuries from judicial attention. It would still create substantial transaction costs, however, in
the form of litigation about whether particular psychic injuries meet
the seriousness threshold. Such a determination would have to be
made on a case-by-case basis.2

The courts seem to have considera-

ble difficulty applying a similar rule requiring plaintiffs to have suffered "severe emotional distress" to recover for intentional infliction
of psychic injury. 219 There is every reason to believe that the serious215. See Nolan, supra note 30, at 587-614.
216. See, e.g., Molen v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-30, 616 P.2d 813, 81920, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837-38 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520
(1970); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982); Sinn v. Burd,
486 Pa. 146, 168, 404 A.2d 672, 683 (1979). This approach seems to be the new wave that will
sweep the psychic injury jurisprudence of this decade. Cf. Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4
Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983) (holding that a cause of action exists for negligent
infliction of serious emotional distress without a showing of contemporaneous physical injury).
217. None of the jurisdictions which have adopted the serious emotional distress requirement have yet ceased other formalistic restrictions on bystander recovery. Paugh v. Hanks, 6
Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983), holds out the promise of abandoning other restrictions,
but is too recent to permit a confident conclusion to that effect. Some seem, however, to have
abandoned other restrictions on recovery for directly inflicted psychic injury. See Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Schultz v.
Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
218. See Pearson, supra note 14, at 511:
Severity is not an either/or proposition; it is rather a matter of degree. Thus, any attempt to formulate a general rule would almost inevitably result in a threshold requirement of severity so high that only a handful could meet it, or so low that it would be an
ineffective screen. A middle-ground rule would be doomed, for it would call upon courts
to distinguish between large numbers of cases factually too similar to warrant different
treatment. Such a rule would, of course, be arbitrary in its applications.
Cf. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 76, at 1255 n.102 (discussion
of difficulty in establishing a standard for determining whether a plaintiff's injury is sufficiently
serious to warrant compensation).
219. See Givelber, supra note 78, at 47-48, 74. The courts likewise have had difficulty
with the application of a similar standard in nuisance law, where a plaintiff may recover only
where the harm caused by the nuisance is "significant." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 10,
§ 821F. The determination of what harm is significant seems to be made by courts on a case by
case basis. See Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 45 Wis. 2d 164, 167-68, 171-72, 172 N.W.2d 647,
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ness test will be costly to apply.
At the same time, society would not derive much benefit from any
rule designed to exclude trivial claims. None of the existing rules
would keep out of court more than a few cases of trivial psychic injury, because few would be brought even if the full recovery rule existed. For centuries, the courts have permitted a physically injured
plaintiff to sue regardless of the seriousness of his injury. Many intentional tort actions do not require the plaintiff to have been injured
at all.2 2 0 Yet there has been no flood of trivial claims for such torts,
despite the multitude of slight physically injurious contacts which occur daily. The reasons there are so few trivial physical injury claims
would also keep trivial psychic injury cases to a minimum under the
full recovery rule. Suing someone is economically, psychologically and
temporally expensive. Most tort cases proceed on a contingency fee
basis, with the fee ranging between one-fifth and two-fifths of the
damage recovery. To take a case to trial if the plaintiff will recover
$400-500 in damages is simply not worth a lawyer's time.2 2' This may
be particularly true with respect to minor psychic injury claims,
where the jury is as likely as the courts have been to be skeptical of
the claim's value.22 2 The relationship between lawyer's fees and the
ultimate award only indicate part of the practical bar to trivial
claims. Finding a lawyer and taking a case through to judgment takes
considerable time and, for most plaintiffs, involves significant anxiety. There are simply too many practical barriers to expect litigation
of more than a small number of trivial claims. 2 3
Not only will few claims be kept out of court by a general rule
aimed to exclude trivial claims, but those few claims excluded are
HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 74-77 (1956). W. PROSSER,
supra note 15, at 577-80. Injuries such as exposure to the aroma of onions cooking and to the
sight of livestock breeding have been held to be significant harms. Medford v. Levy, 31 W. Va.

649, 651 (1969); 1 F.

649, 8 S.E. 302 (1888); Hayden, v. Tucker, 37 Mo. 214 (1866). See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

supra note 10, § 829, illustration 2.
220. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 29-30.
221. See, e.g., E. BERNZWIEG, supra note 181, at 114, reporting on studies which showed
that products liability cases are not worth bringing if the expected verdict is less than $5,000
and that medical malpractice claims involving minor injuries are discouraged by the contingent
fee system from being brought even if they are meritorious. Id.
222. See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 30, at 611 n.164.
223. Professor Pearson suggests that an important impact of permitting trivial claims
would be felt in the settlement process, because it would cost insurers more to fight the claim
than it would to pay the plaintiff. Pearson, supra note 14, at 508. Of course, if it would cost the
defendant more to fight the suit than his expected payout cost (probability of losing x damages
assessed if he loses), it will also cost the plaintiff more to litigate than he expects to win. Unlike
the plaintiff, however, the defendant will usually have an institutional interest in other psychic
injury lawsuits. Accordingly, the defendant will be more willing to take a loss in a particular
lawsuits than will the plaintiff, because a defendant who gets a reputation for forcing small
claims through to litigation will discourage future small claims suits.
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most likely to have primary and secondary accident cost reduction
benefits which outweigh their transaction costs. First, the mere availability of a tort action may discourage some conduct which would
culpably inflict slight psychic injury. The law's formal statement that
even small invasions of a person's psychological well-being are forbidden and the risk of being successfully sued may have a deterrent effect out of proportion to the damages which defendants would have
to pay. 224 Second, permitting trivial actions may have particular benefits similar to those for which actions for nominal damages for intentional torts have long been permitted, namely false imprisonment, assault and offensive battery. Those actions exist at least in part to
encourage recourse to legal action in situations where the plaintiff's
personal integrity has been so invaded that some legal form of retaliation may be needed to prevent a breach of the peace.22 5 Given that
successful plaintiffs who bring trivial psychic injury claims will rarely
make a net gain after paying the costs of bringing the action, the
types of trivial claims most likely to be brought are those in which
the plaintiff has substantial real anger about the injury, injuring incident or defendant.22 6 Finally, the availability of an action for trivial
injuries may, by satisfying individuals that others have not been
given carte blanche to trample on their psychic integrity, increase
overall satisfaction with the law and legal institutions.
Despite indications that overall accident costs will be reduced
even if trivial claims may be brought, the conclusion that an untrammeled full recovery rule best deals with the trivial claims problem has
not been reached with complete confidence. There seem to be legitimate grounds for barring trivial psychic injury claims. If courts still
perceive a need to curb trivial claims with a legal restriction,2 2 7 however, they should at least adopt a rule which avoids substantial transaction costs associated with the seriousness requirement. A useful ap224. In another context, Professor Calabresi has suggested that the administrative costs
of deciding some kinds of tort cases might encourage the use of sampling techniques rather
than case by case litigation to determine what an actor's total liability payments for a particular period of time should be. See Calabresi, supra note 95, at 86. Calabresi's suggestion supports the idea that for cases with transaction costs that are high relative to the benefits of the
transaction, permitting some such cases to be brought might have some deterrent value greater
than the mere sum of the damage verdicts.
225. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 36, 38.
226. See, e.g., Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hasp., 97 Misc. 2d 530, 415 N.Y.S.2d 182
(Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1979), discussed supra note 208.
227. As they might if they shared Professor Pearson's admittedly unsupported view that
most cases of negligently inflicted emotional harm are trivial. Pearson, supra note 14, at 509
n.177. That view finds little support in the reported psychic injury cases since 1970. It also
finds little support in logic, unless one assumes that juries regularly overvalue psychic injuries
in their damage awards, thereby making it worth plaintiffs' while to litigate trivial injury
claims.
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proach, consistent with tort law's traditional preference for market
determinations, would set a specific dollar amount which would be
deducted from any successful plaintiff's damage award."2 By setting
a dollar reduction amount for psychic injury claims, the courts would
ensure that plaintiffs who brought trivial claims would receive no
damages. Courts would thereby avoid the difficult and costly task of
determining case by case which psychic injuries are sufficiently serious. Instead, courts would continue to function as they normally have
in assessing the reality and dollar value of the plaintiff's claimed
psychic injury. With such a rule, plaintiffs confident their claim is
worth more than the deductible amount would proceed with their
suit, rather than being kept completely out of court by someone else's
determination that their claims are not serious. Defendants, knowing
plaintiffs would get nothing if they received verdicts under the deductible amount would have an additional strong card to play in settlement negotiations of claims they considered trivial.2 29 While this
rule would have benefits in eliminating trivial psychic injury claims
as effectivly as a seriousness requirement, without the high transac228. That is similar to the approach used in the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, the suggested uniform automobile no-fault law. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act § 5(a)(7) (1972)
[hereinafter cited as UMVARA]. That model law would have created a $5,000 floor for tort
actions arising out of automobile accidents by simply reducing any tort award by that amount.
That approach was adopted because of the concern that other thresholds of seriousness, even
those which required a set dollar amount of medical expenses, were subject to extensive dispute
or plaintiff manipulation. A $5,000 floor would not be appropriate for trivial psychic injury
cases. It was chosen for the UMVARA to ensure that compensation for most automobile accident injuries was provided through the relatively inexpensive no-fault compensation system. It
did not attempt to do what the dollar reduction amount for psychic injuries must do: distinguish which injuries are so clearly insignificant that they should not be compensated at all. Id.,
comments on § 5.
229. The deductible amount, if it were set at, say, $500, would be the amount paid to the
court by the plaintiff awarded $500 or more. If the plaintiff were awarded less than $500, he
would have to pay his full damage award to the court. The dollar reduction amount would not
reduce the payment the defendant was held to have to make to the plaintiff. This would help
society defray the excess transaction costs of trivial claims litigation, while not removing either
whatever deterrent effect such small judgments might have on a defendant's culpable conduct
or the defendant's incentive to settle small claims, with the transaction cost saving inherent in
such settlement. The accident cost savings achieved by such deterrence of injuries and incentive to settlement would probably exceed whatever increase in costs might result from any
increased social susceptibility to psychic injury occasioned thereby. Some increase in psychic
injury may result from this sanctioning of the defendant. Changes in persons' sensitivity to
conduct, such as the publication of pornography, following that conduct's decriminalization,
suggest that the existence of sanctions against conduct may cause people to be more bothered
by it. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 142, ch. V. However, it seems fair to assume that any tort
sanction for psychic injury would have a greater effect on those directly sanctioned, in changing
their injury causing behavior, than it would have on the sensitivities of the masses who may
never learn of the sanction and may not perceive it as separate from sanctions for more serious
psychic harm.
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tion costs, it should be considered only a close second to the unfettered full recovery rule. The automatic reduction will just raise the
already significant barrier which the economic, temporal, and psychological costs of litigation pose to the significantly psychically injured.
Nonetheless, it is far preferable to the draconian restrictions presently employed in the name of avoiding the flood of trivial claims.
V. COMPENSATION

Unlike the other generally accepted goals of justice and reduction
of overall accident costs, the goal of compensation for injured persons
leads only one way in tort law, towards recovery for the injured plaintiff.230 That does not demean its significance; it remains a fundamental aim of tort law. 23 1 Indeed, it may be the goal which best explains

the marked shift in most areas of tort law in the past thirty years
towards plaintiff recovery.23 2 Because the compensation goals tends
to be so one-directional, however, the useful inquiry which it motivates usually is not "should the plaintiff or the defendant be liable,"
but rather "how strongly does the desire to compensate operate in
the situation at hand?" In other words, the issue for this section is:
how strongly does the need to compensate the psychically injured
pull towards the full recovery rule? In order to deal with that issue, it
is useful to look at what is being compensated and what the nature
and function of compensation is in the context of psychic injury.
There is certainly nothing in the nature of the inquiry to suggest
that the psychically injured plaintiff has any less reason to expect the
compassion of the legal system than other injured persons. Psychic
230. See Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv.
681, 703-04 (1980). Analysts who take a broader view of the workings of the tort system may
not have this one-directional vision of the compensation goal. Accepting the compassion underlying the desire to compensate, some analysts.recognize that a lawsuit and judgment of liability

leave the defendant with a traumatic and perhaps dislocating loss. However, compassion for the
defendant generally is less weighty than that for the plaintiff because most defendants have the
ability to shift their losses, either through insurance or increased costs to consumers. See supra
notes 118-47 and accompanying text. The one-directional character of the compensation goal is
less significant with respect to damages for psychic injury, since, as the above discussion
demonstrated, accident cost reduction goals likewise lead to a conclusion that the full recovery
rule should be adopted. See supra notes 118-47 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 481, 656 P.2d 483, 496
(1983); G. CALABREsI, supra note 52, at 44-45; James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in
Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. R.v. 1, 2 (1951).
232.

Cf. Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U.

CHL

L. REV. 103, 108-09, 115-

16 (1970). Professor Gilmore's comments suggest that changing attitudes towards the role of
society in nurturing its less fortunate members, as reflected in the rise of the Welfare State or
something like it in most Western societies in the last 50 years, may have more to do with
changes in the civil law than any amount of correct legal or economic analysis. Those changing
attitudes find their tort law counterpart more in the goal of compensating injured person than
in justice or accident cost reduction goals.
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injuries can disable a person from the normal conduct of life as completely as the most serious of physical injuries.23 3 If anything, psychic
injury may have a greater call on society's compassion than physical
injury. Most physical injuries are obvious to others. As a result, they
generate spontaneous expressions of sympathy and acts of support
from strangers as well as family, friends and co-workers. Such injuries can usually be understood by the important actors in the injured
person's environment. Psychic injury, on the other hand, is neither
obvious nor easily understood even by those who are aware of it. For
many persons, psychological problems have a stigma about them. As
a result, the potentially supportive element in the psychically injured
person's life will be less likely to respond spontaneously with the sort
of emotional and physical assistance which is vital in helping an individual cope with any sort of significant injury. Insofar as society will
not do as much spontaneously to help the psychically injured overcome that injury, it may consider the compensatory aspects of the
civil justice system more important.
Questions about the importance of compensation have been
raised, however, by those focusing on the nature and function of
monetary damages awarded for psychic injuries. The essence of the
challenge to the importance of compensation is that it serves no purpose to give someone a significant sum of money in return for having
lost something which money cannot buy and which has no real monetary equivalent.2 3 4 The view was well expressed in a leading case denying children the right to recover for the loss of a parent's
consortium:
Loss of consortium is an intangible non-pecuniary loss; monetary compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the companionship and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish
a fund so that upon reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will
be less in need of maternal guidance; they will be unusually
wealthy men and women. To say that plaintiffs have been
"compensated" for their loss is superficial; in reality they have
suffered a loss for which they can never be compensated; they
have obtained, instead, a future benefit essentially unrelated
to that loss. 3 5
Others recognize that compensation for nonpecuniary injury may
serve some purposes, but argue the purposes served are not signifi233. See, e.g., Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Stress, supra note 76, at 1252.
234. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 306 (1977).
235. Id. at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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cant enough to justify inflicting an economic loss on a defendant.2 36
The point of compensation in tort law is to put an injured plaintiff back in the same relative position that he occupied before he was
injured.23 7 Tort law awards injured persons monetary damages to accomplish that end. If a surgeon loses an eye because of negligent conduct of another person, thereby causing the loss of $100,000 in income annually, tort law will, without hesitation, assess damages of
$100,000 per year for lost wages. In so doing, we are confident that by
replacing money lost, we are returning the plaintiff to the same position of relative satisfaction she occupied before her injury. Interestingly, tort law never inquires how the wages lost would have been
spent.
For example, one might have very different concepts of how adequately the plaintiff had been restored to her previous level of satisfaction depending on whether the plaintiff spent most of her income
on fine dining and climate control systems or spent it on fine art and
other primarily visual pleasures. Again, one's view of the adequacy of
compensation would be different if the surgeon herself was not injured, but instead her husband and child, on whom she had regularly
spent two-thirds of her income, were killed. Compensation for what
the plaintiff has suffered in dimunition of her pleasure in life is not
less important where the injury is inability to appreciate beauty or
loss of loved ones than when the injury is loss of wages. For all but
the Uncle Scrooges of the world, money is an instrumental thing, important to a person only because of what it can obtain for him that
gives him pleasure. Wages are significant to the hypothetical doctor
because she can use the money to obtain art and other visually pleasing things or because she can bring a certain kind of life to those she
loves. To regard an injury which consists of the loss of money as
more important than an injury which consists of the direct loss of
something, the availability of which made the money important in
the first place, is nonsensical.
This analysis suggests that the considerations which may
weaken 238 support for the compensation goal in psychic injury cases
236. See, e.g., P. A=AH, supra note 88, at 538-39; Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury:
The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CorrEMP. PROBS. 219, 224-25 (1953).
237. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 86, at 4, 150; W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 6. That
statement assumes an injury solely caused by the defendant's culpable conduct.
238. Clearly, the Borer criticism of compensation for intangible, non-pecuniary injury, see
supra note 231 and accompanying text, does not suggest foregoing compensation for this kind
of injury. For example, while denigrating the value of monetary compensation for lost consortium in Borer, the California Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed its conclusion from a prior
case that a wife can sue for loss of her husband's consortium. Borer v. American Airlines, 19
Cal. 3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858, 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1977). The criticism merely suggests that the desire to compensate should be less strong in these kinds of cases than in others.
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are the difficulty of measuring the proper amount of money to be
given for such intangible injuries and the inadequacy of money in
putting the plaintiff back in his same position of relative satisfaction
following such an injury. The difficulty of measurement should not
give the courts pause. Inherent in a system which embodies its tort
judgments in monetary damages is the need to affix a price tag to
losses which do not have a ready market value. There will, of course,
be greater certainty about the proper amount of damages when the
loss is in the form of money. Most of the injuries for which tort law
provides compensation, however, are not losses of money. While
many injuries, both physical and psychic, may result in loss of
money, from income loss or expenses incurred to remedy the injury,
those monetary losses are only secondary effects of the injury the
plaintiff is experiencing. They may or may not correspond to the
dimunition the plaintiff experiences in his enjoyment of life. Accordingly, to belittle the importance of compensation because the plaintiff's injury is not susceptible to precise monetary measurement
amounts to belittling its importance in most of tort law.
In addition, it must be kept in mind that measurement is not impossible. Judges and juries can place a monetary value on the psychic
injury about which they hear evidence, just as they do for physical
pain and damaged reputations. That monetary value probably will
not be the same as another judge or jury would place on the same
injury; indeed, awards for similar injuries may vary considerably from
case to case. So long as there is no indication that damages are being
consistently over or under assessed because of the uncertainty of
measurement, however, this is unimportant. 3 Given the inability of
anyone to confidently say what a particular psychic injury is worth in
dollars, any attempt to achieve greater internal consistency in judgments would be no less arbitrary than present individual jury assessments, and probably more so.24
239. Consistent over or under assessment would cause over or under deterrence of defendants' risky conduct. Neither is likely to occur. See supra notes 81-83 and 91-93 and accompanying text.
The inconsistencies in verdicts which may result have apparently been more a concern in
Britain than they have in this country. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 88, at 215-16. The British in
1966 abolished jury trials in most personal injury cases in order to achieve greater internal
consistency in damage verdicts. Id. at 216. Any lesser internal consistency which may exist in
our jury system does not violate our generally accepted notions of justice because this society
can recognize that there are many equally valid judgments which can be made about the value
of a non-monetized injury. So long as those judgments are within the range of what would
generally be regarded as reasonable - a range which the courts police with additur, remittitur
and reversals for new trial - feelings of injustice are not likely to be strong.
240. For a brief discussion of possible alternatives to individual jury assessments, see
Miller, supra note 31, at 39. One way to achieve greater internal consistency while maintaining
the individuality of the plaintiff's injury would be to create a three-tiered schedule of psychic
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What apparently gives courts pause about the strength of the
compensation goals is a perceived inadequacy of monetary damages
to return the psychically injured plaintiff to the same position of relative satisfaction he occupied before the injury. Professor Pearson's
recent bystander recovery article comments about this aspect of damages in the context of Dillon v. Legg: "What makes Mrs. Dillon's fear
for her daughter's safety such an intense emotional experience is her
daughter's irreplaceability. It is hard to imagine that a mother would
find solace in a money judgment for the shock of seeing her daughter
being killed or seriously injured. '241 Professor Pearson and the California Supreme Court2 42 are correct that money cannot bring back a
loved one and that damages for very serious psychic injury make the
psychically injured plaintiff somewhat wealthy. However, they and
injury damages, perhaps with the labels "serious," "severe," and "debilitating." Predetermined
dollar amounts would automatically be awarded to the plaintiff, depending on the category in
which the trier of fact placed his psychic injury. Such a system would clearly be preferable to
complete denial of compensation for psychic injury because of uncertainty of valuation. However, the dollar amounts set for each of the categories would not only be arbitrary but they
would probably be low, if not at first, certainly later if the schedule of damages was not altered
regularly -to keep pace with inflation. Cf. G. CALAnRESI, supra note 52, at 203. The dollar
amounts would probably be low because, if the legislature set the amounts, lobbying efforts by
interested companies and insurers would be poorly counter-balanced by lobbying efforts from
trial lawyers, the only organized group which speaks for potential tort victims. If, on the other
hand, the courts set the amounts, they would be influenced to set them conservatively because
even those limited damages would represent a breakthrough for plaintiffs. The woeful national
experience with worker's compensation award levels suggest that such a schedule, once created,
might not be updated. These levels have declined drastically in relation to wages since 1940
because of failure to update the schedules. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 19 (1972). The problem with the low damage awards emanating from such a proposed schedule, which problem does not exist with individual assessments,
is the resulting consistent underdeterrence of psychic-injury-causing conduct.
The argument of one advocate of the British system, which has done away with juries in
most personal injury actions in order to achieve greater internal consistency in verdicts, is telling. "If we cannot say what a leg or arm is worth, we can at least say that a leg today is worth
the same as a leg tomorrow. . . ." P. ATIvAH, supra note 88, at 215. That statement suggests
both the desirability and danger of this type of consistency. A leg, like a dollar, brings different
pleasure to different people. A bank teller who spends most of his time outside work playing
video games or reading may be moved less from his previous level of satisfaction by the loss of
a leg, cf. McNulty v. Southern Pac. R.R., 96 Cal. App. 2d 841, 216 P.2d 532 (1950), than a ski
instructor who spends most of her nonwork hours in physical activity. In addition, a leg tomorrow probably is worth more than a leg today. This increased valuation is due not only to
inflation. As Atiyah admits, safety becomes relatively more important to a society as society
becomes wealthier. P. ATIYAH, supra note 88, at 534. Because jurors' estimates of an injury's
value are rooted in their present experiences, while judges' estimates are rooted in precedent
(which accounts for their consistency) the jury's damage award is more likely to reflect the
ongoing changes in society's valuation of injuries.
241. Pearson, supra note 14, at 502-03. Interestingly, Professor Pearson's analysis would
put the psychic injury bystander plaintiff in a Catch-22 situation. If his injury is very serious,
money will not compensate him. Id. at 501-03. If his injury is not serious, it is too trivial to be
worth the courts' attention. Id. at 506-08.
242. See supra note 234.
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other critics of the compensatory value of damage awards for intangible injuries fail to examine carefully what the damage award can do
for such a plaintiff.2 43 Had they done so, they would have found that
psychic injury damages can prevent the injury from becoming more
severe, help cure it, and help the plaintiff return much closer to his
pre-injury level of satisfaction with life than he could in the absence
of compensation.
The most important. compensatory aspect of monetary damages
for psychic injuries is the critical role they can play in reducing the
total injury which results from the accident. First, damages may enable and encourage plaintiffs to obtain professional psychological assistance soon after the onset of the traumatic injury. 44 The prospect
of a significant damage recovery will enable a person with psychic
injuries to afford professional counseling, from which he would otherwise be deterred by cost considerations. 2 4 The availability of a cause
of action for his psychic injuries also increases the chance the plaintiff will be brought into contact with a mental health professional,
because the plaintiff's lawyer is likely to refer him to one for evalua243. The term "can" is used to indicate the potential beneficial effects of a damage award
on the psychically injured plaintiff. Because damages usually are awarded in tort law without
any requirement that they be spent in a particular way, there is no certainty that the damages
will in fact be used in the beneficial manner they might be. That is, of course, true even for
damages for future medical expenses in physical injury cases. Should it make a difference to a
court how the plaintiff will in fact use his damage award, it could always arrange for special
verdicts and a judgment that provided payment solely for rehabilitation services or the like.
Insofar as a damage award serves the important goal of deterring conduct which risks psychic
injury, it will be of course less significant to the courts how the plaintiff uses that award.
244. The importance of such early professional intervention following a psychologically
traumatic accident was emphasized again recently by experiences in the wake of the collapse of
two skywalks in the Kansas City, Mo., Hyatt Regency Hotel in July, 1981, in which 113 people
were killed, 200 injured, and more than a thousand narrowly escaped injury. For three months
after the disaster, Kansas City mental health professionals provided around-the-clock outreach
services at mental health centers throughout the city. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1982, at C4, col. 3.
That early intervention was credited with having reduced the number of affected persons who
later required professional psychotherapy to one-fifth the number that would otherwise have
been expected to need such medical attention. Id. Statement of Director of the Kansas City
Association for Mental Health.
245. Affordability is more likely to be an obstacle to early professional intervention when
psychic injury has occurred than when physical injury has occurred. An injured person is more
likely to have insurance for physical injury than for psychic injury. See supra note 150. Even
without insurance, a person with any serious physical injury will probably seek aid from a medical doctor. Most of us are conditioned to do that as a normal behavior. On the other hand,
visiting a mental health professional is by no means so normal. An injured person will have to
make a decision on that visit very aware that it is his choice to do so, rather than being "the
thing to do." In such circumstances, financial cost is likely to be a determinative deterrent. A
plaintiff's willingness to seek professional assistance for psychic injury may increase markedly if
he learns that some financial compensation, including payment of his psychiatric bills, is likely
for his injury.
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tion of his injury, if not for treatment.2 4 6 The prospect of some payment for his injury will also enable the plaintiff to obtain help with
daily responsibilities, 2 4 7 the burden of which may be crushing for the
person whose initial psychic injury has already made coping with life
a more difficult than normal task. Interestingly, the prospect of damage liability for psychic injury may motivate defendants, and insurcrisis interers, to provide insured plaintiffs with specially2 designed
48
vention assistance in the early stages of injury.
Many of the same considerations are at work when one thinks
about what the plaintiff does with damages once they are awarded.
As an example, consider the plaintiff in Dillon.24 9 Although Mrs. Dillon is unable to buy a new child, she will be able to buy services
which help her cope with secondary reactions2 50 to the trauma. The
awarded damages may also facilitate critically important2 51 supportive efforts of family and friends, such as freeing a family member
from wage earning pressures, eliminating the barrier of transportation or accommodations costs, and making possible the time and the
environment most conducive to the provision of emotional support.
At the same time, the damages that make the plaintiff "wealthy" also
give her the means to control her environment more fully and assert
her will on society.252 In addition, a damage award may give the
246. Contrary to popular belief, lawyers may actually assist injured clients to obtain cures
for their injuries. See Peck, Fordyce & Black, supra note 162, at 273-74.
247. A person may be able to hire others to do household chores, take care of children,
assist in certain aspects of work, or the like.
248. Such programs could follow the example of one created by the Kemper Group of
insurance companies for its workers' compensation insureds. In the wake of substantial workers' compensation payouts to rape victims, Kemper created a program to deal with workers who
have been raped. Noting that the secondary psychological reactions to rape often do not begin
to surface until up to two months after the rape, Kemper created a program providing 24-houra-day service, with immediate referral of rape cases to rehabilitation specialists. Kemper Group,
Press Release, "Rape Rehabilitation," (June 2, 1982).
It is important to note that the program was initially motivated by the payments the insurer had to make to injured persons and that it was created to provide some immediate rehabilitative assistance (at least until the company determines the victim would not be entitled to
a workers' compensation award) despite the potential for an adversary relationship between the
company and the injured person in a later compensation claim.
249. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
250. For an attempt to categorize the primary and secondary psychological reactions to
trauma, see Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 76, at 1249-51.
251. See, e.g., Hudgens, Family Oriented Treatment of Chronic Pain, 5 J. MARITAL &
FAm. THERAPY 67 (1979). Hudgens reports on a two-year study of persons with chronic pain,
which is similar to psychic injury in many respects. The study concludes that the two key
factors in long-term recovery were (1) a supportive family structure; and (2) the individual's
learned assertiveness and control over his environment. For a discussion of the similarities and
differences between pain and suffering and psychic injury, see infra notes 280-90 and accompanying text.
252. These are also factors in recovery. See Hudgens, supra note 251; G. GLEsER, supra
note 97, at 147. Persons with substantial amounts of money may not exercise assertiveness and
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plaintiff a sense of being valued at a time when self-valuation is low,
as it often is with persons who suffer from continuing psychic
25 3
injury.
While these rehabilitative aspects of damage awards for psychic
injury are substantial, they do not comprise the sole compensatory
impact. For psychic injury, just as for pain and suffering and other
intangible injuries, damages provide both a solace and a substitute
for suffering. Solace comes in the form of a societal expression of
sympathy, through the court ordered payment of money.25 4 Such a
payment represents society's affirmation of the worth of the individual, and satisfies a sense of justice important in many cultures.2 55 The
substitute for suffering comes in the form of the pleasures which
money can buy. Because the goal of compensation is to restore the
plaintiff to the same relative position of satisfaction with life which
he held before being injured, money is given to help him become
more satisfied with his life.2 56 The plaintiff is invited to purchase
units of pleasure to offset the units of pain he has experienced. Such
compensation recognizes that there are many different satisfying
things, events, and people in life. Because one source of satisfaction,
perhaps the most important source, has been taken away does not
render it useless to seek satisfaction from some other source. A new
house, the ability to make substantial charitable contributions, adventurous travel - none of these will replace Mrs. Dillon's dead
child; yet, one or all of these may make her life more satisfying.
In the end, this is what compensation is all about, the effort to
restore a level of satisfaction, to replace units of pleasure which have
been suddenly taken 25 7 from the plaintiff through an accident caused
by a culpable defendant.. Where it happens that the lost units of
pleasure involved a loss of money, which is a means to attain pleasure, the law is quite content to feel the compensation goal pull
control in their environments, but they have the capability to do so. At the very least, they can
completely change their environments, by traveling to a more desirable location.
253. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 236, at 224; cf. G. GLESER, supra note 97, at 129.
254. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 88, at 538-39; Jaffe, supra note 236, at 224.
255. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1982, at A18, col. 1 (editorial commenting on $40,000
award for emotional distress to parents of Bonnie Garland, whose beating death five years earlier by the defendant, a popular Yale student, had been the subject of considerable publicity
and several books; the editorial compares that lawsuit, for justice, to the African custom of
awarding a cow and a heifer to the family of an accidental shooting victim). See also Peck,
Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV.
1335, 1371 n.79 (explaining the New Guinean custom of burying slain warriors with fingers cut
from little girls to give group recognition to the seriousness of death).
256. See, e.g., P. ATYAH, supra note 88, at 537-38; Pearson, supra note 14, at 502.
257. Calabresi sees the suddenness of the change in one's position because of accidental
injury as a major motivator of the feelings of compassion that underlie the wish to compensate.
G. CALABRESI, supra note 52, at 44-45.
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strongly. Compensation should not pull any less strongly when the
dimunition in satisfaction occurs because of psychic injury. When the
dimunition comes from that source, it simply means that we are less
certain about its dollar value and less certain about the extent to
which that dollar value replacement will restore the plaintiff to his
former satisfaction. That the law is not so certain that it is doing the
perfect compensation job is no reason to feel the desire to compensate less strongly than when circumstances permit greater confidence.
VI. JUSTICE CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to their other flaws, detailed in previous sections, the
existing rules governing recovery for psychic injury offend generally
accepted principles of justice, which would be better heeded by the
full recovery rule. The existing rules violate the principle of equality, 25 8 that likes should be treated alike, because treatment of psychic
injuries is inconsistent with that of injuries which are essentially the
same. The current rules also violate the principle of proportionality,
that one should pay according to his wrong and recover according to
his lOSS.

2 59

A. Consistency
The existing restrictive rules are unjust both in their appearance
of inconsistency and their real inconsistency. The appearance of inconsistency 26 0 comes in part from the law's apparent valuation of
chattels and other minor interests higher than interests in family relationships. For example, Louisiana allows a plaintiff to recover for
emotional distress caused by the loss of a pet cat negligently sent to
its death at an animal shelter. 6 " Where a mother suffers psychic injury from witnessing a car raised from her dead son's crushed body,
however, Louisiana law will not allow recovery from the culpable de258. This principle is a major component of our sense of what is just. See R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGrrs SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977).
259. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 31, at 33-36.
260. Apparent inconsistency may be significant even where that appearance can be shown
to be erroneous, i.e., where it can be shown that rules are in fact consistent. Apparent inconsistency may be significant where people's view of the law as just, i.e., consistent, is important and
the cost of explaining apparently inconsistent entitlement decisions outweighs whatever gain
society gets from having those differing decisions. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 40, at
1103-04. The ensuing discussion demonstrates that rules regarding psychic injury recovery are
egregiously facially inconsistent with rules permitting full recovery for pain and suffering, phys-

ical injury and psychic injury resulting from property damage. It would be very difficult, if not
impossible, to convince the public that the restrictive rules governing recovery for psychic injury are consistent with those rules.
261. See Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 367 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (Ct. App.), aff'd
on other grounds, 378 So. 2d 560 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
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fendant who caused the death.262 New York, in its heyday the fount
of most tort doctrine, dismisses the psychic injury claims of parents
whose children are born with severe birth defects caused by a doctor's negligence.263 Yet, if the parent's emotional trauma results from
receipt of a telegram mistakenly telling them that their child had
been injured, the New York courts would permit full recovery from
the negligent message sender.264
These are not isolated examples, but rather represent the mainstream of tort law. Hawaii and California courts have led the country
in willingness to entertain tort claims for psychic injury.26 5 Yet, the
Hawaii Supreme Court recently denied recovery to the estate of a
man so emotionally tramatized by his daughter's and granddaughter's negligently caused deaths that he suffered a fatal heart
attack.266 Paradoxically, the same court upheld recovery to a couple
and their three children for emotional distress, valued at a total of
$1,000, resulting from the death of their nine-year-old dog who suffered heat prostration when negligently kept in a hot van by defendants.26 7 The California Supreme Court, which in 1968 opened the
262. See, e.g., Miles v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 389 So. 2d 96 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 394
So. 2d 612 (La. 1980). There is no indication in the Miles opinion that the result would have
been different if the defendant had acted intentionally with respect to the son's death. The
general rules with respect to a third party's recovery for emotional distress require that the
defendant have intended, or at least have been reckless concerning the third party's distress
when intentionally injuring the primary victim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, §
46(2).
263. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
One gets an additional feeling for the haphazard nature of recovery for psychic injury from the
appellate decision reversed in part by the Court of Appeals in Vaccaro. The lower court's decision allowed the mother to recover for her emotional harm, but did not allow the father to
recover despite the court's conclusion that "[u]ndoubtedly the father is suffering mental distur-

bances and emotional distress similar to that of his wife." Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 72 A.D.2d
270, 278, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
264. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
New York might also permit the Vaccaros to recover if it had been their dog who was injured
by defendant's negligence. Cf. Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., 97 Misc. 2d 530, 415
N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (plaintiff awarded $700 damages for distress suffered when a
cat was negligently placed in casket intended to contain plaintiff's dog).
265. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
266. Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). The court
denied recovery because the decedent lived in California and thus was not close enough to the
scene of the fatal accident, Hawaii.
267. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981). As in
Kelley, the plaintiffs learned of their loved one via telephone. They, however, lived in Hawaii.
Campbell was not decided differently from Kelley because the court had become more hospitable to psychic injury claims between 1975 and 1981. Both relied heavily on a pioneering 1970
decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court, where the plaintiffs were permitted to recover for
mental distress resulting from danmage negligently caused to their home. Rodrigues v. State, 52
Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
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courtroom doors to bystander recovery 65 and in 1980 eliminated the
ensuing physical injury restriction on psychic injury recovery, 269 shut
the door to recovery for a father traumatized by watching the negligent delivery of his stillborn infant.270 A California appellate court
followed their lead in barring a psychic injury suit brought by parents who watched their son die minutes after being electrocuted due
to defendant's negligence.2 71 The California appellate courts, however, have no difficulty permitting recovery for psychological suffernegligent damaging of the plaintiff's
ing occasioned by defendant's 272
property rather than his child.

These illustrations introduce the discussion of tort law's inconsistent treatment of psychic injury by demonstrating that a significant
part of the law runs directly counter to the common intuitive sense of
justice. Closer analysis will show that this intuitive sense of injustice is supported by the actual inconsistent treatment of psychic injuries when such injuries become the focus of the court's attention. Actual inconsistency shows up in tort law's unwillingness to provide full
recovery for proximately caused physical injuries and the pain and
suffering which accompanies them. It also surfaces in the law's differential treatment of particular psychic injuries.
Permitting full recovery for physical injuries while denying it for
psychic injuries is inconsistent. The injuries are difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish in essential nature and critical characteristics.
The similarity in nature occurs because each contains a substantial
component of the other. As more becomes known about the biochemical bases of psychic harm and the psychological roots of physical
harm, the indivisibility of the two becomes clearer.27 4 Physical injury
268.
269.

Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831

(1980).
270. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
271. Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
272. See, e.g., Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980)
(tenant can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, without proof of physical injury, when defendant caused the rented premises to be in dilapidated and unsafe condition).
273. In order to satisfy the community sense of fairness, apparent inconsistency must be
explained both rationally and emotionally. See, e.g., G. CALABRsI, supra note 52, at 294. The
cost of such explanation in the context of the rules governing psychic injury will be high.
Rather than incur those costs, for whatever modest increased sense of fairness might come to
pass, society might well simply adopt rules which create the apparent consistency. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 40, at 1103-04.
274. For example, several studies emphasize the strong correlation between stress and
physical illness. See Seizer, Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease Causation,56
CORNELL L. REV. 951 (1971). All acute psychic injuries involve physical changes in glandular
secretions, in the cardivascular and circulatory systems, and in the gastrointestinal and urinary
tracts. See, e.g., Comment, Mental Distress in PsychologicalResearch, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 520,
525 (1969); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress,supra note 76, at 1259 n.128. Ap-
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is experienced through the mind; its significance lies in the reduction
of the psychic well-being it causes through pain or inconvenience.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the usual grounds for distinguishing the
two kinds of injury, susceptibility to fraud, uncertainty of valuation
and potential for unlimited liability, do not stand up as legitimate
bases for such a distinction.27 5
The most obvious inconsistency in tort law's treatment of physical
injury cases involves awards for pain and suffering, which comprise
one of the most significant items of recovery in such cases. Recovery
for that essentially psychic harm is available to any physically injured plaintiff. There is no requirement that the pain and suffering
produce physical consequences for a plaintiff to recover.2 7' The
courts award pain and suffering damages even where those damages
would not have occurred to a "normal" individual.2 77 Where an injury
is one which is normally accompanied by pain, the plaintiff need not
offer expert testimony to support his claim for pain damages 27 and,
in some instances where proof would be particularly difficult, need
not offer any proof at all.279
In these respects, pain and suffering receives more liberal treatment than psychic injury standing alone.2 s0 Yet the two are essentially the same. Pain and suffering includes not only physical pain,
but also fear, anxiety, worry about future health, embarrassment, humiliation, depression and, in some instances, loss of enjoyment of the
parently, persons suffering grief reactions, whether normal or abnormal, are much more susceptible to physical diseases, such as colds, allergies and perhaps even cancer. See Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L.
163, 209 n.103 (1976-77). Recent research at the National Institute of Mental Health and other
research centers has disclosed that anxiety has a biochemical basis. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1982,
at C1, col. 8.
275. See supra notes 77-80, 87-90, and 131-33.
276. Miller, supra note 31, at 5 n.31.
277. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 255, at 1386-88. In support of this point, the article notes
a case in which plaintiff was found to have suffered chronic pain for more than two years after
an automobile accident, in large measure because of a preexisting psychoneurotic depressive
reaction. The court rejected defendant's argument that it should not have to compensate the
plaintiff for the pain that was due to her preexisting idosyncratic mental condition. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1964).
278. See, e.g., Halberg v. Brasher, 679 F.2d 751, 757 (8th Cir. 1982); Capelouto v. Kaiser
Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 895, 500 P.2d 880, 884-85, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 860-61 (1972). Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 15 (Wyo. 1980).
279. See Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 895-96, 500 P.2d 880, 885, 103
Cal. Rptr. 856, 860-61 (1972).
280. Courts do not treat pain and suffering differently from the way they treat psychic
injury which results from physical injury. In fact, courts usually speak of such resultant psychic
injury as part of a plaintiff's pain and suffering. In actuality, pain and suffering is really a
psychic injury, although courts treat it differently when it does not result from some physical
injury.
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normal activities of life.28 l On its face this generally accepted definition suggests that the only significant difference between pain and
suffering and psychic injury is the component of physical pain. Extensive research of physical pain in the past two decades, however,
convincingly indicates there is no such difference. Like psychic in282
jury, pain can be caused by either physical or psychological stimuli.
In a clinical setting, persons begin to feel painful stimulation at
roughly the same point, but vary widely in the points beyond which
they will not permit additional painful stimulation. 28 3 This variation
is chiefly accounted for by psychological factors such as existing emotional tranquility, anxiety levels, learned patterns, cultural conditioning and one's interpretation of the injury's significance. 2 " As is the
case with much emotional or mental distress, anxiety plays a major
part in the perception of paih.28 5 For example, studies of patients
with frontal lobotomies reveal they rarely complain of severe pain or
request medication. The sensory component of pain remains, no pain
pathways are severed by a lobotomy, but the suffering and anguish
associated with pain has disappeared. The lobotomy has removed
only their anxiety. 288 The suffering that accompanies a particular
painful stimulus will thus depend in part on the nature of the stimulus, but largely on factors unique to the injured individual: anxiety
281. See Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-83, 500 P.2d 880, 883, 103
Cal. Rptr. 856, 859; Peck, supra note 255, at 1358-63; Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life Should It Be a Compensable Element of PersonalInjury Damages?, 11 WAXE FOREST L. REv.
459 (1975).
282. Pain can result from a physical stimulus which activates nerve fibers and sends signals through the nervous system to the brain, which perceives, interprets and responds to the
impulses. Melzack & Dennis, NeurophysiologicalFoundationsof Pain,in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
PAIN 1 (R. Sternback ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Melzack]. Pain can also result from emotional or developmental problems with which one cannot cope adequately. The resulting stress
is converted by the subconsious into pain symptoms. Such pain, which may have no organic or
physiological origin, is just as real to the individual as physically stimulated pain. Merskey,
Psychiatric Aspects of the Control of Painin I ADvANCES IN PAIN REsEARCH AND THEORY 711,
711-12 (J. Bonica & D. Albe-Fessard eds. 1976); T. SzAsz, PAIN AND PLEASURE xxiii-xxiv, 70-71
(2d ed. 1975).
283. In other words, individuals have similar pain thresholds, but markedly different pain
tolerances. P. FAiRLEY, THE CONQUEST OF PAIN, ITS NATURE, ANALYSIS AND TREATMENT 58 (1978);
M. BOND, PAIN: ITS NATURE ANALYSIS AND TREATMENT 26-27 (1979).
284. A. PETRIE, INDIvmuALrrY IN PAIN AND SUFFERING 1-7 (1967); Weisenberg, Pain and

Pain Control, 84 PSYCHOLOGIcAL BULL. 1008, 1021-23, 1032-35 (1977). Physical factors, such as
one's general physical condition may also influence how one experiences pain. Id.
285. Anxiety is frequently linked to acute pain. Chronic pain is more often associated
with depression, with patients' estimates of the severity of their pain being correlated to their
levels of depression. Sternback, PsychologicalFactorsin Pain,in I ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH
AND THERAPY 293, 293-94 (J. Bonica & D. Albe-Fessard eds. 1976).
286. Melzack, supra note 282, at 7-8; Koskoff, The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13
TRIAL 21, 23 (July 1977).
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level, coping abilities, support systems, attitudes and the like.287
The substantial similarity between the causes and subjective experience of psychic injury and pain likewise exists with respect to
aspects, such as their susceptibility to identification and measurement, which have been important to courts and commentators in assessing the appropriateness of damages for those injuries. 288 For both
pain and psychic injury, the acute phase is accompanied by physiological signals, changes in heart rate, respiration, etc. Chronic pain
and post-traumatic stress are generally identified through verbal
complaints and behavioral signs of the victim.28 9 Measurement of
both sorts of injury is difficult.2 90 Specialists can uncover information
about the nature of stimuli which bring about pain or mental distress
and whether similar stimuli usually cause such pain or distress. However, the subjective experience cannot be measured. In both cases, an
evaluator must rely on the victim's honesty and ability to verbally
communicate what he is experiencing. For both kinds of injury, there
is the possibility that litigation may affect the victim's subjective experience.291 Even a court which did not consider psychic injury as
important as physical injury would be unlikely to view it as less important than the equally subjective elements of pain. In fact, a survey
in England suggests that disabled persons regard their pain and suf287. For example, the same painful stimulus level may incapacitate some people and be
only a minor annoyance to others, even though both physically felt the pain at about the same
level of intensity. Persons who experience the same emotional trauma, such as seeing the death
of a child in an accident, will react with fear and alarm. Then their defenses will be called into
play to resist the impact of the trauma. Depending on their ego strength, problem solving ability, flexibility and social skills, they will be more or less successful at assimilating that impact
without moving to a pathological end state. See Jenkins, PsychosocialModifiers of Response to
Stress, 5 J. HUMAN STRESS 3, 4-5 (1979).
288. This discussion does not intend to deal with the merits of permitting damage awards
for pain and suffering. For an exposition of the view that pain and suffering should not be
compensated, see O'Connell, supra note 72, at 333. Nevertheless, all American jurisdictions
award damages for pain and suffering. Insofar as one concludes that damages should not be
awarded for pain and suffering, the inconsistency argument advanced in this subsection loses
much of its force. However, the principal arguments advanced for full recovery for psychic
injuries retain full force.
289. The behavioral signs symptomatic of physical pain may differ from those indicative
of psychic injury. The former more likely will be evidenced by cautious movements, taking
medication, seeking medical help, or even undergoing surgery. Psychic injury more likely will
show up through personality changes, withdrawal from the external world, nightmares, and
depression. Both are likely to manifest themselves in curtailed activity and sleeplessness.
290. See, e.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 181, 417 P.2d 673, 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129,
137 (1966), where the California Supreme Court said of a dispute over the use of a per diem
argument to a jury with respect to damages for plaintiff's pain and suffering: "Every case which
has considered the issue before us has emphasized the difficulty faced by a jury in attempting
to measure in monetary terms compensation for injuries as subjective as pain, humiliation and
embarrassment."
291. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
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fering as relatively unimportant compared to their lack of social contact, sense of isolation and inability to move around, 9 2 all basically
psychological troubles resulting from their accidents. Thus, even
when focusing on the pain aspect of pain and suffering, that category
of damages does not significantly differ from psychic injury.
The primary reasons advanced for treating pain and suffering differently from purely psychic injury are unconvincing. The first reason
is that pain and suffering is limited to one person per physical injury.
With psychic injury, however, many "bystanders" may suffer psychic
injury from another's physical injury, thus risking a crushing liability
burden not possible with pain and suffering damages. 293 In fact, it
seems far more likely that the burden of damages for pain and suffering would be noticeably heavier than damages for bystanders' psychic
injuries.29 4 Critics also argue that damages for pain and suffering are
permitted only because they pay for plaintiff's attorneys fees. Because those fees are already covered, it makes no sense to permit recovery for psychic injuries.2 9 5 Courts have not, however, articulated
any concern for payment of plaintiff's attorneys' fees as the rationale
underlying compensation for pain and suffering. Moreover, no attempt is made by judge or jury to correlate pain and suffering damages and attorney's fees in any particular case. Such awards continue
to be made in England,2 9 6 where a victorious plaintiff can obtain his
attorney's fees from the loser. To throw out awards for psychic injury
on the ground that attorneys' fees are already provided for by pain
and suffering damages would suggest a similar treatment for all intangible injuries, while ignoring the existence of the real injury costs
which society wants to reduce. 97
Although most prominent with respect to pain and suffering, the
292. P. ATIYAH,supra note 88, at 221.
293. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. Given their similar natures, there is
no reason why liability insurance should be any less available for psychic injury alone than for
pain and suffering. Also, the dollar value a jury would place on the pain and suffering accompanying a serious physical injury seems likely to be greater than the dollar values a jury would
assign to the accompanying psychic injuries of others, even when those injuries are added together. See, e.g., Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982) (parent's psychic injury
awards much less than physically injured child's award for physical injury which included pain
and suffering); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 361 (6th Cir. 1978).
295. See, e.g., G. CALABREsi, supra note 42, ch. V; D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES - EQurry - REsTrruTION 548-49 (1973).
296. See, e.g., H. McGREGOR, MAYNE AND MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES 668 (1961).
297. Were one to conclude, however, that the only justification for the award of pain and
suffering damages is the offset of attorneys' fees, the inconsistency argument with respect to
the law's treatment of psychic injury and pain and suffering would become weak. The apparent
inconsistency argument would remain, see supra note 260, as would the arguments for full recovery discussed in supra, § IV.
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inconsistent treatment of similar injuries does not end there. Tort
law is rife with circumstances in which psychic injury damages are
awarded without evidence of ensuing physical injury or where the direct target of the initial harm is someone or something other than the
plaintiff. Such recoveries are regularly seen in cases similar to pain
and suffering cases, where psychic injuries are parasitic to some other
injury done to the plaintiff. Whether the defendant interfered with
plaintiff's personal property, 98 real property, 99 or use and enjoyment
of his property,300 courts will permit recovery for plaintiff's psychic
injuries which flow from that interference. There are indications
plaintiffs can recover damages for any psychic injury parasitic to an
independent tort.30 ' Furthermore, that tort need not be inflicted directly on the plaintiff. Actions for loss of consortium, where another
person is the victim of the direct tortious invasion, are recognized
throughout the country.302 It may even be enough that the psychic
injury tags along with any interference with a legally protected interest, regardless of whether that interference alone would render the
defendant liable in tort."'3
298. See, e.g., Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066
(1981); Norris v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 416 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Chappetta v. Bowman Transp. Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (damage to plaintiff's car).
299. See, e.g., Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980)
(interference with conditions of rented premises); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d
509 (1970) (flood damage to home); Senn v. Bunick, 40 Or. App. 33, 594 P.2d 837 (1979) (trespass on plaintiff's land); Cactus Drilling Co. v. McGinty, 580 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(damage to land).
300. Courts award damages for psychic injury in nuisance cases. See, e.g., Dixon v. New
York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944); Edwards v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,
280 Or. 307, 570 P.2d 1169 (1977).
301. See, e.g., Bullard v. Central Vermont Ry., 565 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1977); Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 400 So. 2d
369, 373 (Ala. 1981).
302. Most jurisdictions permit both a husband and wife to recover for loss of consortium,
loss of society, love and companionship, as a result of injury to that spouse caused by the
defendant's culpable conduct. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-ChildRelationship:
Loss of an Injured Person'sSociety and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 596 (1976). Although
the action originated in the husband's right to the services of his wife and children, it has
evolved into an action the essence of which is psychic harm, the intangible injury one experiences when deprived of the love, companionship, and otherwise positive presence of a family
member. To recover damages for loss of consortium, the plaintiff need not prove any physical
impact nor physical harm resulting from the psychic injury he has suffered. Likewise, he need
not show presence at the accident scene or any of the other factors required by those courts,
except, of course, a close familial tie, which do allow limited recovery for psychic injury in
bystander cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, § 693(1) & comment f. The reason
bystander suits for psychic injury continue to be significant is that actions for loss of consortium have generally been limited to cases of spousal injuries. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
303. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967);
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This inconsistent recognition of psychic injury as a compensable
wrong also occurs in many nonparasitic settings. There is no requirement that a plaintiff whose privacy has been invaded or who has
been defamed show some physical manifestation of his injury to recover.30 4 In fact, until the United States Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,s s a plaintiff was generally allowed to recover for intangible, essentially psychic harin to his
reputation without offering proof of any damage whatsoever.3 0 6 Such
psychic harm has long been the core of several intentional torts, such
as assault, false imprisonment and, obviously, intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 3 0 7 Likewise, in the parallel workers' compensation
system, courts customarily approve awards for psychic harm where it
is not manifested in physical injury3 0 8 or is the result of some physiJarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975). See also
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 927, 616 P.2d 813, 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837
(1980) (California Supreme Court approvingly mentions Gruenberg,Crisci and Jarchow, characterizing them as situations where the plaintiff "asserts an independent cause of action apart
from personal injury."). However, the Molien court quoted that section of the Crisci opinion
which refers to "substantial invasions of clearly protected interests" as sufficing for liability for
accompanying psychic injuries. Id. It was that segment of Crisci which the Jarchow court focused on in concluding that the substantial damage to the plaintiff need not be compensable in
and of itself for emotional distress damages to be awarded as parasitic to it. See Jarchow, 48
Cal. App. 3d at 936-37, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
304. See, e.g., Martino v. Family Serv. Agency, 112 IM.App. 3d 593, 445 N.E.2d 6 (1982);
cf. Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 548 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (requiring physical injury for wife's claim of loss of husband's services to be actionable).
305. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
306. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 762. There are, of course, nonpsychic aspects
which accompany harm to reputation. See Posner, Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation, 28 BUFF.
L. REV. 1, 31 (1979). However, insofar as damage to reputation has a tangible element in cutting
off certain advantageous market transactions, it is subject to proof for special damages. Insofar
as plaintiff loses out in nonmarket transactions, such as friendships and other social relationships, his experience of harm is psychic in nature.
307. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 37-38, 42-43, 49-51; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra
note 10, § 21, § 35, § 46. As the explicit, albeit limited, recognition of a right to recover for
intentionally inflicted emotional distress suggests, courts are accustomed to awarding damages
for psychic harm alone when the defendant has intentionally interfered with a protected interest of the plaintiff. Why the courts would distinguish between psychic injury intentionally inflicted and that which is negligently inflicted is unclear. Given the tendency of the courts to
regard a defendant as more blameworthy when he intentionally injures a plaintiff, an educated
guess would point to courts' concern with liability being proportionate to fault. This influences
them to permit recovery for psychic injury intentionally inflicted when they would deny recovery if the harm were negligently caused. The next subsection questions the soundness of a
concern about disproportionate liability as a basis for limiting recovery for negligently inflicted
psychic injury. See infra text accompanying notes 310-28.
308. See, e.g., Deziel v. Difco Lab., 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978); Todd v. Goostree,
493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), aft'd, 528 S.W.2d 470 (1975) (severe anxiety neurosis
resulting from discovery of crushed body of co-worker fits statutory requirement of "violence"
to "physical structure" of claimant's body); Purver, Workers' Compensation:DisabilityResulting from Mental Stress, 25 P.O.F.2d 1, 10-19 (1981).
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cal injury to a related third person.30
In short, in a pervasive range of cases, tort law allows plaintiffs to
recover for psychic injury or its equivalent. This recovery is unaccompanied by any requirement that the plaintiffs clear the major hurdles
erected to recovery for purely psychic injury. Absent sound explanation, such inconsistency of treatment speaks as clearly of injustice as
the examples at the outset of this section suggest.
B. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality suggests that liability rules are
just where defendants pay damages in proportion to their wrongs and
plaintiffs recover damages in proportion to their losses. The large discrepancy between allowable recovery for psychic injury and plaintiffs'
actual losses indicates that the existing restrictive rules violate the
proportionality principle. Proportionality is more often invoked in
psychic injury cases to deny a plaintiff recovery, however, on the theory that the defendant's liability would be disproportionate to his
fault.3 10 For most culpably caused psychic injuries, the latter view
errs because it is based on an inappropriate sense of fault in tort law.
Even in the few "eggshell" personality cases where psychic injury liability seems at first blush disproportionate to the defendant's fault,
the availability of liability insurance decreases the likelihood of a dis309. See, e.g., In re Fitzgibbons' Case, 374 Mass. 633, 373 N.E.2d 1174 (1978) (claimant's
psychotic depression and suicide resulted from death of employee while doing job assigned by
claimant); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr, Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d
637 (1975) (depression caused by discovery of boss after his suicide). These cases refer to workers' compensation systems rules. They recognize that such systems differ from the general tort
compensation system in several repects. These differences, such as limits on liability and job
disability, are significant for arguments about the merits of awards for psychic injury. The willing recognition of psychic injury by workers' compensation systems implies that one significant
branch of compensation law in this country rejects some of the arguments that are advanced to
bar full recognition of psychic injury in the courts.
310. The idea seems firmly entrenched that holding a defendant liable for psychic injury
when he has been "merely" negligent would result in an imposition of liability disproportionate
to his fault. In stating its bar against recovery for psychic injury in the absence of ensuing
physical harm, the Restatement of Torts lists, as one of the three reasons underpinning the
rule, that defendant's "fault is not so great that he should be required to make good a purely
mental disturbance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10, § 436A, comment b. Cases since at
least the 1930's and continuing to the present have restricted recovery because of disproportionality concerns. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 936, 616 P.2d 813,
825, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 843 (1980) (dissent); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 750-51, 441 P.2d
912, 927, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 87 (1968) (dissent); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 402, 520 P.2d
758, 761 (1974); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, -,
437 N.E.2d 171, 176, 192-93
(1982) (both majority and dissent); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, -,
258 N.W. 497,
501 (1935). Similarly, Richard Miller's recent intelligent article on the scope of liability for
psychic injury argued that "disproportionality is the key to the problem of extending the scope
of liability for mental disturbance." See Miller, supra note 31, at 33-37.
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proportionately heavy burden on a defendant. Moreover, the need for
accurate deterrence of risky conduct explains why some disproportionality may be appropriate and not unjust.
The entrenched view that permitting full recovery for psychic injury would result in disproportionate liability3 1 1 seems based on a
mistaken view of fault in tort law.3 12 Courts shy away from holding a
defendant liable for substantial psychic injury damages when he has
been "only negligent." 31 3 In so doing, the courts ignore not only the
disproportionality of awarding a plaintiff nothing for a serious injury,
but also the fact that fault in tort law does not equate with moral
blameworthiness. Fault may include elements of moral blameworthiness, but its essence is the failure of a defendant to live up to a certain minimal standard of behavior, that of the reasonable person
under all the circumstances.31 4 The extent of a negligent defendant's
fault depends on the extent of his unreasonableness. In Judge
Learned Hand's classic formula, unreasonableness exists where the
defendant's burden of precaution is less than the probability his be31 5
havior will cause an injury multiplied by the gravity of the injury.
One of the key factors in any determination of fault, therefore, is the
nature of the injury which may result from the defendant's risky conduct. If psychic injury is foreseeable from such conduct, then the
chance that it will occur is a major component in assessing defendant's fault.316 Generally, the greater the foreseeable psychic injury,
the greater the defendant's fault.31 7 To hold the defendant liable for
311. See supra note 310.
312. The basis for the entrenched view is unclear because courts and commentators rarely
go beyond a statement that an award of psychic injury damages would be disproportionate to
437 N.E.2d 171, 176
defendant's fault. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, -,
(1982); Portee v. Jaffe, 84 N.J. 88, 99, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980).
437 N.E.2d 171, 176 (1982).
313. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, ,
314. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108-10 (1881). For a view that liability for
negligence expresses a moral outrage at the inefficient use of resources, see R. PosNER,supra
note 67, at 8-9.
315. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoN), supra note 10, at § 291.
[T]he owner's duty ... to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury
if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion
into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury L; and
the burden B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multipled by P; i.e.,
whether B is less than PL.
159 F.2d at 173.
316. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)
").
(Cardozo, J.) ("The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed..
317. In any particular instance of greater foreseeable psychic injury, of course, the defendant's fault may be tempered by a lower probability of the injury occurring or a higher burden
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foreseeable psychic injury is to hold him liable for the consequences
of the risk which made his conduct faulty (negligent) in the first
place. After the law tells a defendant "you are behaving improperly
because you are creating an unreasonable risk that X amount of
psychic injury will result," he should generate no sympathy when
held liable for that amount of psychic injury when it occurs as a result of his negligence. In sum, the full recovery rule, insofar as it
holds a defendant liable for psychic injury foreseeably caused by his
culpable conduct, mandates liability which is directly proportional to
the defendant's wrongdoing.
The possibility of disproportionate liability for psychic injury realistically occurs only with respect to persons with eggshell skulls or
personalities. If held liable for injuries resulting from extraordinary
psychic or physical fragility,3 1 a defendant will pay for injuries he
could not reasonably foresee as a result of his risky conduct. Therefore, even if he was at fault in causing the injury,3 19 his fault was less
than the damages he will have to pay. Even in such cases, however,
concerns about disproportionality should not move the courts to stop
short of the full recovery rule. The potential injustice of holding the
defendant liable is less than it seems. First, the widespread availability of liability insurance means that most defendants who injure eggshell personalities will not have to personally pay unforeseeable damages. In fact, because a potential defendant's insurance premiums
will reflect the expected accident costs associated with his activities, 3 ° most defendants will be paying an amount
to cover liability
for psychic injury which is roughly equivalent 3 2 to the risks they are

of avoiding the expected loss (P x L). There is disproportionality in a sense even when the
defendant is held liable for the precise injury risked by his unreasonable conduct. If, by that
action, defendant creates, say, a 1 in 5 chance of a grave ($100,000) injury, the expected cost of
his conduct, the cost which is used to determine its unreasonableness is $20,000. See R. POSNER,
supra note 67, at 2. If the injury occurs, defendant will be liable for the full $100,000. He is
thus liable for a cost five times as great as the expected cost which determined his fault in the
first place. Of course, if this is the kind of disproportionality with which the courts and commentators are concerned, they would have to brand the entire law of negligence as unjust.
318. Extraordinary physical fragility may result in unforeseeable psychic injury in a
roundabout way. If a defendant negligently harms a person who has a eggshell skull, that person will suffer unexpectedly grievous injury. In turn, the family of the physically fragile victim,
and others who love him, may suffer serious psychic injuries, which would not have been expected to occur if the victim had been of normal constitution. See Miller, supra note 31, at 35.
319. A defendant will not be held liable for an eggshell personality's extraordinary
psychic injuries unless he was negligent with respect to the psychic injury which would have
occurred to a normally constituted individual. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 10,
§ 313, comment c; W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 332-33.
320. Those expected costs, being based on past accident experience, will include the costs
of the few extraordinary eggshell cases which will result from the activities of the defendant
and actors like him, who are lumped together for insurance ratemaking purposes.
321. The insurance premium will be determined by the insurer's best cheap estimate of
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causing. As noted above,32 2 because the extent of the risks one creates
is a prime determinant of his fault in tort law, he will pay in direct
proportion to his fault. Those persons who do not avail themselves of
liability insurance are gambling that their own predictions of their
future accident costs are more accurate than those of insurance companies. If they lose their gamble and find themselves liable for extraordinary eggshell personality damages, they have little claim that
they are being treated unjustly. Second, even if the defendant was
only slightly at fault, absolving him of liability for extraordinary
psychic injury means the plaintiff, who was entirely without fault,
will have to bear the full burden of the injury. In other words, some
disproportionality inherent in the damages awards to the psychically
frail should be accepted in order to avoid the greater disproportionality inherent in denying all such awards.3 23
In addition, disproportionality caused by psychic injury awards to
unusually fragile persons is necessary to accurately deter future risky
conduct. Absent such liability, 2 4 defendants would continue their
conduct, underdeterred from causing psychic injury. 26 Although unexpected, physical or psychic injuries to unusually fragile plaintiffs
are costs which have occurred because of defendant's unreasonable
activity. Failing to hold defendants liable will lead them to disregard
those costs in considering a level of activities which may in fact increase a risk of eggshell injuries. Thus, defendants will engage in conduct in which the social benefits are less than the social costs, mea326
sured in terms of the injuries which will result over time.
what accident costs will result from the insured's covered activities.
322. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 257. "If the result is all out of proportion to
the defendant's fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff's entire innocence."
324. Professor Miller's main argument as to why disproportionality mandates liability
limits on bystander psychic injury recovery is tied to eggshell skull cases. When such bystander
injuries were due to a serious physical injury to another which was serious because of the victim's thin skull, then, according to Miller, liability for the psychic injuries would "grossly
overdeter" useful, often nonblameworthy, enterprises. See Miller, supra note 31, at 35.
325. For a discussion of why the defendant's culpable conduct is properly seen as a cause
of even the ultra-fragile plaintiff's psychic injury, see supra notes 94-113 and accompanying
text.
326. As an example, assume that Pat is a member of a motorcycle gang, Heav'n's Devils,
which makes it a point to ride together noisily and with macho bravado into small towns on
weekends. Because the Devils are a large and popular gang, no more than 25% of their membership ride together at any one time in any one place. Due to their manner, the gang members
from time to time will accidentally bump into pedestrians with their bikes, causing minor injuries and occasional damage claims, which are dutifully paid by the insurer of the biker whose
risky riding caused the injury in question. Because the Devils are a discrete, highly visible
group of bikers, the liability insurance component of the rates they pay for motorcycle insurance reflects the injury costs for which they become liable. Accordingly, those insurance rates
are noticeably higher than those for motorcyclists generally. Pat is willing to pay that higher
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As the above analysis indicates, holding defendants liable for
psychic injury which directly results from their negligence,327 even
where the victim may have an eggshell skull or personality, will not
result in liability disproportionate to the defendant's fault. Even
where such disproportionality might result, that liability is necessary
to assure that defendants are accurately deterred from risky
conduct.2
VII. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Supreme Court in Paugh v. Hanks329 has apparently
moved substantially toward adoption of the full recovery rule for
psychic injury. If other jurisdictions begin to follow suit, tort law will
at long last take what steps it can to efficiently minimize harm to its
citizens' psychic well-being. No longer will basic entitlements be violated with impunity or callous challenges to toughen your hides dominate the law's dialogue with the psychically maimed. The Ohio court
has shown its sister jurisdictions the open door to a tort doctrine
which will be coolly efficient in reducing accident costs while bringing
a broadly humanizing influence to bear on social interaction. Ohio's
sisters should step through.

amount for the benefits she receives from belonging to the gang. If, among the persons who are
bumped or otherwise negligently injured each year by the Devils' group biking, there are one or
two unusually fragile individuals who suffer serious physical or psychic injury, the gang member
who caused that injury would not be liable if there were not an eggshell skull or eggshell personality liability rule. If the gang members are not liable for such serious injury, the gang's
insurance rates will not go up in response to the injury. Pat will be looking at the same yearly
motorcycle insurance bill she would see if no such serious injuries had occurred. When she
looks at her checkbook and ponders whether membership in the gang is worth the extra cost,
Pat will not be taking into account the real costs that such membership in the Devils entails. In
turn, the gang, which does not lose members because of notable insurance rate hikes that would
occur if members were liable for the eggshell skull injuries, has no more incentive to modify its
risky riding behavior than if it caused only the minor injuries for which it is otherwise liable. In
short, if the gang were held liable for both the abnormal and normal injuries which they cause,
the members would be given a greater incentive to cease the injurious activity or to alter it to
make it less risky. That incentive, in the form of lower insurance rates, would be exactly proportional to the expected costs which go along with their risky behavior. Not making the gang
liable for the injuries to the ultra-fragile plaintiff would result in insurance rates which underdeterred the gang members, because they would be making decisions about whether and
how to engage in certain activities while only being forced, through their insurance rates to
consider expected accident costs which were lower than the actual expected costs.
327. In the case where the injury results from activity for which the defendant is held
strictly liable, tort law has already clearly stated that it is not concerned with the issue whether
defendant's liability may be disproportionate to his fault.
328. I am indebted for whatever understanding I have of the proper deterrent role played
by the eggshell skull rule to Judge Posner's lucid explanation in R. POSNER, supra note 67, at
26-27.
329. 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983).
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